ARCHETYPE COMPONENT IN THE ELECTORAL CYCLE OF UKRAINE IN 2019

Abstract. The research objective of the publication is to analyse the results of the 2019 election cycle in Ukraine (presidential and early parliamentary elections) through the lens of K. Jung’s socio-cultural archetypes. It was necessary to determine the reasons for the victory of the candidate Zelenskyi, who had no political and managerial experience over competitors who had been active in politics and governance for a long period.

It is proved that the result of the election cycle was the socio-economic and institutional crisis in which Ukrainian society found them. Another reason was the decline in the legitimacy of political and administrative institutions, caused by the inability to carry out successful reforms.

The models of the positioning of the main competitors during the election campaign are analysed. It is shown that Poroshenko’s unprecedented loss is due to the fact that society has not adopted a national-conservative ideology.
Voters under the influence of socio-cultural archetypes chose a candidate who was not affiliated with the political class, attributing to him qualities that he did not have. The ‘unsystematic’ candidate won the electoral race because society was in a state of disintegration of institutions and low legitimacy of the authorities.

It is shown that the 2019 election cycle symbolizes the end of the post-Soviet period in the history of Ukraine and the beginning of the destruction of the administrative-oligarchic model. The political and economic groups that have come to power have adopted the doctrine of ‘market fundamentalism’ (or libertarianism). It is predicted that in the future the implementation of this doctrine will be accompanied by the consolidation of the raw material model of the economy, export of labour and the destruction of social obligations of the state.

It is concluded that the use of socio-cultural archetype methodology provides the key to understanding the unprecedented results of the 2019 election process in Ukraine.

Keywords: socio-cultural archetypes, presidential elections in Ukraine in 2019, parliamentary elections in Ukraine in 2019, socio-economic crisis, institutional crisis.

АРХЕТИПНА СКЛАДОВА В ЕЛЕКТОРальному ЦИКЛІ УКРАЇНИ У 2019 РОЦІ

Анотація. Дослідницьке завдання публікації полягає в аналізі результатів виборчого циклу в Україні у 2019 р. (президентські і дострокові парламентські вибори) через призму соціокультурних архетипів К. Юнга. Необхідно було визначити причини перемоги кандидата Зеленського, який не мав політичного та управлінського досвіду над конкурентами, які тривалий період функціонували у сфері політики і управління.

Доведено, що причиною результатів виборчого циклу стало соціально-економічна та інституційна криза, в якій опинилося українське суспільство. Наступною причиною стало падіння легітимності політичних та управлінських інститутів, викликане нездатністю до проведення успішних реформ.

Аналізуються моделі позиціонування основних конкурентів під час виборчої кампанії. Показано, що безпредецентний програш Порошенка спричинений тим, що суспільство не прийняло націонал-консервативну ідеологію. Виборці під впливом соціокультурних архетипів вибрали кандидата, який не був пов’язаний з політичним класом, приписуючи йому властивості, які не прийнято в Україні. "Несистемний" кандидат став переможцем у виборчих перегонах тому, що суспільство перебувало в стані дезінтеграції інститутів і низької легітимності органів влади.

Показано, що виборчий цикл 2019 р. символізує закінчення пострадянського періоду в історії України і початок деструкції адміністративно-олігархічної моделі. Політико-економічні групи, які прийшли до влади, взяли на озброєння доктрину “ринкового фундаменталізму” (або лібертаріанство). Робиться прогноз, що у перспективі реалізація цієї доктрини супроводжується...
ватиметься закріпленням сировинної моделі економіки, експортом робочої сили і руйнуванням соціальних зобов'язань держави.

Робиться висновок, що використання методології соціокультурних архетипів дає ключ до розуміння безпрецедентних результатів виборчого процесу в Україні в 2019 р.

Ключові слова: соціокультурні архетипи, президентські вибори в Україні у 2019 р., парламентські вибори в Україні в 2019 р., соціально-економічна криза, інституційна криза.

**АРХЕТИПИЧЕСКАЯ СОСТАВЛЯЮЩАЯ В ЭЛЕКТОРАЛЬНОМ ЦИКЛЕ УКРАИНЫ В 2019 ГОДУ**

**Аннотация.** Исследовательское задание публикации состоит в анализе результатов избирательного цикла в Украине в 2019 г. (президентские и досрочные парламентские выборы) через призму социокультурных архетипов К. Юнга. Необходимо было определить причины победы кандидата Зеленского, который не имел политического и управленческого опыта над конкурентами, которые длительный период функционировали в сфере политики и управления.

Доказано, что причиной результатов избирательного цикла является социально-экономический и институциональный кризис, в котором оказалось украинское общество. Следующей причиной стало падение легитимности политических и управленческих институтов, вызванное неспособностью к проведению успешных реформ.

Анализируются модели позиционирования основных конкурентов во время избирательной кампании. Показано, что беспрецедентный проигрыш Порошенко вызван тем, что украинское общество не приняло национал-консервативную идеологию. Избиратели под воздействием социокультурных архетипов выбрали кандидата, который не был связан с политическим классом, приписывая ему свойства, которых у него не было. “Несистемный” кандидат стал победителем в избирательной гонке потому, что само общество находилось в состоянии дезинтеграции институтов и низкой легитимности органов власти.

Показано, что избирательный цикл 2019 г. символизирует окончание постсоветского периода в истории Украины и начало деструкции административно-олигархической модели. Пришедшие к власти политико-экономические группы взяли на вооружение доктрину “рыночного фундаментализма” (или либертарианства). Делается прогноз, что в ближайшей перспективе реализация этой доктрины будет сопровождаться закреплением сырьевой модели экономики, экспортом рабочей силы и разрушением социальных обязательств государства.

Делается вывод, что использование методологии социокультурных архетипов дает ключ к пониманию беспрецедентных результатов избирательного процесса в Украине в 2019 г.

Ключевые слова: социокультурные архетипы, президентские выборы в Украине в 2019 г., парламентские выборы в Украине в 2019 г., социально-экономический кризис, институциональный кризис.
**Problem statement.** The results of the 2019 election cycle in Ukraine (presidential and early parliamentary elections), when the ‘non-systematic’ candidate Zelenskyi confidently defeated competitors who had considerable political and managerial experience for a long time to attract the attention of researchers. As a result of this election, the political configuration was completely changed when the Servant of the People presidential party, which was created specifically for ‘elections’, won a majority of seats in parliament.

This situation has attracted the attention of the world media, who are lost in speculation about the causes of the collapse of the ‘old’ political forces in Ukraine. Observers noted that the election of the new president was largely innovative and, at the same time, meaningless, it was conducted mainly on social networks while avoiding direct political debate. Most observers indicated that millions of voters sympathized with the candidate who presented them with the image of a ‘simple guy’ from the Servant of the People TV series. However, these estimates only recorded the outside of the situation, without touching on the political, economic and social causes of the collapse of the political system that has developed over the decades. It is obvious that a systematic study of these social and political transformations is an extremely urgent matter, given the need to identify further ways of development of Ukrainian society.

**The purpose of the article** is an analysis of the results of the election cycle in Ukraine in 2019 through the lens of socio-cultural archetypes. It was necessary to determine the reasons for the victory of the candidate Zelenskyi, who had no political and managerial experience over competitors who had been active in politics and governance for a long period. In particular, to analyse the positioning patterns of the main competitors during these election campaigns. It was also a task to prove that the 2019 election cycle symbolizes the end of the post-Soviet period in Ukrainian history and the beginning of the destruction of the administrative-oligarchic model that has emerged over the last decades.

**Analysis of recent research** dedicated to the 2019 election cycle, in particular, Ye. Holovakha [1], V. Hurbulin [2] and A. Yermolaiev [3] shows that the socio-cultural causes of social transformations are clearly not given sufficient attention. These and other authors mainly focus on the analysis of purely political and electoral factors. At the same time, through the use of the methodology of cultural archetypes, it becomes possible to more systematically explore the cultural and macro-social tendencies that led to the victory of the neophyte candidate over the administrative-oligarchic system, which at that time was embodied by Poroshenko and other candidates from the ‘old’ politics.

**Presentation of the main material.**

*The archetype of the Clown and the King in political discourse*

The key to understanding the vicissitudes of the 2019 election cycle may be the archetypes of the Clown and the King. K. Jung notes that ‘the motive of the stuntman is manifested not only in mythical form but also inherent in the modern man, who does not sus-
pect anything when he feels like a toy in the hands of a ‘case’, which paralyzes his will and actions with an openly evil intention. Any cultural person looking for excellence somewhere in the past should be surprised to meet a trickster figure. The so-called civilized man forgot the trickster. He only mentions the figurative and metaphorical meaning of his image when irritated by his own helplessness, he talks about the fate of playing evil jokes with him’ [4].

In the socio-cultural tradition of the King (monarch, political leader, leader, top-manager, and commander) are fixed the desire for power, leadership, and political demagogy. The clown (aka trickster, clown, comedian, humourist, joker, jack-pudding) is associated with the King in such a way that, in the guise of a joke (irony, anecdote, variety speech, literary sketching, etc.), he does not speak in official political discourse. At the same time, the Jester does not play the role of an oppositionist. He, using his position, simulates rebellion. Therefore, both the King himself and the real political opposition are loyal to the Clown. Thus, the actions of the Clown perform the functions of political communication, when in a playful form an assessment of the actions of both the King and his opponents.

The advantage of the Clown over any politician is that his jokes do not require additional interpretation for the mass audience. They are clear to all, cause laughter, which is an unmistakable feature of approval. Therefore, the Clown is ‘his’ for various social groups. Another obvious advantage of the Clown is that he cannot be ridiculed.

The Clown can act as a virtual discreditor for political process participants. The character who became the subject of ridicule of the Clown invariably loses legitimacy. Dictators, as well as Democrat politicians, are well aware that laughing at them is the first step to delegitimization. At the same time, the Clown does not take part in the overthrow of the idol of power, because the joke (anecdote, satire) has no political alternative. Therefore, the Clown cannot claim the role of a collective King.

The archetype of the Clown and the King provides a socio-cultural code for understanding the 2019 election drama, when Zelenskyi, a well-known successful comedian who has never been in the system of government and politics, was able to convincingly defeat the collective King, then the President Poroshenko, and all the other candidates who had extensive experience in government and political work. And later, virtual haste for the early elections made the Servant of the People party of Zelenskyi, which included many random people, also convincingly won the parliamentary elections of all competitors.

In the 2019 election drama, the logic of the genre should not have happened to the Clown; he himself took the place of the King, squeezing numerous competitors. Some experts interpret this transformation as a result of manipulation by screenwriters and actors. Others call it ‘electoral independence’. We argue that this was not a consequence of manipulation, but a reaction of the population to the institutional and ideological crisis of society.

The example of Ukraine shows that the Clown painfully occupies the place of the King when social mechanisms fail. He is elected by voters because
other candidates in the King appear insincere and dangerous. And as stated above, the Clown enjoys a high level of trust. For a mass voter who does not trust the ‘official’ politicians, the person of the Clown is a means of fighting against corrupt and deceitful power, unable to represent the interests of ‘ordinary people’. In this respect, jokes (sometimes on the verge of an image) addressed to the current politicians and the entire system of government in the Servant of the People TV series and the Quarter 95 show were in tune with the sentiments of large social groups.

The socio-economic context of the entry on the Trickster political scene

The 2019 election cycle saw Ukraine in the worsening economic crisis, wars in the east of the country and discontent with the ruling elite. Despite the fact that the country’s economy ended in 2018 with slight GDP growth of 3.3 %, it did not close the decline in 2014 by 6.6 % and in 2015 by 9.8 %. The experts pointed to alarming tendencies in the quality of this economic growth, which was mainly achieved through the export of raw materials and trade. The industry did not show a convincing growth tendency, on the contrary, de-industrialization was gaining ground in the country. The foreign trade deficit also showed a significant deficit. Thus, the negative balance of foreign trade in goods in 2018 amounted to $ 9.8 billion, in particular, with the EU countries — $ 3 billion. [5] The downturn in the economy was indicated, in particular, by a fall in Ukrainian exports of goods, which in the year 2018 was down 25.3 % from $ 63.3 billion in 2013 to $ 47 in comparison with ‘domidan’, $ 3 billion in 2018. The commodity structure of exports was mainly raw material, consisting mainly of agricultural raw materials, ore and of ferrous metallurgy of low level of processing.

These economic tendencies contributed to the decline in the well-being of citizens. According to the IMF, in 2018 Ukraine is the poorest country in Europe with a GDP per capita of $ 2.96 thousand. As of December 2018, wage arrears reached their historic high UAH 2.8 billion. [6]. Labour migration is gaining ground in the country: according to the World Bank, in 2018, workers have transferred about $ 14 billion to Ukraine. For comparison, foreign direct investment in Ukraine in 2018 amounted to about $ 2.8 billion. According to expert data, about 3.2 million Ukrainians worked abroad on a permanent basis, with seasonal jobs ranging from 7 to 9 million.

A real nightmare for citizens was the rapid increase in tariffs for utilities. Thus, from 2014 to 2018, natural gas tariffs for the population increased by 1080 %, hot water supply by 560 %, heating by 1240 %, and electricity by more than 221 %. In the conditions of progressive poverty, the increase in utility tariffs has led to the population simply not being able to pay them. As a result, in the pre-election year 2018, Ukrainians paid only 80.6 % of the amount charged for utilities. At the end of December 2018, public debt on housing and utilities services amounted to UAH 55.6 billion. [7].

The so-called ‘external governance’, when international financial institutions dictated the main directions of social and economic policy, and ‘friendly’ states defined personnel policy. An elo-
sequent illustration of this was the story surrounding the intervention of US Vice President Biden on the appointment of Attorney General of Ukraine.

These crisis tendencies have contributed to the growing negative attitude of citizens to the authorities. According to the Rating Group, in December 2018, 70% of the population were of the opinion that things were going wrong in the country. 57% of respondents said that their family’s financial situation had deteriorated during 2018. 62% said rising prices were one of the three most important problems for them. 77% indicated that they did not approve of the activities of the then President Poroshenko, 88% indicated that they were dissatisfied with the work of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine [8]. The fall of the legitimacy of the authorities at the moment of the beginning of the election cycle reached such a level that the politicians associated with it actually acted in a hostile environment.

To these economic and social destructions should be added the ideological consequences of the failure of the proclaimed reform policy. The events of 2013–2014, which led to the fall of the then President Yanukovych, were held, in particular, under the slogans of ensuring the European integration of Ukraine and the need for radical reforms. In response to these public opinion queries, the ruling political class had adopted several reform programs during 2014–2015. It was the Presidential Strategy for Sustainable Development ‘Ukraine 2020’, which identified 10 areas of major reform [9]. European Ukraine Coalition Agreement provided for the implementation of reforms in 17 directions [10]. To implement these programmatic documents, the Legislative Support Plan for Ukraine was approved, which envisaged the preparation of 488 bills [11]. In order to coordinate the implementation of the reform policy, a National Reform Council was established [12].

However, this ‘reformist gigantism’ has largely been a pretext for political class self-promotion. The promised reforms have either not begun at all, or their implementation has been ‘sunk’ in fruitless discussions. The political class got the most out of presenting itself as ‘reformers’, but no real institutional ‘European’ reforms were carried out. In the public consciousness, the frustration with unjustified hopes for quick results from the signing of the Association Agreement between Ukraine with the EU increased.

Having come to power in an atmosphere of revolutionary enthusiasm for Euromaidan, the ruling factions were essentially repeating the political behaviour patterns of the previous Yanukovych regime. Namely, no real anti-corruption policy was carried out, nepotism flourished, material stratification increased. Added to this, the campaign of ‘universal Ukrainization’ aimed at displacing the Russian language from the public sphere, rewriting history and instilling a nationalist conservative ideology began. This, of course, contributed to the increase of negativity in the population of the South and East to the State Humanitarian Policy. As a result, the reform trend ended and never started. Poroshenko entered the election campaign as a carrier of nationally conservative ideological units.
The devastating social and economic processes have shaped society’s demand for a ‘non-systemic’ politician, that is, a person who would not be affiliated with the ruling political elite.

Models of the positioning of the main competitors

Zelenskyi perfectly met the expectations of society. His lack of political experience, as well as his high level of popularity thanks to the television series and the 95 Quarter show, which aired on the rating TV channels, gave him an increase in electoral popularity. The stage image of ‘one of the boys’, formed under the influence of satire on incumbent politicians, has been understood by millions of potential voters.

It should be noted that the election campaign was the most successful. During the electoral race, Zelenskyi himself and his team members kept quiet. The voters were not presented with any programming document or public statement, which could give an idea of what the candidate plans to do with the country in case of victory. There were isolated posts on social networks, a few insignificant interviews, and promotional material. As a result, it turned out that millions of voters attributed to Zelenskyi those qualities he would like to see in him. This can be called a situation of ‘self-forgery’. In this regard, Zelenskyi himself successfully defines his position in the public debate, stating that he is ‘not a competitor but a verdict of Poroshenko’.

Against this background, its main competitor Poroshenko developed an active outreach, promoting national conservative ideological settings, trying to portray himself as a Russophobe and an orthodox Ukrainian nationalist. His team used the so-called traditional methods of Ukrainian politics as ‘segmentation of the electorate’ when, in order to mobilize ‘their’ supporters, an image of the enemy from social groups who refused to vote was created. In particular, this was achieved through the use of so-called ‘hate speech’ in controlled media, as well as ‘dirty’ technological techniques. At the same time, the population did not receive clear answers from candidate Poroshenko regarding further ways of solving urgent socio-economic problems. On the whole, the image of a belligerent orthodox nationalist turned out to be unacceptable to the majority of voters.

Zelenskyi avoided commenting on themes that divide society. Poroshenko, on the contrary, used them without restrictions, contributing to the injection of hysteria. Poroshenko’s election campaign was no longer a ‘European reformer’ (due to the lack of real results of the proclaimed reforms), but a preacher of radical ethnonationalism. However, the destructive style of the election campaign did not produce the desired results. Against Poroshenko’s candidacy, the electorate of the southern and eastern regions was consolidated, and a moderate voter in the western regions chose other candidates.

The propaganda thesis that Zelenskyi was not ready to perform the functions of the head of state was widely used but was not received by public opinion, first of all, due to the poor results of Poroshenko’s work and the system of government he formed. The population saw with their own eyes that Poroshenko himself with his political ‘experience’ is not able to show positive results.
It should be noted that, unfortunately, on the whole, the presidential and parliamentary election campaigns were characterized by an anti-intellectual trend. The attempts of the candidates for the presidency to initiate public dialogue on the concept and mechanisms of reforms (most of these efforts were made by Yulia Tymoshenko through her New Deal Program) were unsuccessful. The problems of structural reforms were brought out of the public sphere.

*The vicissitudes of the election campaign*

There is a lot of unconfirmed information about the motives for joining Zelenskyi’s election race. At present, the most plausible version remains that Zelenskyi’s Project was conceived as a spoiler for the Vakarchuk Project, which Western sponsors had previously prepared for the role.

As a potential candidate, Zelenskyi firstly appeared in sociological rankings in March 2018 with a very good starting rating of 6%. Throughout 2018, intrigue was maintained as to whether he would ever participate in the campaign. At the same time, its potential rating increased, and since September it has been measured by a double-digit index (11%). Since January 2019, there has been a break in electoral sympathies in favour of Zelenskyi: the level of willingness to vote for him has reached the mark of 22% and increased until the very date of voting [13].

Tymoshenko for a long period was considered a favourite of the campaign. In particular, in November 2018, its rating peaked at 21%. However, she did not manage to stay in the lead and her popularity was diminishing towards the end of the polls. About 17% of voters were ready to support it by the date of voting.

From the outset, sociological measurements of electoral sympathies revealed tendencies that ultimately determined the outcome of the campaign. First, it is the consistently high anti-rating of President Poroshenko at the time about 50% of respondents refused to vote for him. This indicator was maintained throughout the election cycle. Whereas in Zelenskyi, this figure was in the range of 20%. Secondly, Poroshenko ‘confidently’ lost to all possible candidates when modelling the second round of voting.

The widespread use by Poroshenko’s team of technologies aimed at discrediting its competitors has played a negative role. The so-called ‘black technologies’, aimed at destroying the reputation of competitors, have always been used in election campaigns, but this time they crossed a kind of ‘red’ line. From the vast arsenal of various fakes, it is worth mentioning the innuendo around Zelenskyi’s allegations of drug addiction. Moreover, Poroshenko himself on the air of one of the central TV channels stated that ‘I think that it is an extremely big threat when there is a suspicion that a candidate or even the President of Ukraine, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces may become a person who is not excluded having a drug addiction. Because the drug addiction of the candidate is a direct threat to national security’ [14]. This statement was duplicated on the official presidential website. Of course, this was a kind of ‘bottom’ that managed to break
the current president, who, under the influence of his political technologists, tried to turn the election campaign into a clown. For which he paid. The result was that no one could believe at the start of the election campaign: a successful comedian and variety actor toppled the entire ‘old’ political party with spectacular results.

Another note characterizing the helplessness of the election campaign tactics conducted by Poroshenko’s team. As noted above, 70 % of the citizens were of the opinion that things were going wrong in the country. Against this background, the basic motto of the Poroshenko campaign was used: ‘We are going our way!’ Is this not an indication of the amusement of the then President when he could not be perceived with these mottos other than with a surprised smile? As a result of these twists and turns, the King appeared to be a fool, and the Clown took the throne.

As V. Horbulin noted, ‘the problem of Petro Poroshenko in this election was manifested in a simple but critically important link: his mottos should not be sent to the future. Proposed by him a refined ‘Ukrainian conservative idea’ that appealed to things that were unimportant or perceived by two-thirds of the population, passed by electoral preference. ‘Language, faith and the army’ is not entirely about the bright image of the future. It’s a preservation of values, but not an ‘Explosive Development Program’. This triad did not answer the question, ‘What is tomorrow?’ More precisely, not the kind of answer most would like to hear’ [15].

Public-conservative ideology promoted by Poroshenko, public opinion struck a colossal blow. The society did not accept the setting of xenophobic hysteria, the practice of recruiting people and destroying the identity of the inhabitants of the south and east of the country. The defeat of Poroshenko’s election project actually meant the defeat of the authoritarian ideological doctrine that was associated with the population’s socio-economic crisis and poverty. Therefore, it is not surprising that the election results provoked almost apocalyptic sentiments among the supporters of national-conservative ideology. Zelenskyi’s victory was rated almost like a worldwide threat when the ‘non-Ukrainians’ elected their president.

The statistics eloquently illustrate the extent of this collapse. Zelenskyi in the 1st round gained 30 % of the vote, winning in 20 regions. Its closest competitor Poroshenko gained 15.9 %, winning in 2 regions. In the second round, Zelenskyi had 73 % of the vote and a convincing victory in all regions except Lviv. Poroshenko received 24 %.

Equally impressive are the results of the Servant of the People’s Party in early parliamentary elections. In fact, virtual, made by a snap on the date of early elections and without any political history, this party gained 43 % in the multi-member constituency, winning in 22 oblasts. The party showed similar success in single-member constituencies, taking 130 seats. The latter is a historical sensation: the Servant of the People Party simply ‘undermined’ the majoritarian party, which for decades was considered the most corrupt component of the electoral process. In 2019, the majority constituencies, most often ‘fed’ by local barons, won
no known candidates just because they were running for the Servant of the People Party’. This has never been the case in Ukrainian politics.

**Conclusions**

1. The defeat, more precisely the defeat of Poroshenko, marks the collapse of the former political and economic model, which he personified for millions of voters. The election of a ‘non-systemic’ candidate who had no experience or understanding of government was an open demonstration of rebellion against the old political class.

   At the same time, the 2019 election cycle did not solve any problems. The winners clearly captured the society’s request for the so-called. ‘New faces’ and tried to satisfy him. This does not mean creating a new model of power relations, because Zelenskyi and his team simply had no idea of its content. *The scale of the crisis is not yet understood, as are the ways to overcome it. Therefore, in the near future, society will have to go through irreversible turbulent processes.*

2. In 2019, Ukrainian society received a unique historic opportunity. The president, with the support of 73% of the population, has a tremendous amount of credibility for change and reform. Unfortunately, the new government, firstly, does not fully understand the reasons why it has ‘fallen’ this happiness, secondly, does not have at the moment any idea what to do, thirdly, the public opinion itself unable to articulate a request for a strategic agenda view. As a result, not only candidate Zelenskyi, who was left with the choice of millions of citizens, turned out to be ‘unsystematic’, but also the society itself, which was in a state of imbalance of institutions and political disorientation...

   However, what is important is that the tectonic shift is affected. Therefore, the painful process of shaping the design of a new political and economic model, which may well be even worse, characteristic of peripheral countries with their inherent preservation of poverty and technological backwardness, should be anticipated.

3. *The 2019 election cycle symbolizes the end of the post-Soviet period in Ukrainian history.* The country demonstrated the so-called ‘negative consolidation’, supporting Zelenskyi, seeing in him the image of a new policy. This consolidation was based not so much on the support of any conscious goals and values, but rather on the rejection of national-conservative ideology and the inability of previous authorities to carry out effective social and economic policies. This ‘negative consolidation’ shattered the misconceptions about the ontological split of the country into the East and the West, which had been thoroughly fuelled by previous political groups for decades.

4. As a result of the election cycle, representatives of grant organizations, whose network has been carefully constructed by Western governments and international donors, have found themselves in many key positions in the public administration system. As a result, the so-called ‘external governance’.

   Zelenskyi’s first practical steps as president and his government show that the absence of a program of his own has not become an insurmountable obstacle for them. They have adopted the neo-liberal doctrine of ‘market fundamentalism’ (or liber-
tarianism), which is strongly encouraged by Western centres of influence. The national-conservative ideology, based on the mottos ‘Army, Language and Faith’, has changed to the same limited neoliberal triad ‘Deregulation, privatization, and liberalization’. So there is reason to predict that in the near future, Ukraine is facing threats of transformations that will be dictated by ‘external governance’: consolidation of the raw material model of the economy, export of labour, destruction of social obligations of the state, refusal of the proactive role of the state in the formation of priorities of social and economic development.

5. For decades, a system of power relations has emerged in Ukraine, which has received surpluses from the exploitation of natural and human resources. This system of organization of power relations has been defined as an administrative-oligarchic model [16]. The phenomenal results of the 2019 election cycle have been a clear indication of the model’s rejection by the public. At the same time, the beneficiaries of this model were also dissatisfied: first of all, the large capital formed on the ‘relationship of godparents’ with the bureaucracy, as the traditional political parties, which were the leaders of the oligarchy, showed their absolute inefficiency. In this regard, 2019 marks the beginning of the destruction of the administrative-oligarchic model and the formation of a new system of power relations.

However, it is equally obvious that the new president and his team are not fully aware of the reasons for their victory. Because they offer the concepts of libertarianism, ‘the state in a smartphone’, ‘e-democracy’ and the reduction of functions of the state to providing services are in many ways a refrain of the corporate model of the state, because these concepts only contribute to its modernization.

6. Zelenskyi owes his success, above all, to the total crisis of state and political institutions, the inability of competitors to form an actual agenda, as well as luck, intuition, production talent, and amateurism. Millions of voters, following the actions of deep socio-cultural archetypes, chose a candidate unrelated to the political class, attributing to him qualities he did not have. As a result, the Clown archetype destroyed the political and ideological monster created by the King. So, the methodology of cultural archetypes proves useful in understanding the victory of the showman, the satirist, the mocker over the administrative-oligarchic system, which was embodied by Poroshenko and other candidates from the ‘old’ politics.

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