

**Крива Людмила,**

кандидат історичних наук, директор Центру координації наукових видань та розвитку міжнародного співробітництва Міжрегіональної Академії управління персоналом, 03039, м. Київ, вул. Фрометівська, 2, <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8766-1543>

**Kryva Liudmyla,**

Candidate of Historical Sciences, Director of the Center of Scientific Publications Coordination and Development of International Cooperation, Interregional Academy of Personnel Management, 03039, Kyiv, 2, Frometivska str., <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8766-1543>

**Шауренко Анна,**

кандидат історичних наук, доцент кафедри всесвітньої історії та методик навчання Уманського державного педагогічного університету імені Павла Тичини, 20300, м. Умань, вул. Садова, 2, <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3275-4478>

**Shaurenko Anna,**

Candidate of Historical Sciences, Associate Professor at the Department of World History and Teaching Methods, Pavlo Tychyna Uman State Pedagogical University, 20300, Uman, 2, Sadova str., <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3275-4478>



---

## «ЛЮБЛІНСЬКИЙ ТРИКУТНИК»: МОЖЛИВОСТІ І ПЕРСПЕКТИВИ НОВОГО ФОРМАТУ СПІВПРАЦІ<sup>1</sup>

**Анотація.** Сучасні виклики ставлять перед Україною багато проблем, що потребують свого вирішення. Виходячи з її реальних можливостей на сьогодні можна відмітити, що подолання деяких з цих проблем самостійно є достатньо важкою справою. Тому перспективним виглядає ідея входження нашої держави у міжнародне співтовариство, враховуючи як досвід інших країн, так і власні національні інтереси. В цьому дослідженні розглядаються питання, пов'язані із проблемами інтеграції України в європростір, використовуючи можливості Люблінського трикутника. Автор аналізує різні наукові та нормативні джерела з цього приводу та на цій підставі розробляє відповідну інтеграційну модель. В зазначеній моделі визначаються основні напрями інтеграції та роль України в кожному з них. Крім того, окреслюються ті зусилля, які наша держава має здійснити аби досягти успіху, та можлива допомога з боку тих чи інших учасниць Люблінського трикутника. Отримані результати є власними здобутками автора і можуть слугувати складовою наукової основи для розробки та впровадження ефективної зовнішньої політики країни в зазначеному напрямі.

**Ключові слова:** Люблінський трикутник, Балто – Чорноморський регіон, євроінтеграційні процеси, євроінтеграція, інтеграційні зусилля, інтеграційна модель, інтеграційні напрями, можливості та перспективи, принципи євроінтеграції.

<sup>1</sup>The publication was created as part of the scholarship program of the Center for Juliusz Mieroszewski Dialogue Center

## **“THE LUBLIN TRIANGLE”: OPPORTUNITIES AND PROSPECTS FOR THE NEW FORMAT OF COOPERATION**

**Abstract.** Modern challenges present Ukraine with many problems that need to be solved. Based on its real capabilities today, it can be noted that overcoming some of these problems on its own is quite a difficult task. Therefore, the idea of our state entering the international community looks promising, given the experience of other countries and our national interests. The present study examines issues related to the problems of Ukraine’s integration into the Eurospace, using the capacity of the Lublin triangle. The authors analyze various relevant scientific and regulatory sources and thus develop an appropriate integration model. In this model, the primary integration directions and the role of Ukraine in each of them are defined. In addition, the efforts that our state must make in order to achieve success are outlined, including possible assistance from particular members of the Lublin triangle. The research findings are the authors’ achievements and can serve as a component of the scientific groundwork for shaping and implementing an effective foreign policy of the country in the area concerned.

**Key words:** Lublin triangle, Baltic- Black Sea region, European integration processes, European integration, integration efforts, integration model, integration directions, opportunities and prospects, principles of European integration.

---

**Research relevance.** As of the beginning of 2023, interstate economic relations require renewal and sweeping changes. PhD (Economics) T.I. Aleksieieva, in her joint study with student K.O. Honcharuk, marks that renewal should take place “toward establishing associations for further fruitful cooperation” [1, 2021, p. 11]. It is expected that such cooperation will consolidate networks in various fields, i.e., economy, politics, culture, etc. [1, 2021, p. 11]. However, the practical implementation of the evident idea naturally faces some problems; these are the main ones: the coming global economic crisis, the war with Russia, the potential threat of the coronavirus, climate change, and many others. Existing global and regional institutions have proved unprepared, if not incapable, to counter modern challenges effectively.

In the context of present problems, “there is a complex systemic issue of searching not only for new forms and mechanisms but also new different kinds of international associations. At the same time, it is not (and cannot be) about neglecting or wrapping up the available effective forms, mechanisms, and associations of international cooperation” [4, 2020, p. 41]. From this point of view, “the foundation of a new format of cooperation between the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine) – The Lublin Triangle – on July 28, 2020, as reported by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of these countries J. Czaputowicz, L. Linkiewicz and D. Kuleba, is quite logical” [4, 2020, p. 41]. The document signed in Lublin emphasizes the strategic relevance of intensifying cooperation between the European Union, NATO, and the Eastern Partnership countries and the significance of efficient collaboration within the framework of the

Three Seas Initiative. It also expresses readiness to coordinate the activities of the participating states to ensure compliance with international law, both at the level of trilateral cooperation and within international organizations (NATO, European Union, UN, Council of Europe, OSCE) [5, 2020]. In addition, attention was rivetted on other things, involving the need to intensify regional trade and investment, the implementation of ambitious joint projects, cooperation between civil societies, etc. [5, 2020]. The importance of the Lublin Triangle (as well as other international organizations and interstate associations) for Ukraine lies in the fact that it “has passed a complicated and ambiguous stage of statehood formation since the declaration of independence, which cyclically did not coincide with the processes of state-building in the countries of the former “people’s democracy” [2, 2020, p. 21]. And this, in turn, allows using the experience of other countries to accelerate own development. However, according to PhD (Economics) Ye.V. Chebotarov, “we currently have a political declaration on establishing a platform for cooperation between these countries” [5, 2020, p. 41], which, without doubts, needs to be filled with actual content. Moreover, that sort of content can be effective and long-lasting solely on the basis of specific scientific research. As a result, the present contribution is relevant today.

**Analysis of recent research and publications and problem statement.** There is a lot of research devoted to European integration processes in Ukraine, including the Lublin Agreements. Thus, PhD Ye.V. Chebotarov notes (with reference to the estimates of the World Bank) that in 2019 “the gross domestic product of Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine

exceeded 800 billion USD (*authors' alteration*). The total trade turnover between Poland – Ukraine, Lithuania – Ukraine, and Poland – Lithuania has already reached 14 billion USD (*authors' alteration*)” [5, 2020, p. 45]. According to his research, the above allows the countries to rank together fifth after Germany, France, Italy, and Spain. However, the Russian-Ukrainian war affected that indicator, but it still remains decisive for future development prospects. Determination is also intensified by the fact that the area of the Lublin Triangle countries is 981 thousand km<sup>2</sup>, and the population is 83 million citizens [5, 2020, p. 44]. At the same time, the scientist focuses on the historical relationships between the modern updated association and the so-called Lublin Union, which the same countries concluded in 1569 (the very fact of signing in the new conditions of the mentioned declaration of foreign ministers in Lublin, and not elsewhere, is symbolic and indicative). The researcher rightly states that “the primary objective for the practical implementation of the Lublin Triangle concept (*authors' alteration*) is to convey the idea of its viability” [5, 2020, p. 45]. Moreover, conveying the idea should occur both at the level of leading business players and the political level. It is also fundamental to prove its relevance to the participants of the newly formed platform but the entire European Union [5, 2020, p. 45].

On the other hand, T.I. Aleksieieva & K.O. Honcharuk mark that “the establishment of the Lublin Triangle (*authors' alteration*), a new platform for trilateral cooperation between Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine, opened up ample opportunities for further relations between the states” [1, 2021, p. 13]. They believe that the association was founded for a reason and not just from scratch because all these countries have much in common historically, and the contractual basis between them (at the time of signing the declaration) was sufficient. In particular, Ukraine and Lithuania already have more than fifty mutual interregional agreements, and Ukraine and Poland – a half dozen. After analyzing the evolution of each of the Triangle’s member states, the authors conclude that “amidst globalization, dynamic development and changes, youth will become one of the leading driving forces for the progress of society and the state” [1, 2021, p. 14]. Therefore, they propose to focus interstate efforts on cooperation with youth and effective youth policy [1, 2021, p. 14]. On the other hand, it is marked some advantages of the Lublin Triangle for each of its players. For Ukraine, such advantages include “the ability to pursue a more subjective foreign policy in the region and

European and Euro-Atlantic integration in the future” [1, 2021, p. 14].

In his dissertation, PhD (Political Science) O.F. Motsyk considers a wider range of issues regarding Ukraine’s European integration aspirations. He does not directly touch upon the Lublin Triangle, but his research analyzes and studies the relations between Ukraine and the Republic of Poland (one of the Triangle’s branches). In particular, the scientist proves the need to change the foreign policy paradigm for modernizing interstate relations (the transition from purely national interests to considering European integration processes in these interests, the involvement of non-state players in foreign policy, etc.), clarifies the content of the relevant institutional factors in the humanitarian sphere, classifies them according to the criteria of measurement and focus (such groups are distinguished: temporal, sectoral, pan-European, state, regional, local), offers directions for solving challenging issues in Ukrainian-Polish relations, outlines promising ways to find appropriate compromises, deepens knowledge of the role of the Eastern Partnership in EU foreign policy, etc. [2, 2020, p. 24–26].

Unlike O.F. Motsyk, DSc (Philosophy) R.F. Panchuk drew his attention to a more profound material. His dissertation is devoted to the problems of interstate cooperation in the Baltic-Black Sea region (BBSR). The scientist presented a new conceptual plan for building a stable partnership between the relevant states, given the organizational structure, parties, goals of the countries, and factors uniting them. He also offered new definitions (“interstate investment alliance” and “interstate investment integration”), improved a theoretical approach to establishing a defense alliance with individual members of the North Atlantic Alliance (with special emphasis on such an alliance between Ukraine, Poland and Lithuania), elaborated the point of updating Ukraine’s foreign policy towards the alliance in BBSR, etc. [3, 2020, p. 4–5]. The above creates a deeper scientific basis for studying the future prospects of the Lublin Triangle.

In view of the aforesaid, it appears that the European integration of Ukraine in general and the Lublin Triangle in particular aroused great interest in the scientific community. At the same time, available research does not address the following in full: possibilities and prospects of the specific triangle; what it gives to our state; the role Ukraine itself can play in it. In the present article, we will try to outline all these issues and study them more thoroughly.

**The purpose of the article** is to conduct a comparative and interdisciplinary analysis of the national business cultures of Poland, Lithuania, and Ukraine in the context of strengthening scientific and practical arguments in favor of the development and expansion of the Lublin Triangle format with the involvement of other countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

The study aims to combine analysis and synthesis when considering the parameters of Polish, Lithuanian and Ukrainian business cultures and logic and history when examining the institutional prerequisites for the foundation of the Lublin Triangle. Division and comparative analysis were used when considering countries of Central and Eastern Europe that could become participants in the Lublin Triangle.

**Basic Material Statement.** There is no doubt that the Lublin Triangle, when used properly, has many opportunities and prospects, the main of which include the following:

1) *Defense cooperation.* It will allow for more effective exchange of intelligence, increase the security (including information) of each of the triangle's state parties (more so that each of them shares borders with an authoritarian state recognized by the world community as terrorist – the Russian Federation), reduce the corresponding financial burden on their budgets, etc. This is beneficial for Ukraine also because it allows building military-industrial complex (MIC) enterprises in territories safer from rocket attacks.

2) *Social and economic cooperation.* At this stage, it becomes possible to develop and implement ambitious joint investment projects, large-scale educational programs, health care programs, modernization of the pension and banking systems, introduction of European standards in industry, transport, energy, etc. The above will bring Ukraine closer to membership in the European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance at a faster pace, using the experience of neighbors who are already members of these respected international institutions.

3) *Cultural cooperation.* It can involve the exchange of cultural achievements, entering the world of music, cinema, art, etc., industry, and enhancement of support for book publishing and libraries.

4) *Scientific cooperation.* Uniting specific experience and efforts will contribute to stimulating investment in science, opening access to global archives for our scientists, informing foreign colleagues about their achievements more effectively, the joint study of scientific problems, and settlement of emerging concerns.

5) *Diplomatic cooperation.* Prospects in this field are joint promotion of the idea of Ukraine's membership in the EU and NATO, mutual protection of interests on the global stage, deepening of interstate relations, including in order to overcome historical misunderstandings, etc.

Thus, the mentioned opportunities and prospects are those integration areas in which Ukraine can profit. However, it is not all as easy as it sounds. The point is that the development level of state parties of the triangle varies. While Poland and Lithuania have already completely reformed both their economy and politics, and most importantly, the mentality of their society (they got rid of the Soviet legacy and returned to their roots), Ukraine is just taking the corresponding path (it is more painful for us as we follow it with a significant delay, when much is irretrievably lost). In addition, there are hostilities on our territories, which cannot but affect the pace of reforms. Therefore, it is appropriate and logical to enter the European space on a phased basis, which can be clearly represented as the below **integration model**. Consequently, the **integration efforts** of Ukraine should be as follows:

*At the first stage (the war with Russia),* Ukraine should focus on defense, scientific (in terms of military advances), cultural (informing the world about the antiquity and richness of Ukrainian culture, and therefore confuting various Russian fakes about Ukraine as a nonexistent state) and diplomatic cooperation (mainly in promoting the peace plan of Ukraine). The efforts of our state should be aimed at the country's survival and preventing such threats in the future. In this regard, Poland, a long-time ally in relevant affairs, can provide us with considerable assistance. On the other hand, Lithuania is able to share its experience in de-Russification of society. In turn, Ukraine should be more active in this regard, but it has problems mainly related to fundamental long-present shortcomings: a high level of corruption and a lack of self-identification in Ukrainian society (the latter often causes internal conflicts which are dangerous in wartime, especially when they concern the so-called national issue).

*At the second stage (post-war reconstruction),* the above areas of cooperation should be supplemented with a socio-economic one (in terms of reconstruction of the national economy). On the other hand, scientific and cultural cooperation should be expanded and deepened, and diplomatic cooperation should promote the idea of the investment attractiveness of post-war Ukraine. Thus, the latter is obliged to reform its political and economic system (including the tax system),

utterly update the legislation, bringing it closer to EU standards, initiate systemic reforms in pension support, education, health care, and systematize and deepen commenced ones. Moreover, it is necessary to offer incentives for small and medium-sized businesses, enshrine sustainable guarantees for investors where it is essential and beneficial for society, pursue a balanced protectionist policy, open free economic zones in the most convenient places, if possible (e.g., in resort regions), diversify energy supplies, while establishing effective domestic production (at the same time, it crucial to consider ways and mechanisms for the economy's transition to renewable sources that can cover the necessary energy costs), etc. All of the above are challenging systemic tasks, so the uncompromising fight against corruption (which is impossible without a transparent and effective law enforcement system, including judicial one) and unwavering work with public mentality should be actively undertaken at this stage. The experience of Polish reforms will be relevant, as well as the similar experience of Lithuania.

*At the third stage (development stage),* Ukraine should become a full member of the EU and NATO and begin to play an active role in both institutions. Partnership with Poland and Lithuania and coordination of positions before introducing any initiatives will make the latter more significant and acceptable to Ukraine and other countries. At the same time, the idea of transforming our state into an economic, scientific and cultural hub of Europe in general, and the Baltic-Black Sea region in particular, should come to the fore.

In our opinion, it is impossible to achieve goals and prospects without observing **European integration principles**, namely:

*The principle of self-identification of society.* It means that towards external relations, the entire society should act (regardless of language, faith, etc. of individual citizens) as a single whole based on historical roots and common interests. In other words, social actions should demonstrate independence and sovereignty from external effects and narratives (often unfriendly to us). We must feel like Ukrainians, masters on our own land. On the other hand, we should keep in mind that we are different, and the duty of the command of the Ukrainian language, culture and history does not force anyone to forget the language and culture of the native ethnic group. These things shall not contradict each other. Consequently, it is necessary to create appropriate conditions. The same applies to some economic issues, the implementation of which

manifests or may manifest the identity or ethnic characteristics of an individual citizen.

*The principle of a coherent foreign policy.* It is evident as a compromise balance between integration requirements and national interests. Entering the European space (including using the capacity of the **Lublin Triangle**) should not close for Ukraine other markets and opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation with those countries that are not part of this space. Moreover, it is inappropriate to approve those decisions and standards that frankly destroy the domestic producer, and where such standards are crucial and necessary for the development of Ukraine, a sufficient transition period should be set for relatively painless adaptation to the new conditions of Ukrainian enterprises, organizations, and institutions.

*The principle of active initiation.* Under any conditions, Ukraine should not be a passive observer and supplicant in the European space in general and in the **Lublin Triangle** in particular; it should actively promote its ideas and proposals and defend own interests in the international arena.

*The principle of external attractiveness.* It includes a transparent national economic, fiscal and social policy, observance of human rights, clear external course, fair business support, investment protection, etc.

Every country has interdisciplinary business culture due to a wide range of factors shaping it. They are structured and interrelated and form two groups. The first group (economic, institutional, international, and psychological) are determinants. The second group (demographic, communication, scientific-technical, and natural-geographical) are derivatives or jointly ordered in relation to the former.

Domestic business culture is a system of values, characteristics and codes of conduct inherent in entrepreneurship, basic rules and norms of doing business, traditions and ethics shaped evolutionarily and reproduced in time, space, country (or a group of countries formed by relevant parameters), and under specific combinations.

The specified characteristics of key parameters of the business culture of every country are based on the assimilation of research and practice results of world comparative economic studies and are as follows.

The Power Distance parameter can be described as the distance between middle- and low-level managers to make crucial business decisions. "Individualism" measures the development and spread of an individualistic approach to launching and running a business. "Courage" measures the

advantage that society gives to business success, assertiveness, and materialism. In countries with a high level of “courage”, the struggle for power in organizations is usually implemented through struggle and confrontation rather than through mutual concessions based on the parties’ interests. “Uncertainty Avoidance” measures the degree to which society, and therefore managers, find uncertainty and ambiguity uncomfortable and strive to cope with them. “Long-Term Orientation” shows whether managers in their behavior focus on the short- or long-term perspective. “Indulgence” in comparative economics is interpreted as an assessment of natural desires, selfishness, and profit satisfaction in entrepreneurship and whether these “values” permeate all other areas of society.


Fig. 1 shows the characteristics of the business culture of the mentioned countries in terms of power distance, individualism, and courage, involving their quantitative assessment. According to power distance, the countries of the Lublin Triangle are characterized by a very diverse business culture. Lithuania has the lowest power

distance between middle- and low-level managers (42 points) and hence does not differ significantly from the developed countries of the world. Poland (68 points) has a mean value and is generally comparable to developed European countries. The highest level of power distance is peculiar to business environment of Ukraine (92 points).


The “individualism” parameter is the same in Poland and Lithuania (60 points each). Such an indicator is typical for Western countries. Ukraine (25 points) is a classic collectivist country – such a form is typical for Eastern countries. However, according to the authors’ empirical research, Ukraine ranks much higher by this parameter and slightly differs from Poland, which is about halfway between the West and the East.

In general, the “courage” parameter renders quite similar features in the business culture of Lithuania and Ukraine (19 and 27 points, respectively). Poland (64 points) represents a more Western trait of realism in entrepreneurship and management.

Figure 2 similarly demonstrates the characteristics and assessments of the national



**Fig. 1. Comparative characteristics of the national business cultures of the Lublin Triangle in terms of “power distance”, “individualism” and “courage”**



**Fig. 2. similarly demonstrates the characteristics and assessments of the national business cultures of the Lublin Triangle countries under three other dimensions which are widely used in modern comparative economic studies**

business cultures of the Lublin Triangle countries under three other dimensions which are widely used in modern comparative economic studies.

In the dimension of “uncertainty avoidance”, the business cultures of Poland and Ukraine are not only similar but also very close (93 and 95 points, respectively), and Lithuania differs from both countries in this regard (65 points). In terms of “long-term orientation”, the national business cultures of Lithuania and Ukraine are also close (82 and 86 points, respectively). On the other hand, Poland has a strong short-term business orientation (38 points).

The national business cultures of Lithuania and Ukraine are also very close in terms of tolerance (16 and 14 points, respectively), as is Poland (29 points). A general comparative analysis of the business cultures of the Lublin Triangle countries shows that they resemble each other: in five of the six dimensions, their business cultures are pairwise similar (even identical, as in the case of “individualism” in Poland and Lithuania).

At the same time, an objective analysis shows that, paradoxically, the business cultures of Lithuania and Ukraine are more similar. This is due to the similarity their business cultures in terms of “courage” (19 and 27 points, respectively), “long-term orientation” (82 and 86 points) and “tolerance” (16 and 14 points).

Based on the sectoral structure of the national economic complexes of Poland, Lithuania, and Ukraine and current trends, the countries cooperate most effectively in the agri-food sector (agriculture, mainly the processing and food industry), industrial construction (implementation of large infrastructure projects – predominantly the logistics of road and rail transport, modernization of ports and terminals, etc.), energy (implementation and modernization of terminals), energy (including nuclear energy), oil refining, IT, and almost all industry segments.

In addition to the sectoral dimension, special attention should be paid to interregional cooperation. It would be expedient to create Euroregions and transnational clusters more systematically. Cooperation on economic free zones can be very productive, as can be seen from the analysis of the Lodz Special Economic Zone. Cooperation between the countries of the Lublin Triangle in creating a Euroregion or a free economic zone can be efficient if the European Union provides particular support.

Under sectoral and regional cooperation through bilateral and tripartite business entities, it would be appropriate to focus on the internal market, given the similarity and complementarity of national business cultures. At the same time, it makes sense to consider the option of accelerating the transition from simple import-export transactions between business entities to more advanced forms of integrated cooperation. This emerges from the study of theoretical, methodological, and applied practical aspects of the national business culture.

Under institutional, organizational and methodological support, including direct economic and regulatory policies of the countries, cooperation between Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine can result in a solid integration center for most part of Central and Eastern Europe. It includes Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria, which is confirmed by the parameters of their national business cultures (Table 1). The main conclusions of the comparative analysis of the business culture of these countries based on the developments presented in Table 1 can be summarized as follows.

Ukraine (92 points), Romania (90 points) and Slovakia (100 points) are close to each other in terms of power distance, as are Lithuania (42 points), Latvia (44 points) and Estonia (40 points). In addition, Poland (68 points) and

Table 1

**Parameters of national business culture in Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine, Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria**

Country	Power distance	Individualism	Courage	Uncertainty avoidance	Long-term orientation	Indulgence
Poland	68	60	64	93	38	29
Lithuania	42	60	19	65	82	16
Ukraine	92	25	27	95	86	14
Latvia	44	70	9	63	69	13
Estonia	40	60	30	60	82	16
Slovakia	100	52	100	51	77	28
Romania	90	30	42	90	52	20
Bulgaria	70	30	40	85	69	16

*Source: compiled by the authors*



Romania (70 points) have similar characteristics of national business culture.

Three countries (Poland, Lithuania and Estonia) scored 60 points in terms of “individualism”. The countries of this subgroup are close to Slovakia (52 points), on the one hand, and Latvia (70 points), on the other. Bulgaria and Romania are the same in this aspect (30 points each) and are quite close to Ukraine (25 points).

From the perspective of courage, Romania and Bulgaria are very close (42 and 40 points, respectively), as are Lithuania (19 points), Ukraine (27 points) and Estonia (30 points). Latvia (9 points) logically goes alongside with Lithuania.

Poland (93 points), Ukraine (95 points), Romania (90 points), and Bulgaria (85 points) are very close in terms of uncertainty avoidance. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia (65, 63 and 60 points, respectively) are close to Slovakia (51 points).

In terms of long-term orientation, Lithuania and Estonia have the same indicators (82 points), as do Latvia and Bulgaria (69 points each). Ukraine (86 points) and Slovakia (77 points) are very close to the first subgroup.

In terms of indulgence, the three countries are the same: Lithuania, Estonia, and Bulgaria (16 points each). Ukraine and Latvia are very close to them (14 and 13 points, respectively), as is Romania (20 points). Poland and Slovakia (29 and 28 points, respectively), which are also almost identical here, differ little from Romania (20 points).

By relying on the data presented in Table 1, the following generalizations can be made. The relevant group of eight Central and Eastern European countries have close similarities in four of the six parameters used in alike comparative studies (individualism, uncertainty avoidance,

long-term orientation, and indulgence); seven to eight countries share that kind of similarity, most often Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. The other two parameters (“power distance” and “courage”) are somewhat less similar.

Thus, the expansion of integration ties between Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine in priority areas of activities both at the interstate level and between economic organizations and the intensification of organizational and economic benefits of such cooperation can (as an example and impetus) lead to the formation of similar collaboration in the markets of the countries of the expanded grouping.

The institutional basis for cooperation between Ukraine and Poland is represented by a contractual legal framework which comprises 156 current international legal documents [6].

The Ukrainian-Polish cooperation is grounded on the Treaty on Good-Neighborliness, Friendly Relations and Cooperation between Ukraine and the Republic of Poland as of May 18, 1992 [7].


Figure 3 shows the key indicators of bilateral trade between Ukraine and Poland.

Figure 4 shows the commodity structure of exports from Ukraine to Poland for 2022.

Figure 5 shows the dynamics of exports and imports between Ukraine and Poland for 2017–2021.

**Conclusions.** National business culture is one of the fundamental components not only of entrepreneurial activity but also of the economic organization of the entire modern society. The component is interdisciplinary. At the same time, it can act as a stimulus and restrainer, especially for business development and international integration.


For the Lublin Triangle, the business culture of every country can be a potent force of multilateral



**Fig. 3. The key indicators of bilateral trade between Ukraine and Poland for 2021–2022, mln. USD**


Source: [8].





**Fig. 4. Commodity structure of exports from Ukraine to Poland for 2022, %**

Source: [8].



**Fig. 5. The key indicators of bilateral trade between Ukraine and Poland for 2017–2021, mln. USD**

Source: [8].

cooperation both at the interstate level of the original member states – Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine, and at the level of business entities. This is largely due to the centuries-old common history of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. In our opinion, its origins were laid not only by the Union of Lublin in 1569 but also by the Union of Krevo in 1385.

Cooperation between the countries of the Lublin Triangle is in line with the EU spirit: it can be an essential complement to ensure

economic and political stability on the eastern border.

Based on the similarity between national business cultures, other countries of Central and Eastern Europe – Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria – are very close to the founding countries of the Lublin Triangle. Therefore, successful cooperation within the Lublin Triangle between Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine can be an essential element of integrated cooperation between the countries of Central

and Eastern Europe and the European Union as a whole.

Directions for further development include the understanding of the broad institutional framework (prerequisites) of Polish-Lithuanian-Ukrainian cooperation and substantiation of specific economic mechanisms, i.e., the development of investment projects in specific priority sectors and areas of cooperation between the Lublin Triangle's parties. They could shape the basis for expanding the format of the Lublin Triangle and ensuring a high level of competitiveness in the modern system of international division of labor.

Thus, we notice that Ukraine can benefit much within the Lublin Triangle. At the same time, it is obvious that in order to make the most of prospects, our state should do a lot of homework. Other parties of the Triangle will help us, but they will not work for us; we will have to do it on our own, overcoming the inertial resistance of some conservative-minded segments of the population. Such a path involves unpopular decisions, as well as inevitable losses. Nevertheless, it should lay the groundwork for building a more humane, modern, and just Ukrainian society.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. Алексеева Т.І., Гончарук К.О. Міжнародні відносини між країнами Люблінського трикутника новий формат співпраці крізь призму історичного минулого / Т.І. Алексеева, К.О. Гончарук // Світове господарство та міжнародні економічні відносини. Серія: Економіка та підприємництво. 2021. №2 (119) С. 11–14.
2. Моцик О.Ф. Інституційні чинники модернізації українсько – польських відносин в гуманітарній сфері в умовах процесів євроінтеграції: дис. ... кандидата політ. наук: 23.00.02 / Моцик Олександр Федорович. Луцьк: Східноєвроп. нац. ун-т ім. Л. Українки, ЛНУ ім. І. Франка, 2020. 267 с.
3. Панчук Р.М. Україна у міждержавному співробітництві країн Балтійсько – Чорноморського простору: дис. ... доктора філософії: 052 / Панчук Роман Михайлович. К: КНУ ім. Т. Шевченка, 2020. 254 с.
4. Спільна декларація міністрів закордонних справ України, Республіки Польща та Литовської Республіки щодо заснування «Люблінського трикутника». // Міністерство закордонних справ України 28.07.2020. [Електронний ресурс]. URL: <https://mfa.gov.ua/news/spilna-deklaraciya-ministriv-zakordonnih-sprav-ukrayini-respubliki-polshcha-ta-litovskoyi-respubliki-shchodo-zasnuvannya-lyublinskogo-trikutnika>. Назва з екрану.
5. Чеботарьов Є.В. «Люблінський трикутник»: інституціональні передумови та економічний потенціал створення / Є.В. Чеботарьов // Економічний вісник донбасу. 2020. № 3 (61). С. 41–48.

6. URL: <https://poland.mfa.gov.ua/spivrobotnictvo/233-dogovirno-pravova-baza-mizh-ukrajinoju-ta-polyshheju>
7. URL: [https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/616\\_172#Text](https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/616_172#Text)
8. URL: <https://poland.mfa.gov.ua/spivrobotnictvo/229-torgovelyno-jekonomichne-spivrobotnictvo-mizh-ukrajinoju-ta-polyshheju>

#### REFERENCES:

1. Alekseeva T.I., Honcharuk K.O. (2021). Mizhnarodni vIdnosini mizh krayinami Lyublinskogo trikutnika noviy format spivpratsi kriz prizmu istorichnogo minulogo [*International relations between the countries of the Lublin triangle – a new format of cooperation through the prism of the historical past*] World economy and international economic relations. Series: Economy and entrepreneurship, 2 (119), 11–14 [in Ukrainian].
2. Motsyk O.F. (2020). Institutsiyini chinniki modernizatsiyi ukrayinsko – polskih vidnosin v gumanitarniy sferi v umovah protsesiv Evrointegratsiyi [*Institutional factors of modernization of Ukrainian-Polish relations in the humanitarian sphere in the context of European integration processes*]. Candidate's thesis. Lutsk: Eastern Europe. national University named after L. Ukrainka, Ivan Franko National University of Lviv [in Ukrainian].
3. Panchuk R.M. (2020). [Ukraine in the interstate cooperation of the countries of the Baltic – Black Sea region]. Candidate's thesis. K: Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv [in Ukrainian].
4. Spilna deklaratsiya ministriv zakordonnih sprav Ukrayini, Respubliki Polska ta Litovskoyi Respubliki schodo zasnuvannya «Lyublinskogo trikutnika» (2020, July 28). [*Joint declaration of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, the Republic of Poland and the Republic of Lithuania regarding the establishment of the «Lublin Triangle»*]. Kyiv: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Retrieved from: <https://mfa.gov.ua/news/spilna-deklaraciya-ministriv-zakordonnih-sprav-ukrayini-respubliki-polshcha-ta-litovskoyi-respubliki-shchodo-zasnuvannya-lyublinskogo-trikutnika>. – Name from the screen [in Ukrainian].
5. Chebotaryov E.V. (2020). «LyublinskIy trikutnik»: institutsionalni peredumovi ta ekonomichniy potentsial stvorenniya [*“Lublin triangle”: institutional prerequisites and economic potential of creation*] Economic Bulletin of Donbass, 3 (61), 41–48 [in Ukrainian].
6. URL: <https://poland.mfa.gov.ua/spivrobotnictvo/233-dogovirno-pravova-baza-mizh-ukrajinoju-ta-polyshheju>
7. URL: [https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/616\\_172#Text](https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/616_172#Text)
8. URL: <https://poland.mfa.gov.ua/spivrobotnictvo/229-torgovelyno-jekonomichne-spivrobotnictvo-mizh-ukrajinoju-ta-polyshheju>