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ARCHETYPATIVE BASIS OF INTERACTION AUTHORITIES AND OPPOSITIONS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECOMMUNIZATION POLICY IN UKRAINE

Abstract. In the article, in the context of the archetypal approach, the interaction of the authorities and the opposition in the course of implementing the decommunization policy was analyzed. An integral part of a decommunization policy was changing the Soviet names of toponymic objects in residential places bearing the Communist totalitarian regime symbols that consecrated persons involved in the crimes of the latter, also the events related to the activities of the Communist Party, the development of Soviet power in Ukraine, the persecution of participants in the struggle for Ukraine's independence in the XX century. The Soviet archetypal basis of decommunization methods in Ukraine is revealed, which it was testified to the rapid pace of policy, the lack of information support, explanations,

especially for the population of the central and eastern regions of Ukraine, for which the Soviet symbolics was continues to be valuable.

The imperial/Soviet archetypes of interaction between the authorities and the opposition are defined by the example of renaming of Soviet names for objects of toponymy of settlements containing symbols of the communist totalitarian regime.

Polarized regionalism of Ukrainian society, two distinct national identities based on different systems of political values, have formed various archetypes. Thus, in Uzhgorod and Kirovohrad, the influence of the imperial (respectively, Austrian and Russian) archetypes was reflected. The opposition of some city councils of the Naddniproshynny and eastern Ukraine to the parliament's decisions was sometimes determined not by the number of opposition, but by the Soviet identity of the deputy corps.

The existence of a confrontational type of the interaction between parliamentary opposition and government/president is substantiated; also between the opposition, embodied by the local political and management elite of Kirovohrad, Kharkiv and Komsomolsk of Poltava's region, and the state power, personified by the head of the relevant regional state administration/parliament. It is proved that the conformal type is inherent of interaction the opposition, which is represented by the city council of Dnipropetrovsk and the authorities represented by the respective mayor/parliament; also the interaction between opposition, which represented by the city council/mayor of Uzhhorod and the authorities, which is represented by the chairman of the Transcarpathian Regional State Administration.

Keywords: decommunization, values, identity, Soviet archetype, confrontational and conformal types of interaction, opposition, power.

АРХЕТИПНЕ ПІДҐРУНТЯ ВЗАЄМОДІЇ ВЛАДИ Й ОПОЗИЦІЇ У ПРОЦЕСІ РЕАЛІЗАЦІЇ ПОЛІТИКИ ДЕКОМУНІЗАЦІЇ В УКРАЇНІ

Анотація. У контексті архетипного підходу проаналізовано взаємодію влади та опозиції у процесі реалізації політики декомунізації. Складовою політики декомунізації стало перейменування об'єктів топоніміки населених пунктів, назви яких містили символіку комуністичного тоталітарного режиму; були присвячені особам, причетним до злочинів останнього, а також подіям, пов'язаним із діяльністю комуністичної партії, встановленням радянської влади на території України, переслідуванням учасників боротьби за незалежність України у ХХ столітті. З'ясовано радянське архетипне підґрунтя методів декомунізації в Україні, що засвідчили швидкий темп проведення політики, відсутність інформаційного супроводу, пояснень, особливо для населення центральних і східних регіонів України, для якого радянський символічний простір продовжує бути цінним.

Виявлено імперські та радянські архетипи взаємодії влади та опозиції на прикладі перейменувань радянських назв об'єктів топоніміки населених пунктів, що містили символи комуністичного тоталітарного режиму. Поларизований регіоналізм українського суспільства, дві відмінні національні

ідентичності, що спиралися на різні системи політичних цінностей, сформували різні архетипи. Так, в Ужгороді та Кіровограді відбився вплив імперського (відповідно, австрійського та російського) архетипу. Протидія деяких міських рад Наддніпрянщини та Східної України рішенням парламенту іноді обумовлювалася не кількістю опозиції, а радянською ідентичністю депутатського корпусу.

Обґрунтовано конфронтаційний тип взаємодії парламентської опозиції та уряду/Президента; а також опозиції, уособленої місцевою політико-управлінською елітою Кіровограда, Харкова й Комсомольська Полтавської області, та державної влади, уособленої головою відповідної обласної державної адміністрації/парламентом. Доведено, що конформний тип взаємодії притаманний опозиції, репрезентованій міськрадою Дніпропетровська, та владі, репрезентованій відповідним міським головою/парламентом; а також опозиції, представлений міськрадою/міським головою Ужгорода, та владі, представлений головою Закарпатської обласної державної адміністрації.

Ключові слова: декомунізація, цінності, ідентичність, радянський архетип, конфронтаційний та конформний типи взаємодії, опозиція, влада.

АРХЕТИПНОЕ ОСНОВАНИЕ ВЗАИМОДЕЙСТВИЯ ВЛАСТИ И ОПОЗИЦИИ В ХОДЕ РЕАЛИЗАЦИИ ПОЛИТИКИ ДЕКОММУНИЗАЦИИ В УКРАИНЕ

Аннотация. В контексте архетипного подхода проанализировано взаимодействие власти и оппозиции в процессе реализации политики декомунизации. Составляющей политики декомунизации стало переименование объектов топонимики населенных пунктов, названия которых содержали символику коммунистического тоталитарного режима; были посвящены лицам, причастным к преступлениям последнего, а также событиям, связанным с деятельностью коммунистической партии, установлением советской власти на территории Украины, преследованием участников борьбы за независимость Украины в XX веке. Выявлена советская архетипная основа методов декомунизации в Украине, которые показали быстрый темп проведения политики, отсутствие информационного сопровождения, объяснений особенно для населения центральных и восточных регионов Украины, для которого советское символическое пространство продолжает быть ценным.

Выявлено имперские и советские архетипы взаимодействия власти и оппозиции на примере переименований советских названий объектов топонимики населенных пунктов, содержащих символы коммунистического тоталитарного режима. Поляризованный регионализм украинского общества, две отличные национальные идентичности, которые опирались на различные системы политических ценностей, сформировали разные архетипы. Так, в Ужгороде и Кировограде отразилось влияние имперского (соответственно, австрийского и российского) архетипа. Противодействие некоторых городских советов Приднепровья и Восточной Украины решениям парламента

иногда обуславливалась не количеством оппозиции, а советской идентичностью депутатского корпуса.

Обосновано конфронтационный тип взаимодействия парламентской оппозиции и правительства/Президента; а также оппозиции, олицетворенной местной политико-управленческой элитой Кировограда, Харькова и Комсомольска Полтавской области, и государственной власти, олицетворенной председателем соответствующей областной государственной администрации/парламентом. Доказано, что конформный тип взаимодействия присущ оппозиции, представленной горсоветом Днепропетровска, и власти, представленной соответствующим городским головой/парламентом; а также оппозиции, представленной горсоветом/городским головой Ужгорода, и власти, представленной председателем Закарпатской областной государственной администрации.

Ключевые слова: декоммунизация, ценности, идентичность, советский архетип, конфронтационный и конформный типы взаимодействия, оппозиция, власть.

Target setting. Formation of a unified humanitarian space (in particular, that of symbols) in Ukraine under the conditions of a hybrid information war has a security dimension. In this respect, pursuing a decommunization policy aimed at elimination of the consequences of the Communist ideology and enhancing the national identity has become a forced step entailed by external aggression. The ideological antagonism of the parliamentary opposition, counteraction, sabotage of part of the local politico-administrative elite, and ambivalent attitude to the government action on the part of some territorial communities have aggravated and slowed down decommunization policy implementation. This policy has made visible the existence of the Soviet archetypes inherent in both the representatives of power and opposition, which has come to determine a capacity/incapacity for managing local humanitarian development. All the above said gives

special importance to the research into the archetypal basis of the power-opposition interaction in the course of decommunization policy implementation in Ukraine.

Analysis of recent research and publications. Research works on a decommunization policy focus on the problems of its implementation (V. Babka, V. Lozovyi, L. Males, V. Viatrovych) [1; 13; 14]; methods and practices of carrying out the policy (H. Kasianov, T. Khitrova, A. Portnov) [9; 17; 25]; archetypes in the historical memory (O. Vovchenko) [3]. Analysis of the ethno-cultural, value-based identities of the regions (A. Kolodii, V. Kozakov, V. Rebkalo) [10; 11; 20] makes it possible to foresee the specificity of local perception of the current policy of the Ukrainian state. At the same time, the archetypal basis of the power-opposition interaction in the course of decommunization policy implementation in Ukraine has not be-

come a subject of scientific analysis yet, which explains the scientific topicality of the present study.

The purpose of the article is exploring of the archetypical basis for interaction between the power and opposition under decommunization policy implementation in the Zakarpattia, Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad, Poltava, and Kharkiv regions with regard to changing the Soviet names of toponymic objects in residential places bearing the symbols of the Communist totalitarian regime.

The statement of basic materials. The archetype being a type of interaction among characteristics of a social structure exerts a determining impact on social trends and transformations [5, p. 11]. The application of the archetypical approach involves interpreting governance processes as collective subconscious. It can be assumed that representatives of the power and opposition of the same age may be carriers of the same archetype of management culture. Thus, they reproduce the archetype of an interaction/social practice that was assimilated at the collective subconscious level previously/at an earlier stage of political system development. Archetypes manifest themselves in the form of symbols (heroic images, rituals, traditions, behavioral practice in general) and contain generalized experience of the ancestors [3, p. 69, 74; 5, p. 124, 126]. Therefore, a type of the power-opposition interaction determines the rate, efficiency, and quality of a decommunization policy.

In the opinion of V. Rebkalo and V. Kozakov, “the post-Communist countries develop in accordance with the logic of forming a collective iden-

tity (by contrasting themselves with others), rather than in line with solidarity logic through recognition of the rights of one another (a democratic solidarity) [20, p. 99]. Absence of “the collective Ukrainian subconscious” leads to “an increased attractiveness for the ethnic groups inhabiting the border regions of Ukraine to identify with the peoples of the neighboring states, while for many of the neighboring states – to design scenarios of “protecting their compatriots” in the Ukrainian territory” [3, p. 4]. That is why one of the lines of the national memory policy is decommunization which is aimed at Ukraine’s making a definitive break with the Soviet past (Soviet archetype) at the level of fundamental values, liquidation of the Communist symbols, in order to renovate the Ukraine-centered values, consolidate the Ukrainian nation, and develop its historical consciousness [1, p. 166]. This policy came into being at the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union and received a boost in May of 2015 due to entering into force of a package of ‘decommunization laws’, namely: “On condemnation of the communist and national-socialist (Nazi) totalitarian regimes and prohibition of propaganda of their symbols”; “On access to the archives of repressive bodies of the communist totalitarian regime of 1917–1991”, “On the legal status and honoring the memory of fighters for independence of Ukraine in the twentieth century”, “On commemoration of the victory over Nazism in the World War II (1939–1945)”. These laws were elaborated by the Ukrainian Institute of the National Memory (UINM) – a government body that is responsible

for forming and implementing policy “in the sphere of restoration and preservation of the national memory” in Ukraine. Decommunization was planned to be completed on 21.11.2016.

An integral part of a decommunization policy was changing the Soviet names of toponymic objects in residential places bearing the Communist totalitarian regime symbols that consecrated persons involved in the organization and execution of Holodomor of 1932–1933 in Ukraine, political repressions, people who occupied the leading positions in the Communist party, the highest bodies of power and governance in the USSR, UkrSSR, other union and autonomous republics (except persons engaged for the most part in development of the Ukrainian science and culture), the Soviet state security officers; as well as symbols devoted to the memorable events of the Communist party’s activity, establishment of the Soviet rule throughout Ukraine or in separate administrative territorial entities, persecution of the participants in fighting for the independence of Ukraine in the twentieth century [19, Art. 7, para. 6].

The Council of Ministers of the Autonomous Republic of the Crimea, regional state administrations, the state administrations of Kyiv and Sevastopol, local self-government bodies were to accomplish the planned actions within a six-month term from the effective date of the Decommunization Law. Within that period of time, they were to hold public hearings and submit for consideration of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine their suggestions about the appropriate renaming of residential places, districts, and regions [19, Art. 7, para. 7]. In case of they do not

make any relevant decisions within the six-month period, the chairs of village, township, municipal councils were to issue renaming regulations within the next three-month period, taking into account suggestions of the public, scientists, and recommendations of UINM. If no renaming was effected, the next step was to be a directive issued by the head of the respective regional state administration [19, Art. 7, para. 6].

If over the six-month period from the effective date of the said Law the responsible public authorities and local self-governments have not submitted to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine their proposals on changing the Soviet names of residential place, districts and regions, the relevant decision was to be made by the Parliament within a three-month term. In the absence of proposals from the local level, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine was to act in the line with recommendations of UINM [19, Art. 7 para. 8].

The shortness of the period during which the Communist symbols were supposed to be eradicated was stipulated by the external threat. However, unlike the archetype, the symbol represents one of the most stable elements of the cultural continuum. The fast pace of decommunization and the potential of conflict between representatives of different tiers of authority, built in the above algorithm of the decommunization laws implementation, was the manifestation of the Soviet archetype in administrative culture. The characteristic features of the archetype under study are as follows: “a closed organizational system, a bureaucratic administrative entity; the goal-setting domain is the interests of “the leader-

ship elite”; ...the mechanism of authority is one-man management aided by a bureaucratic apparatus; the main function – redistribution of resources; the political culture – conservatism (the ruling party); the mechanisms of social mobilization – coercive; the key ethical value – servility (hierarchy); the basic moral and psychological principle – conformism” [26, p. 16]. It is notable that a Doctor of Historical Sciences H. Kasianov pointed out that methods of decommunization are little different from those applied in the Soviet period: “the methods of implementation resemble very much the cultural patterns against which these laws are directed, ...“decommunization” of topography is a twist of its “communization” [9]. T. Khitrova also warned against monopolization of a decommunization discourse in the information space [25, p. 62].

At the first decommunization stage, some representatives of the parliamentary opposition (O. Vilkul, M. Skoryk) voiced criticism of the governmental line of policy. On 19.05.2015, Vice-Prime Minister of the oppositional government and a people’s deputy N. Korolevska declared in the Verkhovna Rada that “the government increases a divide in the Ukrainian society through the autocratic laws on decommunization” [21]. At the same time she stressed that the Opposition Bloc demands adherence to democratic principles, in the first place, civil freedoms, the right for every citizen of Ukraine to freely express their views and convictions [21]. After an official completion of decommunization in spring 2017, the Opposition Bloc made an official statement (11.04.2017): “In several years

that passed from the moment of declaring a decommunization policy, the government committed a number of crimes against people’s memory, against the dignity of the Ukrainian citizens, against the freedom of conscience and the right of citizens to have their own opinion” [7]. In May 2017, 46 people’s deputies (from the Opposition Bloc and other fractions) lodged a petition with the Constitutional Court of Ukraine about holding the law on decommunization unconstitutional. Combining the opposing contents – protection of the Soviet/nondemocratic values with a simultaneous advancement of demands of adherence to democratic principles – testifies to the ambivalence of the parliamentary opposition towards the colliding components of a dichotomy “democracy – totalitarianism”. Such an attitude towards the decommunization policy is explained, on the one hand, by existence of a stable Soviet archetype, denying crimes committed by the Communist regime (as A. Portnov puts it, “ignorance and misunderstanding of the Soviet” [17]). The repressive Soviet system “was engineering “a new man” who was distinguished by such features as intolerance, aggressiveness, claims on monopoly over truth, opportunistic nature. These traits ultimately formed a man who was totally unstructured in an ideal-value dimension...” [20, p. 101]. On the other hand, under transformation towards a democratic regime the parliamentary opposition assimilated a new value orientation. The confrontational attitude of the Opposition Bloc to the public authorities, represented by the parliamentary majority, the government and the President, is rooted in the Soviet

archetype of power-opposition interaction. The respective model appeared in the context of the command-and-control system functioning, lack of parliamentarism and private ownership [22, p. 352].

It has been found that for the majority of the population of the central and eastern regions of Ukraine, the space of symbols (monuments, place-names) of the Soviet regime still remains valuable. An all-Ukrainian sociological research “Conflict in the media, the media in conflict” conducted in August 2015 showed a prejudiced attitude of 35 % of the respondents towards the decommunization reform [2]. Upon completion of decommunization in November 2016, as a research by the Sociological group “Rating” proves, the respondents were more opposing (57 %), rather than supportive (35 %) of the reform [23]. Also, some of the poll results have shown ambivalent attitude of the population to the decommunization policy. 44 % of the respondents were totally against the idea of renaming streets, while 49 % of the respondents favored “selective renaming” [23]. The number of decommunization policy supporters differs essentially from one region to another: in the west of Ukraine – 72 %; in the central regions – 41 %; in the south – 26 %; and in the east – 18 % of the respondents [23].

The above differences are premised on different regional identities. A political analyst A. Kolodii noted that “the regional divergence of political likes and dislikes was typical of the Ukrainian policy during the entire independence period” [10]. The researcher believes that due to the polarized regionalism of the Ukrainian society with

two politically active ‘centers of gravity’ – Galychyna (Lviv) and Donbass (Donetsk) – over the years of independence two opposing (antagonistic) societal cultures were formed, having two different national identities based on different systems of political values, economic and socio-political practices, and regional elites’ activities [10]. The foundation for the Donetsk culture and identity was laid by the Soviet and regional (local) identities [11, p. 74] characterized by domination of material needs, propensity to authoritarian governance methods, fear of nationalism, a cult of force and power, intolerance. The identity of Galychyna and the rest of the regions was based on the national Ukrainian identity, a desire – although expressed to a varying extent in different parts of the country – to create ‘a Ukrainian Ukraine’ (protection of the language and culture of the ethnical Ukrainians with a tolerant treatment of other languages and cultures) and to establish a democratic form of government with the rule of law [10].

Different basic “sets of values” form different archetypes [20, p. 96]. Regional identities/archetypes determine the types of power-opposition interaction which surfaced in the course of implementing decommunization in the Zakarpattia, Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad, Poltava, and Kharkiv regions.

Before intervention of the head of the Zakarpattia Regional State Administration (ZRSA), the attitude of the territorial communities was indifferent. The creative “threats” of H. Moskal “to rename Clara Zetkin Street as Red Lights Street, and Chapaev Street – as Anka and Pet’ka Street” have accelerated decommunization to some ex-

tent [18]. However in spring 2016, the mayor of Uzhhorod B. Andriiv (from Vidrodzhennia (Revival) Party [16] represented by the former members of the Party of Regions) withdrew from consideration a draft resolution on renaming of 22 streets [8]. A passive resistance to the decommunization policy on the part of the majority of the Uzhhorod City Council (25 % of deputies from Vidrodzhennia fraction [16]) can be explained by their Soviet identity. Procrastination, backtracking from resolving the issues of renaming the Soviet residential places are the evidence of a conformal model of interaction between the opposition (Uzhhorod mayor and city council) and public authorities (head of ZRSA). It is likely that the archetypical basis for the said type of interaction is a result of transformation of a consensus model that was formed in the Zakarpattia in the Austrian period (the 19th century) into a confrontational model (from 1939) which existed in the Soviet Union [22, p. 351, 352].

Not all of the mayors opted for issuing resolutions that contradicted the values of the majority of local councils' deputies and part of their electorates i.e. territorial communities. Renaming of the city of Dnipropetrovsk (named after the Dnipro river and one of the initiators of the 1932–1933 Holodomor H. Petrovskiy) was complicated by the opposition of a relative majority (39 %) of deputies from a fraction of the Opposition Bloc party, and a city mayor B. Filatov, a representative of the “Ukrainian Association of Patriots — UKROP” party [16]. Since 90,5 % of the city residents were against renaming Dnipropetrovsk [18], the city council did not submit any renaming sug-

gestions to the Parliament at all. It was not done even after signing a coalition agreement on 24.02.2016 (by 35 deputies of the city council from the fractions UKROP, Samopomich, and a larger part of deputies from the Opposition Bloc) which was to help arrange joint work with the mayor [4]. Therefore, the Parliament renamed the city as Dnipro by itself, which was argued against by the Opposition Bloc representatives. At first mayor B. Filatov declared the necessity for implementing decisions of the state legislative body [15]. Yet, later on he addressed the speaker A. Parubii with a request to postpone the signing of the resolution on renaming of the city, arguing that “a change of the city is untimely, since many people do not understand what is going on” [18].

A desire of Dnipropetrovsk territorial community and its politico-administrative elite to preserve the humanitarian space of the Soviet Union speaks for the presence of the Soviet identity traits. A loyal attitude of the city leader from a pro-presidential political party towards the decommunization policy and the confrontation of the city council/territorial community promoted establishing of the conformal type of interaction between the power (mayor, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine) and local political opposition (the majority of the city council members). This, in turn, was stipulated by the Soviet archetype of interaction between a city as “a foundry of administrative cadres” and the metropolitan center. As well as by the conformal type of the power-opposition interaction in part of the Eastern-Ukrainian lands that was formed after a repeated Soviet practice of using Holodomors as a state mecha-

nism for liquidating the opposition [22, p. 352].

The resistance of certain city councils to the decisions of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in some cases is explained by their deputy corps' identity rather than by the opposition's numerical strength. The confrontation between a territorial community/city council and the Parliament also took place in Kirovohrad where its mayor A. Raikovych together with a relative majority (21 %) of city council deputies represented a pro-presidential party BPP Solidarnist [18]. The territorial community voiced its discontent with the new city names ('Inhulsk', 'Kropyvnytskyi') in the form of protest acts beneath the walls of the Parliament and the city council. Naming the city after a Ukrainian writer, dramatist, and public figure M. Kropyvnytskyi satisfied a mere 8 % of its residents [6]. A poll jointly conducted in by Kyiv International Institute of Sociology and the Sociological group "Rating" in April 2016 demonstrated a desire of the majority of the city residents (56,9 %) to retain the name of 'Kirovohrad' (despite the fact that Kirov was one of the orchestrators of Holodomor in 1932–1933), or to change it (if there is no other way) for 'Yelisavetgrad' (54,9 %) [6]. Wishing to remove the Soviet and imperial symbols from the humanitarian space of Ukraine, however, without pressing for "the UINM strategy of renewal of the past Cossack symbols" [14, p. 19], on 14.07.2016 the Parliament changed the name of the city of Kirovohrad to Kropyvnytskyi, consolidating the symbols of the Ukrainian identity. The confrontational attitude of the opposition (the majority of the city council members)

towards the Mayor/UINM/the Parliament was also displayed during the renaming of the Kirovohrad City Council. Thus, the new name 'The City Council of the city of Kropyvnytskyi' given on 30.11.2017 instead of the normative 'the Kropyvnytskyi City Council' does not conform to the law [12]. The confrontation between the local opposition and the government authorities can be accounted for by a dualistic imperial-Soviet archetype, formed under rigid centralization as far back as in the times of the Russian empire [22, p. 351] (the city emerged in the mid-1770s) and enhanced in the Soviet period.

The process of renaming Komsomolsk, Poltava region, was difficult and long-lasting, although the majority of its city council was represented by members of the fraction of BPP Solidarnist and Poltava Regional Council – by members of the then pro-government fractions (BPP Solidarnist, Batkyvshchyna) [16]. During public hearings (17.09.2015), 98 % of the residents favored retaining of the name 'Komsomolsk' as an abbreviation for a Ukrainian phrase meaning 'a team of young socially motivated people, true Cossacks' (*KOLEKTYV Molodykh SOtsial'no MOTYVOVANYKH LIUDEJ*, ('), *SPRAVZHNIKH*, ('), *Kozakiv*) [18]. The city council left the old name, giving it a new interpretation. In spite of the ruling of UINM as to illegitimacy of that "renaming", the mayor socialist D. Bykov [16] kept the city's old name, giving as a reason the will of its 16 thousand residents [18]. On 19.05.2016, the Parliament renamed Komsomolsk as Horishni Plavni. At the protest rally of the residents of Horishni Plavni near the

city hall on 23.05.2016, D. Bykov made a promise to contest the decision of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in the Supreme Administrative Court, to apply to the President and the deputies most of which, in his opinion, “were unaware of the fact that the community of Komsomolsk is against the new name” [18]. The opposition fractions of Poltava Regional Council initiated a draft decision about calling on the speaker of the Parliament as to renaming the city.

Representatives of local authorities, being the carriers of the Soviet identity, do not realize that the space of symbols of the Communist regime impedes the formation of the Ukrainian identity. They are oriented at welfare issues, comparing the living standards at the times of “communists” and “democrats”, which evokes nostalgia for the “socialist stability” and, as it was considered, “a fair distribution” of social benefits [13, p. 300]. The archetypical basis for a confrontational model of interaction between the government bodies (head of Poltava Regional State Administration, UINM, the Parliament) and the political opposition (mayor, majority of the city council) is a Soviet model of the relevant relations. This model is marked by priority of socio-economic requirements over a state-formation component [22, p. 352].

In Kharkiv, where a vast majority of deputies of the Kharkiv City Council (almost 70 %) and the mayor H. Kernes represent the political party Vidrodzhennia [16], also tried to preserve the names of some of the city districts by changing the underlying rationalization. At the municipal hearings (November, 2015) H. Kernes suggested that Dzerzhynskiy district should be

named after a neurologist who was F. Dzerzhynskiy's brother; Zhovtnevyi (October) district — in honor of the month when Ukraine was liberated from the German invaders; Frunzenskiy district — to commemorate the pilot, a Hero of the USSR, the son of the Bolshevik. The city council decided that the decommunization law does not apply to the names of Chervonozavodskiy (Red Factory) and Kominternivskiy (Communist International) districts altogether [18]. Decommunization was completed by the head of Kharkiv Regional State Administration I. Rainin (order of 17.05.2016). The local politico-administrative elite of Kharkiv showed the territorial community its noninvolvement with the decommunization policy, counterposing itself to the state (central/regional) authorities under the principle “us-them”, effecting, in the meantime, a series of renamings. The origins of this confrontational model of interaction between the local political opposition and state authorities can be found in the Soviet archetype of the status of Kharkiv as “the first capital of the Soviet Ukraine”. Its former opposition to the Ukraine-centered Kyiv is reproduced, now and then, in the modern political history. This fact proves the Soviet archetypical basis of interaction of the local opposition (mayor, majority of city council) and power (head of Kharkiv Regional State Administration, UINM).

In December of 2016, UINM reported that decommunization in Ukraine was completed by 99 %: 987 residential places bearing the names of the Communist era were renamed, and 1500 monuments to Lenin and Bolsheviks were dismantled. However,

alongside with reduction of the number of decommunization adversaries, the number of its supporters reduced, too: 41,1 % and 32,8 % of the respondents, respectively; while the number of indifferent respondents grew to 24,5 % [24].

Conclusions. Thus, application of the archetypical approach to analysis of the methods for decommunization policy implementation in Ukraine made it possible to identify their Soviet archetypical basis. A forced application of these methods to forming a new Ukrainian collective identity in the conditions of external aggression, at the stage of transformation from the Communist to a democratic regime restored the Soviet archetypes of power-opposition interaction. A confrontational type is represented by interaction of the parliamentary opposition and the government/President; the local politico-administrative elite of Kirovohrad, Kharkiv, Komsomolsk of Poltava region and the state (regional/central) power; a conformal type – by interaction of the City Council and mayor of Dnipropetrovsk/the Parliament, and between the City Council/mayor of Uzhhorod and the head of the Zakarpattia Regional State Administration.

Further research will be devoted to forecasting the trends of forming a unified humanitarian space, the national identity with account of the archetypical basis for the power-opposition interaction, and substantiation of effective models of managing local/regional humanitarian development.

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