Socio-Political Myth: Myths Making and Myth Creativity in the Prism of Modern Communicate Practices

Abstract. The analysis of myth within the political science of the humanities does not contain precise guidelines for solving current problems of rethinking the role of myth in the transit society, highlighting the possibilities of using the mobilizing potential of myth in achieving positive social changes. Therefore, the need to outline a new understanding of the phenomenology of modern myth, conceptualization of the problem field of political myth as a factor in forming new qualities of political consciousness of Ukrainian society, clarifying the content, efficiency, morality, instrumentality of mythmaking in a transformational society determines the relevance of the research topic.

The dynamics of socio-cultural change at the present stage raises new problems associated with the crisis in the political sphere, exacerbated by the virtualization of social relations. Social myth-making is an integral part of public life, and election campaigns are the clearest example of it.

Consciousness of the transformational stage of development of Ukrainian society is a favourable basis for change, but it is particularly inclined to manipulation.
Mythology in society can be an excuse, a pretext to assert one’s inaction. In a crisis society, given the low legitimacy of power, the technological role of artificial political myths in the aspect of manipulation of public consciousness is fully revealed.

Thus, the figurative language of political communication constructs a sacred political reality by modeling the idea of it, constituted in the form of significant constructive facts, relevant to the Ukrainian political culture ‘mythotext’, which the collective personality reads. Therefore, communication through myth is a model of one-way political communication.

Socio-political myth effectively structures the vision of the present and the future, but complicates conscious political choices.

**Keywords:** socio-political myth, myth making, myth creativity, modern communicative practices, public management.
Ключевые слова: социально-политический миф, мифотворение, мифотворческость, коммуникативные практики, публичное управление.

СОЦИАЛЬНО-ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИЙ МИФ: КОНСТРУИРОВАНИЕ И МИФОТВОРЧЕСТВО В ПРИЗМЕ СОВРЕМЕННЫХ КОММУНИКАТИВНЫХ ПРАКТИК

Аннотация. Проанализирован миф на основе междисциплинарного подхода. Данный вопрос не содержит точных указаний относительно решения актуальных задач переосмысления ролей мифа в транзитном обществе, выделение возможностей использования мобилизационного потенциала мифа для осуществления позитивных общественных изменений. Поэтому необходимость определения нового понимания феноменологии современного мифа, концептуализации проблемного поля политического мифа как фактора формирования новых качеств политического сознания украинского общества, внесение ясности в вопрос содержательности, эффективности, справедливости, инструментальности мифотворчества в трансформационном обществе обусловливает актуальность темы исследования.

Динамика социокультурных изменений на современном этапе порождает новые проблемы, связанные с кризисными явлениями в политической сфере, усиленные виртуализацией части общественных отношений. Обосновано, что социальное мифотворчество является неотъемлемой составляющей общественной жизни, а самым ярким его примером становятся избирательные кампании.

Сознание украинского общества является благоприятной основой для изменений, но оно особенно подвержено манипуляциям. Мифология в социуме может быть оправданием, отговоркой для утверждения собственной бездеятельности. В кризисном обществе при низкой легитимности власти в полной мере раскрывается технологическая роль искусственных политических мифов в аспекте манипуляции общественным сознанием.

Итак, образная речь политической коммуникации конструирует сакральную политическую реальность способом моделирования представления о ней в виде значимых фактов-конструктов, релевантного украинской политической культуре "мифотексту", который читает коллективная личность. Коммуникация с помощью мифа — это модель односторонней политической коммуникации.

Социально-политический миф действительно структурирует видение настоящего и будущего, но усложняет осознанный политический выбор.

Ключевые слова: социально-политический миф, мифотворение, мифотворчество, коммуникативные практики, публичное управление.

Сформулирование проблемы. Nowadays, myths are a tool that shapes communication strategies, and political mythology is a way of understanding
social communications. Myth is a form of rationalization of communicative practices.

Therefore, myths are of different types: created in the process of myth-creativity and through the mechanisms of myth-making. Of course, most myths that appeared through myth-creativity have clearly defined subjective motives and, consequently, a formal mythical structure with a low level of energy. Because of this, the myth loses its sacredness. In the case of myth-making, the deep energies of the collective and national unconscious are involved, which creates the possibility of immersing a person in a sacred time. In the works of R. Bart [1] and J. Derrida [2], which chronologically date back to the second half of the twentieth century, we can trace the emergence of a radical change in the understanding of myth as a desecrated fragmentary structure that has no metanormative energy content.

Analysis of the recent research and publications. Among the works in Ukraine in which the issue of political myth is highlighted, we should give an emphasis to the studies of D. Arabadzhiev, V. Artyukh, V. Buyan, O. Donchenko, S. Krymsky, V. Malakhov, O. Polysayev, M. Popovych, Y. Shaygorodsky. However, today there is no concept that could provide a comprehensive view of the political myth as one of the factors of transformation of consciousness of the current stage of the Ukrainian society development. In addition, the specificity of the phenomenon of political myth determines the situation that its study in domestic science is characterized more by the problem statement the than its solution.

Within the study, it is important to distinguish between natural (evolutionary) tendency or process of myth-making and purposeful construction of artificial myths in the process of myth-making.

Gilbert Durand was the first sociologist who began to develop a full-fledged “sociology of depths” or “sociology of imagination” and achieved extremely important and significant results in this direction [3]. Sociology of imagination is a fundamental systematic theory (grand theory), in which the classical sociology in a broader context, which would not only take into account and correctly interpret greater number of facts and phenomena than conventional sociology, but also to identify additional dimensions of the sociological approach, which in such an extended and generalized version reveals new aspects and properties, unknown or ignored constructions still.

The purpose of the study is to analyze the processes of creation, meaning and substantive features of socio-political myths in the prism of modern communicative practices.

Presentation of the main material. Socio-political myth can be defined as a figurative political and cultural scheme of symbolic representation of the relationship between state and society, which simulates an emotionally convincing picture of socio-political relations.

Instrumental theory of socio-political myth considers it as a means of manipulating public, in particular mass, consciousness. At the present stage, as proved on the basis of materials of mass culture and political advertising (G. Pocheptsov, N. Khoma), spontane-
ous myth-making is replaced by conscious myth making. Given the lack of information and prejudices in society, political myths especially perform the function of forming a schematic axiomatic view of social and political relations. Such ideas in the absence of reflective thinking make a person invulnerable to conflicting messages. A weak, lonely, anxious individual, as a phenomenon of the modern unstable world, needs dependence and strong emotional impressions.

Researcher S. Manichev in the work “Mythology in political technology” provides a scheme for constructing a political myth [4]:
1) the story of the hero of the myth continues not in his own, but in the living space of the voter;
2) political myth should be a dramatic action that evokes emotional feelings, setting the meaning of life;
3) mythological story should be constructed according to the laws of the narrative-biographical genre: information about the past life of the hero, reflection on the logic of his life, “biographical constructions”, methods of expression, metaphor, allowing to translate the story into a text with programmed expressive effect;
4) the logic of the hero’s life must coincide with the logic of the voter’s worldview;
5) political mythology imposes certain mandatory requirements on the hero: he must be extraordinary, to know something that others do not know, to have an unshakable faith in what he is fighting for power.

According to the concept of G. Schiller, there are two methods that ensure the effectiveness of manipulative technologies [5, p. 42]: fragmentation, localization as a form of communication (transmission in the news of a large array of unrelated, fragmented information, which acts as an “automatic queue”) and the immediacy of information transfer (false sense of urgency, creating the illusion of extreme importance of the subject, causes distortion of the actual delimitation of data by degree of importance). These methods weaken people’s ability to resist.

At the same time, a set of artificial myths can be used for strategic manipulation in order to form in the minds of people for many years those values, needs, ideas, stereotypes, habits, which in themselves contribute to maintaining a favorable political and economic order for manipulator.

To reach as many people as possible, in most cases myths are spread in the process of mass communication, i.e. through the media (newspapers, radio, television, Internet). The mass media begin to act in the human mind as the root cause that endows reality with its properties. There evolves a phenomenon of easily controlled audience society with suppressed critical thinking. Moreover, the developed mass media set themselves not so much the task of reporting what happened, as to provoke a certain reaction in the audience. This is achieved due to the fact that often in news programs there is first information about the consequences of an event, and only then about its specific content.

The desire for a strong leader arises when the collective desire reaches unprecedented strength and when, on the other hand, all hopes of satisfying this desire by the usual, normal means do
not work. The heroic myth is a myth about the birth, death and resurrection of the hero, in which the hopes and desires of the people are embodied. In such moments, the desires are not only acutely experienced, but also personified.

The political myth of the hero is not only a semiotic language in the communication space of any era, but also a universal archaic symbolic form. When the usual order of social relations, perceived as more or less just, is destroyed, the articulation of the phenomenon of meaning in politics leads to the actualization of the phenomenon of faith in the heroic leader and the constructed sacred political reality. The leader-hero becomes a sign of meaningful communication addressed to the interpreter.

In the context of the myth-heroic construction of political reality, the representation of a politic is associated with the phenomenon of the legitimacy of power. Representation of society through any political actor is a certain claim of the unit to integrity, which lacks the mythological experience of identity. The Homeland or the People are unconsciously transformed into the hero of the myth, and the nominated Hero embarks on a path of hardship, defeats the enemy, and so on.

The symbols of the heroic mono-myth present to Ukrainians the idea of political order, stability, predictability of politics when some citizens are unwilling to take responsibility for the prospects of future developments in the country in conditions of long-term uncertainty.

The symbolic system of modern artificial myths can be seen as a language of communication between government and society. The scheme of the communicative act is as follows: the information message of the addressee, encrypted with a meaningful code, is decrypted by the addressee-society. Authorities may not care about the dialogic nature of communication, having a monopoly on broadcasting the constructed ‘text’. This is how the idea of legitimate power in the state is formalized.

The very possibility of constructing a virtual policy lies in the postmodern approach to information, according to which the symbolic world is the only ‘hyperreality’ relevant to man, in which reality does not differ from theatrical performance. Social reality turns into a pseudo-world, an autonomous world of images of propaganda, advertising, that is, society has basically become a spectator. At the same time, any individual reality becomes social. Communication is possible through representation, as a one-sided performance in the spirit of archaic rule.

It is important that when the image constructed and chosen by someone becomes the main connection of the individual with the world, then in every place, wherever he appears, the individual will recognize this image, which carries everything. After all, inside the same image you can have anything without any contradictions.

The creation of images, the space of simulacra that find a virtual existence, and that gives a special ontological status to this reality, is a modern communicative space. Democracy, as a conditioned reflex in the virtualized world, does not require public discussion, when the election campaign is won by imposed thoughts, and the ‘demonstration’ of the party program gives way
to the ‘predictability’ of the proposed model of political behavior.

The myth of the hero (the archetype of the Ukrainian Kotyhoroshko) remains central in the election campaigns (aspect of situational myth-making). The image of the hero is based on an understanding of basic human problems.

The hero must quickly defeat the enemy; radically change the situation; solve all problems quickly. Unchanged remain the ideal images of power and leaders, which are passed down from generation to generation, although increasingly the images of real and ideal politicians contradict each other significantly. But even at the present stage, the archetype of the hero can be perceived as a collective positive image of the messiah, savior, creator or reformer. An artificially created sense of security causes many negative consequences, turning the individual into an impersonal part of the team.

There are several ways to implement the socio-political myth [6]:

- direct implementation, which provides for the openness of the source of myth-making, but at the same time does not discredit it due to the nature of the myth;
- indirect implementation, which hides the subject of myth-making or only hints at it;
- the direction of influence ‘from you’, which provides an indication of the pseudo-myth-maker;
- the direction of influence ‘not from you’, which is programmed to clearly stating the involvement of a particular subject in the process of creating a myth, but, at the same time, does not indicate the real myth-maker.

In spreading the socio-political myth, the dosage of information presentation plays an important role. The presentation of information should be organized so that a person has the impression that he found it himself or came to certain conclusions. To get this effect of information, the facts need to offer less than the person wants to hear. According to psychologists, information is assimilated from the fourth approach, so the same myth can be introduced in four stages of its mention: not from oneself indirectly, not from oneself directly, from oneself probably, from oneself directly [7].

Making a mythologized choice, a person expects to achieve mythological goals.

In the course of political forces’ attempts to impose the so-called ‘picture of the world’ in the form of a myth in ‘information wars’ during election campaigns, the political elite and other myth-makers prepare the public for the perception of various symbols, including powerful ones. Political myth becomes a stimulus for citizens to learn common ideas and values. However, there is often a need to neutralize certain socio-political ideas. After all, even artificial election myths do not self-destruct in the absence of the need for them to perform a social and organizational function in the new political context.

Among the characteristic features of the socio-political myth are the following:

1) the intentionality of the myth, its motivating nature,

2) the abstractness of the images of the mythological message and the at-
tempt to correlate them with the most relevant social issues;

3) the ability to replace the reflective rational understanding of the socio-political situation with irrational cognitive mechanisms of faith;

4) multilayered meanings of the myth, including: form-image, presenting the content; the main idea — the concept presented; meaning as a relationship between personal experience and mythological discourse. One of the problematic aspects of this multi-layered nature is the duality of mythological images, which are related to both the needs of the group and the emotions of the individual.

Among the most common modern political myths that are instrumentalized, including through television, we can name the myth of the Ukrainian miracle, the magic savior-liberator, the myth of the middle class, the market economy, the rule of law, democratic, national, Western myth (joining the Western civilization space), the populist myth (the people know the program of action for the common good), the myth of revolutionary transformations.

The media purposefully use myth elements. Some materials are filtered, brought to the audience in a distorted negative or hyperbolized positive form, framed by bright headlines and illustrations.

One-dimensional perception of reality created by political technologists through the manipulation of symbols is very detrimental to the stable development of society. Ideally, in our opinion, the greatest interest in building trust in the ‘power – people’ system should emerge at the stage of implementation of strategic reforms, not during election campaigns.

In the information age, politics is characterized by a synthesis of post-modernity and archaism. The return of the archaic is observed in the public demand for the symbolic incarnation of the exemplary sage-guarantor on the brink of archaic chaos, who with his magical abilities ratifies the meaning for the constitution of the whole world. Sometimes the ‘true’ discourse of heroic leadership in the space of one-vector (in authoritarian) or multi-vector (for democratic) meaningful political communication is used to strengthen its legitimacy.

The political myth of the ‘powerful state’ is in the genetic memory of a post-totalitarian society, which, in the dimension of mythologized social consciousness, tends to perceive all economic problems as the consequences of democracy.

Periodic intensification of the myth of the ‘powerful state’ in the political consciousness of Ukrainian society (1994–2004, 2008–2013) is due to:

1) paralysis of the authorities, lack of consensus, conflict of elites;

2) pre-election manipulations by authoritarian attitudes of the mass consciousness with hyperbolization of the effects of the latter (after all, authoritarian attitudes are inherent not in the vast majority of Ukrainian society, even in times of crisis);

3) residual manifestations of ‘Soviet thinking’ in the mentality of a transforming society;

4) the lack of mechanisms for effective communication between government and society, the concentration of powers by individual authorities, the
inability to prevent the usurpation of power through an ineffective mechanism of checks and balances in the system of public administration;

5) the presence of patrimonial bureaucracy, nepotism.

We are deeply convinced that the very practical implementation of democratic values in the socio-political sphere is the key to high efficiency of modernization processes in Ukraine. At the present stage of social development there are particularly favorable conditions for the popularization of positive symbols, stereotypes and mythologists in the eastern regions of Ukraine, where since the removal of Viktor Yanukovych from the presidency and his escape from Ukraine on February 22, 2014 for a large part of the population took place the destruction of the dominant heroic myth.

The power of the myth is a criterion for whether a nation has a historical mission and whether the time of its national greatness has come. The nation, the people may have a large and fairly close mythological space, but it always has the main, leading myths that carry the greatest information, psychological load. Usually, such myths only glorify the nation, markedly distinguishing it from others, making it unique. They have existed for millennia, somewhat renewed and modified, while leaving the same logic and purpose. Some domestic experts call such basic social myths ‘myths that support society’, referring to the myth not as a fiction, but as a meaningful source, idea or concept of society, which has a universal, super-personal nature and in which certain symbolic forms are formulated, perfect images.

In 2014, Poroshenko proposed to unite around a strategic vision of the national idea through the slogans of his proposed Sustainable Development Strategy 2020 — dignity, freedom and future. In our opinion, it corresponds to this strategic vision of two needs:

1) uniting the political elite on the way of performing strategic reforms;
2) uniting the elite with the nation to fight the aggressor.

Discussion within such a datum is important. Ukrainian society needs a clear understanding of its position in the military conflict in eastern Ukraine. Among the constructive myths that in the minds of Ukrainian society can be transformed into the basic, Ukrainian experts name the myth of decency, efficiency, kindness and self-worth of the average Ukrainian (if a Ukrainian is provided conditions, he will work flawlessly and participate in political life) as an idea of human capital in Ukraine, the myth of Ukraine as a Homeland, where everyone will be able to fully realize themselves, the national myth of building “Ukraine in Ukraine”.

Such a 'scarce' list provides an extra argument for stating the need for a holistic and effective humanitarian and information policy of Ukraine, which should respond quickly to the needs of the time and offer society quality information products to facilitate identification processes in crisis stages.

One of the priorities of state policy should be the construction of a system of comprehensive counteraction to destructive myths and the active formation of state-building political myths aimed at consolidating the nation around democratic values, human rights and freedoms.
Despite the artificial and situational nature of many myths, their subject is increasingly becoming political and economic reforms, the formation of a new quality of policy. Constructing positive political myths can become a stable basis for the formation of strategic concepts of social development of Ukraine. Perhaps the need for the formation of a holistic concept of political mythology, built into the modern theory of politics and social change, is relevant for modern Ukraine.

The famous national philosopher M. Popovych defines national mythology as one of the spiritual and creative forces that could help overcome the ideological crisis in Ukrainian society. A special place in the concept of the scientist is occupied by the ‘national political myth’, which he considers a potentially creative component of political consciousness [cited 7]. As A. Tsuladze notes: “national myths are a kind of eternal myths, they make up the soul of the people. Formed during the formation of the nation, national myths accompany it throughout history” [8, p. 61]. National self-consciousness is formed on the basis of myths and is inseparable from them. According to G. Pocheptsov ‘all bright events, from the point of view of the nation, are completely mythological’ [9, p. 216].

However, when certain events or phenomena, such as the Trypillia culture or the Cossacks, are also brought under the definition of myth, this form of view of history, in our opinion, is not scientific.

The ideas of European integration are, of course, positive socio-political myths. But given the high degree of mythologizing of this idea, some parts of it can have a destructive effect on public consciousness. For example, a significant exaggeration of certain elements of the myth in the construction of the myth — ‘EU membership, which will be an instant panacea for all the problems of the Ukrainian economy and society.’ In positioning European values, policy makers and opinion leaders should make it clear to citizens that Europe is not only a problem-free life, but also a responsibility, a regular participation in public life and performing a variety of transformations.

Most myths that maintain people’s sense of security perform positive functions, usually existing at the national ideology level [10].

Purposeful popularization of a specific version of history is spread over three levels of social information space:

1) school (school as a superpowerful mechanism of mass indoctrination);

2) emblematic (emphasis on certain facts, events from specific necessary moments, public opinion, popularization of the nation’s achievements and increasing the image of the state in the world through mythologies and whole mythosymbolic complexes);

3) academic (reconstruction of myths, cultural, social, psychological engineering and institutional framing of current and new social values).

National mythology deals exclusively with simple, emotionally convincing and unambiguous truths that create a collective identity (the continuity of the ethnos from the beginning, the ennoblement of its own cultural tradition, the cult of the ‘prophets’ of the nation).

Historian I. Bredis, taking into account the inevitability of historical mythology, praises the Ukrainians for
choosing from the national history ‘correct’ episodes for their national positioning and explaining the fact that Ukraine is a single republic (of those formed in 1922 USSR), which is moving towards democracy: the elected character of the Hetman, the cult of freedom in the Sich, the constitutional project of P. Orlyk, the dissident movement in the USSR. According to the historian, as long as Russia and other post-Soviet republics adhere to a national mythology in which proto-democratic principles in their history are not given due attention, they will remain trapped in their authoritarian traditions. Ukraine gives them an example of how to create a pluralistic state, using appropriate (even if sometimes idealized in some ways) positive precedents of its national history [11]. However, in our opinion, at present the controversy of the national memory of Ukrainians remains a problem, and not all pages of the history of Ukraine are interpreted unambiguously. In Ukraine, it can be stated that there is no boundary between scientific (research) and popular science history as a cornerstone of the culture of memory. In any case, at the stage of nation-building, the non-contradictory history of the nation is a crucial factor. Strong national self-identification myths are the basis of the integrity of the state, and the desire to destroy political myths is often an attempt to purposefully artificially delegitimize power and deny state sovereignty. In this context, domestic researchers sometimes use the concept of ‘crisis of myth-making’, when new myths do not take the place of destroyed, thus marking the existence of a vacuum of myths that determine social values.

The historical experience of a certain community forms a unique ‘collective memory’ through the emotions experienced by the people. In general, historical events become significant for posterity when they are embedded in the structure of a national myth (the history of a nation is a myth that it has created about itself). In this sense, historical events are ‘building material’ for the national myth.

The formation of common myth-symbolic complexes is based on various factors (national education system, mass media, codes of laws) and is constituted in the national culture (art, language). However, we should not ignore the possibility that in the process of social development, even a useful myth may find itself in a situation where it begins to slow down the process of positive change, and therefore requires modification. Therefore, policymakers need to help society create new or adapt existing ideas in a context of dynamic change. Thus, political leaders fight or prevent the fears of society (when the existing vacuum of ideas or old ideas are not suitable to serve the new social relations).

Our point of view corresponds to the opinions of some domestic scientists and experts about the special susceptibility of the Ukrainian public consciousness to crisis mythology. The widespread and uncritical use of the metaphor ‘anti-crisis’ in the domestic space of political communications, even when the crisis as such, de facto does not exist, gave rise to dangerous destructive consequences of a stable socio-political myth about the crisis permanence in Ukraine.
Socio-political myth has significant potential to correct the shortcomings of ideologies, but the likelihood of using populist slogans in this case is huge.

Over the past six months, Ukraine has been rapidly shaping its own identity — with a pantheon of martyrs, heroes and traitors, categories of ‘their own’ and ‘aliens, which are very clearly crystallized in the context of hostilities.

The functional burden of myths, which is to hide the ideological vacuum and support the process of transition to a consolidated democracy, is universal at all stages of democratic transit of the country. Due to the weakness of democratic and liberal traditions, people have little confidence in a rational explanation of the complex dramatic changes they are experiencing.

Positive myth-making allows to achieve a relative social balance for a while. According to Yu. Shaygorodsky, the myth makes it possible to substantiate both rational and irrational politics, so the mythical in active and passive forms penetrates into the constitution and laws that become the regulators of political life. But it takes a lot of concentration and energy to create a myth that unites people.

In a transforming society, the prevalence of illusions and irrationality, although it has certain therapeutic effects, generally has a negative impact on strategic planning and the potential for sustainable democratic development, which, in principle, is the goal of transformation.

One of the sources of the modern trend of remythologization is ‘semi-knowledge’, in which symbols and real events are mixed, a person’s position in front of a large array of information is passive.

According to the researcher B. Gal, for centuries mythology remains, first of all, the technology of information processing by the public consciousness, when there is a lack of other means for the synthesis of worldview [12]. Transformational society evokes a sharp sense of marginality and subordination of large groups.

Ukraine’s intellectual circles and political elites have long demonstrated an inability to cultivate new symbols. This gives grounds to assert that the ideological constructions of social consciousness that make sense have not been worked out. At the same time, the positive Western European myths were mainly associated with the recruitment of the middle class.

Conclusions. A specific feature of the myth is that it simplifies the world for the convenience of human perception, explains things and phenomena in plain language, turns ‘chaos into space.’ Mythological comprehension of the world is, above all, emotional and sensual, not rational. Myth is characterized by the identification of subjective and objective reality. Mythological images are endowed with substantiality, understood as really existing. The semantic units of mythological thinking are not concepts, but collective ideas.

Myths form a certain system of values in society and dictate the appropriate norms of behavior. In this sense, they act as important stabilizing factors in public life.

The processes of mythologizing are organically intertwined in various structures of social life, but it happens with varying intensity, depending on
the specific conditions of time and place. The most favorable area for mythologizing is modern communicative practices.

The process of mythologizing can be carried out not only by giving the illusory status of reality to fictional objects, but also by: absolutizing the importance of random factors in justifying events; identification of accidental and necessary in social processes; giving the status of random necessary social connections, acting as real causes of phenomena and processes. Moreover, ignoring dialectics in the interaction of random and necessary in social life is manifested in the fact that chance is a form of manifestation of necessity, and necessity is realized through a series of random ‘deviations’.

The consequence of the diversity of humanitarian texts today is the erosion and leveling of their meanings. In this context, mechanisms are being updated that are designed not to clarify the meaning, but to guide the public consciousness, when it is not about people, but about ways to use people in fleeting simulated situations.

Political reality, in addition to the objective, includes a specific closed virtual reality, in which the signs-simulacra are constructed, act as models and create their own existential world. The complex of such signs is a socio-political myth.

In the context of the dynamics of democratic transit in Ukraine, mythical images constructed in contrast to the Soviet ones have not been based on national archetypes for a long time. With their help, a single state conceptual picture of the world was never created. Characteristic of Ukrainian society in the period of transformations was the antonymy between the realities of life and the ideology imposed by the authorities.

Ukraine found itself at a highly mythologized stage of its development in a period of political transformation. Transformation processes in the Ukrainian state are carried out mostly spontaneously, under pressure from certain interest groups or dissatisfied social groups. When old ideals are in the process of destruction and new ones have not yet crystallized, there is a growing demand for a simple, emotionally colored explanation of the events of the political environment and their place in them.

Forms of instrumental influence of political myths on the formation of the domestic political and cultural space are reflected in their technological functions, correlated with the following peaks of myth-making:

1) election campaigns. Electoral myths are largely devoid of objectivity and are an attempt to charismatically mobilize the electorate for a year or two for a specific individual;

2) waves of socio-economic instability, during which myths are used to increase the legitimacy of insufficiently effective government or to mobilize citizens to support unpopular political decisions. Often, myth-making aims to create information noise or a permanent effect of waiting for ‘better times to come’ and ignoring objective reality;

3) large-scale social protests related to the identity crisis or the constitutional crisis, in which there is a need for the reconstruction of social identity.

For a long time in Ukraine, state elites did not engage in positive myth-making and even somewhat inhibited
the processes of evolutionary natural myth-making.

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