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***Sychova Viktoriia Viktorivna,***  
*Doctor of Public Administration, Full Professor, Full Professor of Sociology of Management & Social Work Department, V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University, tel: +38 (097) 440-11-23; e-mail: vvs2679@ukr.net*

ORCID: 0000-0001-5001-8389

***Сичова Вікторія Вікторівна,***  
*доктор наук з державного управління, професор, професор кафедри соціології управління та соціальної роботи соціологічного факультету, Харківський національний університет ім. В. Н. Каразіна, тел. +38 (097) 440-11-23; e-mail: vvs2679@ukr.net*

ORCID: 0000-0001-5001-8389

***Сычова Виктория Викторовна,***

*доктор наук по государственному управлению, профессор, профессор кафедры социологии управления и социальной работы социологического факультета, Харьковский национальный университет им. В. Н. Каразина, тел. +38 (097) 440-11-23; e-mail: vvs2679@ukr.net*

ORCID: 0000-0001-5001-8389

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## **SOVIET ARCHETYPE IN INTERACTION AUTHORITIES AND POLITICAL OPPOSITION AS THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY OF UKRAINE**

**Abstract.** In the article, in the context of the archetypal approach, were analyzed the peculiarities of the cultural code in the interaction of power and political opposition in the independent Ukraine (1991–2019). It was clarified that the cultural archetype of the Soviet Union has features of a culture of confrontation and conformism-consolidation. And also the coexistence of at least two projections of the Ukrainian past, two antagonistic archetypes, at the present stage in the collective consciousness of Ukrainians.

It is determined that the Soviet archetype manifests itself in the formation of the image of “other” as “alien”/“enemy” using aggressive rhetoric, verbal wars, hanging labels; technologies of administrative resources, mass manipulation, in

particular, linguistic issues in Ukraine, intimidation of the electorate of the enemy; the use of information pressure by the authorities to the opposition, sometimes force methods, political repressions – political criminal practices, tactics of ignoring the opposition, unanimous bureaucratic administration, forced methods for the electorate, with imitation of “participation” of citizens in decision-making.

It is revealed that to a greater extent the Soviet archetype is characteristic of the supporters of the communist, socialist ideology, as well as of the part of the political elite, whose world-view principles formed during the Soviet Union, and which represents the electorate with Soviet identity. The first were personified by the Communist Party of Ukraine and the Radical Party of Oleg Lyashko. The second – the Party of Regions, the Political Party “Opposition Bloc”, “Opposition Platform – For Life”. The Soviet archetype in the interaction of power and political opposition with the attitude of one to one as an enemy dominated from 1991 to 2004, and especially in 2010 – the beginning of 2014. Due to external aggression, the water-turbulence between the authorities and the political opposition since February 2014 has intensified not only ideologically, but also in the national (patriotic) context of “our/patriot – a stranger/separatist/traitor”. Methods of implementing decommunization laws also indicate manifestations of the Soviet archetype.

It is proved that the Soviet archetype in the interaction of power and political opposition manifests itself in conditions of curtailing the democratic regime, social inversion, during election campaigns and in extreme situations. At the same time, the democratization of the regime leads to the transformation of the image of an opponent from the “enemy” to “another” in political discourse, the power-political opposition.

It is substantiated that the existence of two archetypes – genuinely Ukrainian and Soviet – polarizes Ukraine, threatening its civil consolidation and social stability. And also that the Soviet archetype in the interaction of power and political opposition in the conditions of external danger in the world-wide uncertainty of the part of Ukrainian society is a political danger threatening the national security of Ukraine.

**Keywords:** soviet archetype, confrontational and conformal culture, interaction of power and political opposition.

## **РАДЯНСЬКИЙ АРХЕТИП У ВЗАЄМОДІЇ ВЛАДИ ТА ПОЛІТИЧНОЇ ОПОЗИЦІЇ ЯК ЗАГРОЗА НАЦІОНАЛЬНІЙ БЕЗПЕЦІ УКРАЇНИ**

**Анотація.** У контексті архетипного підходу проаналізовано особливості культурного коду у взаємодії влади та політичної опозиції у незалежній Україні (1991–2019 рр.). З'ясовано, що радянському культурному архетипу притаманні риси культури конфронтації та конформізму-консолідації, а також співіснування на сучасному етапі у колективній свідомості українців, як мінімум, дві проєкції українського минулого, два антагоністичні архетипи.

Визначено, що радянський архетип виявляється у формуванні образу “іншого” як “чужого”/“ворога” з використанням агресивної риторики, словес-

них війн, навішуванням ярликів; технологій адміністративного ресурсу, масового маніпулювання, зокрема, мовним питанням в Україні, залякуванням електорату противника; застосуванням владою до опозиції інформаційного тиску, іноді силових методів, політичних репресій — політичних кримінальних практик, тактики ігнорування опозиції, єдиноначального бюрократичного управління, примусових методів до електорату з імітацією “участі” громадян у прийнятті рішень.

Виявлено, що більшою мірою радянський архетип властивий прихильникам комуністичної, соціалістичної ідеології, а також частині політичної еліти, світоглядні засади якої формувалися за часів СРСР, та яка репрезентує електорат із радянською ідентичністю. Перші уособлені Комуністичною партією України та Радикальною партією Олега Ляшка. Другі — Партією Регіонів, Політичною партією “Опозиційний блок”, “Опозиційною платформою — За життя”. Радянський архетип у взаємодії влади та політичної опозиції по відношенню одна до одної як до ворога домінував у 1991–2004 рр. та особливо у 2010 — поч. 2014 р. У зв’язку із зовнішньою агресією розділ між владою та політичною опозицією з лютого 2014 р. посилюється не лише по лінії ідеології, а й у національному (патріотичному) контексті на “свій/патріот — чужий/сепаратист/зрадник”. Методи імплементації декомунізаційних законів також свідчать про вияви радянського архетипу.

Доведено, що радянський архетип у взаємодії влади та політичної опозиції виявляється в умовах згорання демократичного режиму, за соціальної інверсії, під час виборчих кампаній і в екстремальних ситуаціях. Водночас демократизація режиму призводить до перетворення образу опонента з “ворога” на “іншого” у політичному дискурсі влада — політична опозиція.

Обґрунтовано, що існування двох архетипів — автентично-українського та радянського — поляризує Україну, загрожуючи її громадянській консолідації і суспільній стабільності. Також радянський архетип у взаємодії влади та політичної опозиції в умовах зовнішньої небезпеки за світоглядної невизначеності частини українського суспільства є політичною небезпекою, що загрожує національній безпеці України.

**Ключові слова:** радянський архетип, конфронтаційна та конформна культура, взаємодія влади та політичної опозиції.

## **СОВЕТСКИЙ АРХЕТИП ВО ВЗАИМОДЕЙСТВИИ ВЛАСТИ И ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ ОППОЗИЦИИ КАК УГРОЗА НАЦИОНАЛЬНОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ УКРАИНЫ**

**Аннотация.** В контексте архетипного подхода проанализированы особенности культурного кода во взаимодействии власти и политической оппозиции в независимой Украине (1991–2019 гг.). Выяснено, что советскому архетипу присущи черты культуры конфронтации и конформизма-консолидации, а также сосуществование на современном этапе в коллективном сознании украинцев, как минимум, двух проекций украинского прошлого, двух антагонистических архетипов.

Определено, что советский архетип проявляется в формировании образа “другого” как “чужого”/“врага” с использованием агрессивной риторики, словесных войн, навешиванием ярлыков; технологий административного ресурса, массового манипулирования, в частности, языковым вопросом в Украине, запугиванием электората противника; применением властями к оппозиции информационного давления, иногда силовых методов, политических репрессий — политических уголовных практик, тактики игнорирования оппозиции, единоначального бюрократического управления, принудительных методов к электорату с имитацией “участия” граждан в принятии решений.

Выявлено, что в большей степени советский архетип присущ сторонникам коммунистической, социалистической идеологии, а также части политической элиты, мировоззренческие основы которой формировались во времена СССР, и которая представляет электорат с советской идентичностью. Первых олицетворяют Коммунистическая партия Украины и Радикальная партия Олега Ляшко. Вторых — Партия регионов, Политическая партия “Оппозиционный блок”, “Оппозиционная платформа — За жизнь”. Советский архетип во взаимодействии власти и политической оппозиции по отношению одна к другой как к врагу доминировал с 1991–2004 гг. и особенно в 2010 — нач. 2014 г. В связи с внешней агрессией разделение между властью и политической оппозицией с февраля 2014 г. усилился не только по линии идеологии, но и в национальном (патриотическом) контексте на “свой/патриот — чужой/сепаратист/предатель”. Методы имплементации декоммунизационных законов также свидетельствуют о проявлениях советского архетипа.

Доказано, что советский архетип во взаимодействии власти и политической оппозиции проявляется в условиях свертывания демократического режима, при социальной инверсии, во время избирательных кампаний и в экстремальных ситуациях. В то же время демократизация режима приводит к превращению образа оппонента с “врага” на “другого” в политическом дискурсе власть — политическая оппозиция.

Обосновано, что существование двух архетипов — аутентично-украинского и советского — поляризует Украину, угрожая ее гражданской консолидации и общественной стабильности. Также советский архетип во взаимодействии власти и политической оппозиции в условиях внешней опасности по мировоззренческой неопределенности части украинского общества является политической опасностью, угрожающей национальной безопасности Украины.

**Ключевые слова:** советский архетип, конфронтационная и конформная культура, взаимодействие власти и политической оппозиции.

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**Formulation of the problem.** The hybrid war of the Russian Federation against the Ukrainian state stipulates the urgency of ensuring the national security of Ukraine. The annexation of the Crimea (2014), the occupation

of the Donbas (2014), as at one time Transnistria (1992) and South Ossetia and Abkhazia (2008), testify to the “imperial” legacy of Russia’s foreign policy, its aspirations before the reintegration of the post-Soviet space, about the “Soviet” attitude to the national question, the denial of another national identity (Ukrainians, Moldovans, Georgians, etc.).

In the May 2015 National Security Strategy of Ukraine, among the topical threats to the national security of Ukraine, are noted “information and psychological warfare, humiliation of the Ukrainian language and culture, falsification of Ukrainian history, the formation of an alternative to the reality of the distorted information picture of the world” by the Russian mass communication media [1, p. 3]. Therefore, under the circumstances of the immaturity of the Ukrainian national identity, the Soviet archetype as the basis of the “Russian world” is the basis for the intensification of separatism, speculation about the “language issue” and foreign policy priorities of the country’s development. At the same time, the irresponsible game of power and opposition on differences in the value, ideological, linguistic and cultural orientations of Ukrainian citizens increases polarization, radicalization of political forces and the electorate. The presence of the “Soviet archetype” in the interaction between the authorities and the opposition is turning into a factor of undermining social and political stability, from within threaten the national security of Ukraine, which determines the political relevance of the topic.

**Analysis of recent publications** on the issues and identification of previ-

ously unsettled parts of the general problem. Archetypal laws of social and state governance processes, behavioral peculiarities of certain Ukrainian politicians are taken care by E. Afonin, O. Donchenko, V. Kozakov, S. Krymsky, A. Martynov, V. Rebklo, A. Sushi [2–6]. The connection of the national identity to the problem of national security from the beginning of the 2000s became the subject of the study of O. Vlasyuk, A. Kolodiy, S. Rymarenko, M. Stepik, and others [7–10]. Appears works that investigate the dangerous influence, in particular, of Soviet identity, the “Soviet” archetype on the self-identification of Ukrainian society (O. Vovchenko) [11], the formation of a single humanitarian space as a component of national security (G. Kasyanov, A. Portnov, V. Sichov) [12–14]. At the same time, the “Soviet” archetype in the interaction between the authorities and the opposition in the context of the threat to Ukraine’s national security has not yet become the subject of an analysis of researchers, indicating the scientific relevance of this issue.

**The purpose of the article** is to justify the existence of a Soviet archetype in the interaction between the authorities and the political opposition for the national security of Ukraine.

**Presenting main material.** The set of values contained in the collective unconscious, the primitive and primordial image – the archetype (as defined by K. Young) has a decisive influence on social tendencies and transformations. The analysis of archetypes, according to S. Krymsky, is a sufficiently adequate method of studying the mentality, the prehistory and the future of social formations. In his opinion, “archetypes

structurally form certain prototypes or can be reconstructed as prototypes” [4, p. 97–98]. So, the interaction of some characteristics of the social structure with others, in particular, the authorities and political opposition, is based on certain prototypes that influence future socio-political processes. According to E. Afonin, A. Martynov, the nonlinear character of the processes of the transitional period in which Ukraine is located are characterized by changes in the tendencies of the social process: from the germination and spread of new institutions to social inversion (the collapse of the social space and the return to the institutional past) [2, p. 45–46].

According to O. Vovchenko, one of the prototypes for Ukrainian self-identification, significant periods of “archetype” of Ukrainian identity, became Soviet times. The researcher calls the following features inherent in the Soviet archetype: “social security along with the lack of political and legal foundations, the formation of a number of sustainable images embodying egocentrism, treason, along with this frankness, honesty and devotion” [11, p. 110].

V. Rebkalov and V. Kozakov substantiate that the repressive Soviet system “created “a new person”, which was characterized by such features as intolerance, aggressiveness, claims to monopoly possession of truth, opportunism. These signs finally formed a completely unstructured person in an ideal-value sense ...” [5, p. 101].

Formation of a Soviet man took place outside the ethnic and national contexts [10, p. 24]. Based on the study of the interaction between the Institute of Political Opposition and Public Ad-

ministration, the features of the Soviet model of the corresponding interaction were clarified [15]. Thus, in the absence of civil society, private property, and parliamentarism, the Soviet authorities in the 1920s and 1930s proclaimed certain “political” currents and target social groups as “enemies of the people”. In the conditions of the operation of the command and administrative system, the government, state bodies repeatedly used violent methods of state administration to the unstructured opposition, up to its physical destruction (shootings of “class enemies”), to the Holodomor 1921–1923, 1932–1933 biennium. The Soviet model of relations between the bodies of state administration and the Ukrainian opposition of the first third of the twentieth century. can be defined as confrontational [15, p. 147]. Cultural confrontation, according to T. Bazarov, B. Eremin, is characterized by the following main cultural archetypes: “closed organizational system, bureaucratic management form; target region – the interests of the “upper”; ... power mechanism – united with bureaucratic apparatus; main function – redistribution of resources; political culture – conservatism (party of power); mechanisms of social mobilization – compulsory; basic ethical value – rank (hierarchy); basic moral-psychological principle – conformism” [16, p. 16].

The establishment of a totalitarian regime in eastern Ukrainian lands since 1929, which allowed organizing and mass repressions against the opposition (the “great terror” of 1937–1938), conditioned the formation of conformism in the attitude of the opposition to the government [15, p. 147]. The culture of

conformism-consolidation is characterized by such cultural archetypes as “the power mechanism — the public opinion of the reference group (“Whoever is not with us, he is against us”); ... political culture — traditionalist or radical type; the presence of collectivist mechanisms of social mobilization. The main ethical value is social justice, the extent of which determines authority (religious, spiritual, political)” [16, p. 16]. Therefore, the Soviet cultural archetype has the features of a culture of confrontation and conformism-consolidation.

At the present stage, various projections of the Ukrainian past coexist in the collective consciousness of Ukrainians. According to M. Stepiko, “at least two of them — actually Ukrainian and Little Russian, containing pro-Russian and Soviet components. It can be argued that these projections of historical memory are not complementary, but in some manifestations — and openly antagonistic [10, p. 273]. According to O. Vlasyuk, the real threat to the national security of Ukraine at the present stage is that almost half of the modern Ukrainian population identifies itself as bearers of Soviet traditions and values, far from the authentic Ukrainian culture; and a significant proportion of citizens consider themselves Russian [7, p. 139]. Based on numerous sociological surveys, the Ukrainian scientist concludes that among the respondents who define themselves as “the people of the former Soviet Union”, the supporters of the left-wing political views — communist and socialist ideology. And among the reference groups that identify themselves with the “Ukrainian population”, there are always more supporters of the Social-Democratic,

Nationalist, and especially National-Democratic ideology [7, p. 139].

Consequently, the Soviet cultural archetype is more characteristic of the supporters of the communist, socialist ideology, as well as representatives of the political forces representing the electorate mainly in the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine. Of course, part of the political-managerial elite, whose ideological principles were formed in the times of the USSR, is also prone to the use of “Soviet” methods of management. The conflict between worldviews and socio-cultural identities, political sympathies and beliefs is clearly manifested in the interaction of power and political opposition.

The Soviet archetype in the interaction of power and political opposition with the attitude of one to another as an enemy dominated from 1991 to 2004. The then political opposition, which was personified by the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU), identified the authorities as someone else: “a corrupt bureaucracy”, carrying out the bouts of the “criminal bourgeoisie”, fixing “the ideology of inequality, the cult of power, cave nationalism” [17]. Later, its leader, P. Symonenko, described the parliamentary majority formed after the Velvet Revolution in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (2000) as the so-called “majority”, which “is run by representatives of the mafia capital and militant nationalist circles”, which “are pushed through parliament anti-people’s laws” [18].

In turn, in response to the massive anti-presidential actions of 2001, the authorities for the first time resorted to attaching the labels of the “fascists” to the mass opposition political structure

of the “National Initiative “National Salvation Forum” (NFP), formed by the National Democrats and Socialists. Thus, in the official appeal of the authorities (then-President of Ukraine L. Kuchma, Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine I. Plyushch and Prime Minister V. Yushchenko) to the Ukrainian people, known as “Letter of the Three” (dated February 13, 2001), was noted : “... before us – the Ukrainian variety of national-socialism”; “One can not but see that attempts to disperse the street element, to launch frankly provocative methods, with which they want to deepen the split in society, to push the power to a power struggle, create a real threat to the national security of the state. We should not forget the lessons of history – let’s recall what and how fascism began” [19].

The Soviet archetype with the signs of confrontation “our – stranger/enemy” was particularly acute on the eve and during the electoral race. During the presidential election campaign in 2004, the authorities, personified by the headquarters of the presidential candidate, Viktor Yanukovich, shaped the enemy's image against the opposition candidate for president, Viktor Yushchenko, using the “alien” markers, demonstrative intolerance: “fascist”, “American son-in-law”. In turn, the headquarters of the opposition candidate V. Yushchenko intimidated the electorate with the future “Donetsk arbitrariness”, the prospect of transforming Ukraine into a dictatorial state in isolation [20]. Opposition on Maydan 2004, using the slogans of value and evaluation (“Freedom not to stop!”, “Gang away!”) Emphasized the “hostility” of power to society.

Changing the form of government from 2005 to 2010 (from the presidential-parliamentary to the parliamentary-presidential republic), the democratization of the political regime led to the transformation of the image of an opponent from the “enemy” to “another” in the political discourse of power-political opposition.

However, the inversion of the political, the return to the institutional past – to the constitutional model of 1996 (presidential-parliamentary form of government) in 2010–2013 restored the Soviet cultural archetype (confrontational culture) in the interaction of power and political opposition. The communists used militant rhetoric not only to the authorities but also to the national-democratic opposition (May-June 2013): “... the fight will have to be on two fronts – “orange-brown “and” white-blue”; to become units of the army, which victoriously fights against capitalism, the primary must coordinate action across the front” [21, p. 18]. Referring to party friends as “fighting friends”, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the CPU, P. Symonenko, assigned them the role of forwards in the fight against the enemy: “Today you are again on the front of the war against Nazism” [22, p. 4, 5; 23, p. 12].

Under the Yanukovich regime, the authorities resorted to the tactics of political persecution of opponents, using administrative resources, abusing the country’s criminal justice system, and the technology of identifying political and criminal responsibility. In 2011, criminal cases were initiated against former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and former Interior Minister Y. Lutsenko.



As R. Voitovich noted, “the post-Soviet practices of building a strong state are based on their technology for the establishment of a strong political regime and the powerful subordination of society to the interests of the state. This is precisely the fundamental difference between the methodology of building a strong state in the post-Soviet and European space, where the emphasis is primarily on the need to establish an effective interaction of power with the public as the basic imperative for strengthening the state’s potential” [24, p. 12]. Thus, in 2010–2013, the authorities regularly applied violent methods of state administration to the political opposition: the dispersal by the power by the forceful way of the Language Maidan (July 2012); the break-up of EuroMaydan in Kyiv (November 2013) with the use of excessive force, the elimination of the opposition and alternative media; The shooting of peaceful protesters on Maydan in Kyiv (February 18, 2014). Launched on February 19, 2014, the so-called “antiterrorist operation” in Ukraine, according to the “Boomerang” plan, pursued the goal of physical destruction of all those who at that time were in the building of the Trade Unions, as well as leaders and activists of the opposition parties of the *Batkivshchyna* Party, “Udar” and “Freedom”. On February 20, 2014, within the framework of the “antiterrorist operation”, according to the Order of the Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine V. Zakharchenko, firearms were used against the protesters for defeat [25].

Russia’s hybrid war against Ukraine, the annexation of the Crimea, the occupation of the Donbas divided power and

political opposition not only through ideology but also in the national (patriotic) context of “our/patriot – alien/separatist/traitor”. The Communists, as the carriers of the Soviet archetype, continued to use militant rhetoric and put the labels of the “fascists” on the authorities (March 2014); characterize the regime in Ukraine as a “national fascist, established as a result of a coup d’etat”; scare by “the threat of fasciation of state and public life ... covered by the authorities!”, call “... fascism will not pass! Get up, the country is great!” [26, p. 6, 11]. Pro-Russian party “Opposition bloc”, formed by rebranding the “Party of Regions”, following the Russian propagandists began to label the government: “junta”, “banderivtsi”, “fascists” (from February, 2014). Became a parliamentary minority in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of the 8<sup>th</sup> convocation, the “Opposition bloc” was accusing the parliamentary majority of the reluctance to end the war by hanging it on the label “coalition of war”. And also criticized the authorities, believing that its purpose was to “by any means” pull “out of the population more money to fill the empty treasury”. “The government has reached practically the social genocide of people, but they do not seem to care” (July 2015) [27].

The attitude of political opposition to power as an enemy led to destabilization of society, complicated the development of democracy, threatened the preservation and strengthening of state sovereignty of Ukraine, as well as the ability of the state to make fundamental and vital decisions in the interests of the entire Ukrainian society.

Understanding the internal political threats to the national security of

Ukraine in conditions of external aggression, in order to level the influence of the Soviet archetype and strengthen the national identity, the authorities were forced to accelerate the policy of decommunization from 2015. According to A. Portnov, the negative attitude to the policy of de-communization of the political opposition (Opposition bloc and CPU) showed the existence of the problem of “ignorance and misunderstanding of the Soviets” [13]. It seems that the rejection of the said political opposition by the crimes of the communist regime is due to the presence of its stable Soviet archetype.

In order to eliminate the symbols of the Soviet identity, on April 9, 2015, decommunization (“memorial”) laws were adopted. The law of Ukraine “On the Conviction of Communist and National-Socialist (Nazi) Totalitarian Regimes in Ukraine and the Prohibition of the Promotion of Their Symbols” prohibited Soviet symbolism, condemned the communist regime [28]. Although he, in essence, identified the communist and Nazi totalitarian regimes, the authorities did not hide the label of “fascists” on modern communists. At the same time, according to G. Kasyanov, the methods of implementation of decommunization laws differed slightly from those used in the Soviet period [12].

In June 2018, the Law of Ukraine “On National Security of Ukraine” was adopted, in which threats to the national security of Ukraine determine the phenomena, trends and factors that make it impossible or complicate or may make it impossible or difficult to realize national interests and preserve national treasures of Ukraine [29, p. 1,

6]. The absence of a collective Ukrainian unconscious (Ukrainian language, democratic values, national democratic ideological orientations) in some regions of Ukraine, the preservation of the Soviet cultural archetype: The Russian language and culture, symbolism, values orientations, customs and traditions, is becoming a significant threat to the humanitarian security of the state. The Soviet archetype in the interaction between the authorities and the opposition creates an internal political danger to the national security of Ukraine.

Rebroadcasting of the Soviet archetype, in particular, appeared during the 2019 presidential election campaign in campaigning for opposition candidates. Thus, the participants of the election race (in particular, Y. Boyko, O. Vilkul, O. Lyashko etc.) demonstratively distanced themselves from the authorities, resorted to populist statements, irresponsible flare up with the instincts of voters, giving promises that could not be fulfilled: reduction of communal tariffs, decrease the price of gas, increasing salaries of pensions, the growth of industry, agriculture. Firstly, the slogans concerning the increase in wealth (incidentally, is not the authority of the president) were often dominated by the speeches of the opposition candidates. It is known that the domination of material needs, the commitment to authoritarian methods of government, the fear of nationalism, the cult of strength and power, intolerance are inherent in the Soviet identity [8, p. 74].

Secondly, anti-Ukrainian agitation was heard (with Soviet / Russian values in the background), which complicated civil consolidation, threatened social stability, made it impossible to preserve

the national values of Ukraine. Thus, the representative of the left forces, the leader of the Radical Party Oleg Lyashko, positioning himself as a “people’s” president, in essence, hinted at the establishment of an authoritarian regime: “Lyashko will be in Ukraine like Lukashenka in Belarus. Everyone will fly like a thorny broom” [30]. The leader of the Opposition Platform – For Life, Co-chairman of the opposition bloc Y. Boyko in one of the campaign video promises to “stop the fratricidal war; to teach children in school in their native language, and not as imposing; pay for real tariffs, and not those that enrich the power; to go to the church to which we want, but not to which the authorities force; Celebrate holidays that you value, not imaginary regime”. So the presidential election witnessed a confrontational interaction between the authorities and the political opposition, which is a manifestation of the Soviet archetype.

**Conclusions and perspectives of further research.** Thus, the Soviet archetype in the interaction of power and political opposition manifests itself in shaping the image of the “other” as “alien”/“enemy” using the instruments of speech influence (aggressive rhetoric, verbal warfare), hanging labels; technologies of administrative resources, mass manipulation, in particular, linguistic issues in Ukraine, intimidation of the electorate of the enemy; the use of information pressure by the authorities to the opposition, sometimes force methods, political repressions – political criminal practices, tactics of ignoring the opposition, unanimous bureaucratic administration, forced methods for the electorate, with the imitation of

“citizen participation in decision-making”. The brightest Soviet archetype in the corresponding interaction manifests itself in conditions of curtailing the democratic regime, during electoral races and in extreme situations. The existence of two types of worldviews, two archetypes – genuinely Ukrainian and Soviet/pro-Russian – polarizes Ukraine, threatening its civil consolidation and social stability. The Soviet archetype in the interaction between the authorities and political opposition in the face of external danger in the worldwide uncertainty of a part of Ukrainian society is a political danger threatening the national security of Ukraine.

Further research will be devoted to the study of the development of trends in the interaction between the authorities and the opposition with the use of an archetypal approach.

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