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IMAGINATION, ARCHETYPES AND SOCIAL FORECASTING: OPPORTUNITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF APPLICATION

Abstract. The article deals with the problem of information and analytical support of public administration in terms of social forecasting. The following problematic cross-sections are highlighted, which are especially important for Ukraine as a country that is in a state of prolonged societal crisis and against which it must respond to today's post-pandemic challenges. The first cross-section concerns the development of psychologically sound strategies and technologies of crisis management, which characterizes the ability of the public administration to a forward-looking vision and strategic thinking. The second cross-section concerns the development of psychologically sound approaches to the implementation of social forecasting. Both problem cross-sections are interdependent and condition each other, and, at the same time, need to be clarified in terms of actualization

of their actual socio-psychological validity. Thus, the problem that determines the purpose of the proposed article is to outline the possibilities and limits of the application of psychological approaches in social forecasting (on the example of G. Durand's social archetypes and sociology of the imaginary). The results of the study suggest that the development of the forecast must consider not only the characteristics of a situation but also the appropriate (characteristic of the situation) psychological state of social groups and communities. Given that the forecast can perform both a preventive and motivational function, underestimating the importance of analysing the irrational sphere of mass (collective) consciousness in the unity of its conscious and unconscious components may be unjustified negligence. Considering the motivational component of human behaviour, which is influenced by both conscious and unconscious components, can significantly expand the methodological arsenal of prognosis. In turn, this actualizes the request for generalization of the best practices of socio-psychological science and the definition of psychological principles in predicting social processes, which requires further painstaking work.

Keywords: social forecasting, social archetypes, mass (collective) conscious and unconscious, anti-crisis management.

УЯВНЕ, АРХЕТИПИ І СОЦІАЛЬНЕ ПРОГНОЗУВАННЯ: МОЖЛИВОСТІ ТА ОБМЕЖЕННЯ ЗАСТОСУВАННЯ

Анотація. Порушено проблему інформаційно-аналітичного забезпечення державного управління в частині соціального прогнозування. Виокремлено наступні проблемні зрізи, які особливо важливі для України як країни, що перебуває у стані пролонгованої соцієтальної кризи і на тлі якої змушує відповідати на постпандемійні виклики сьогодення. Перший зріз стосується розроблення психологічно-обґрунтованих стратегій та технологій антикризового управління, що характеризує здатність державно-управлінського корпусу до перспективного бачення та стратегічного мислення. Другий зріз стосується розроблення психологічно обґрунтованих підходів до здійснення соціального прогнозування. Обидві проблемні зрізи взаємозалежні й обумовлюють один одне та, водночас, потребують уточнення в частині актуалізації власне їх соціально-психологічної обґрунтованості. Таким чином, проблема полягає в окресленні можливостей та меж застосування психологічних підходів у соціальному прогнозуванні (на прикладі соціальної архетипіки та соціології уявного Ж. Дюрана). Результати проведеного дослідження дають підстави стверджувати, що під час прогнозування необхідно враховувати не тільки особливості тієї чи іншої ситуації, а й відповідний (характерний для ситуації) психологічний стан соціальних груп і спільнот. З огляду на те, що прогноз може виконувати як попереджувальну, так і мотиваційну функцію, недооцінка значущості аналізу ірраціональної сфери масової (колективної) свідомості в єдності її свідомих та несвідомих компонентів може виявитися невиправданим недбальством. Врахування мотиваційної складової людської поведінки, що зазнає впливу як свідомих, так і несвідомих компонентів, може суттєво

розширити методологічний арсенал прогностики. Своєю чергою, це актуалізує запит на узагальнення доробку соціально-психологічної науки та визначення психологічних принципів при прогнозуванні соціальних процесів, що потребує подальшої кропіткої роботи.

Ключові слова: соціальне прогнозування, соціальна архетипіка, масове (колективне) свідоме і несвідоме, антикризове управління.

ВООБРАЖЕНИЕ, АРХЕТИПЫ И СОЦИАЛЬНОЕ ПРОГНОЗИРОВАНИЕ: ВОЗМОЖНОСТИ И ОГРАНИЧЕНИЯ ПРИМЕНЕНИЯ

Аннотация. Затронута проблема информационно-аналитического обеспечения государственного управления в части социального прогнозирования. Выделены следующие проблемные срезы, которые особенно важны для Украины как страны, которая находится в состоянии пролонгированного социетального кризиса и на фоне которого вынуждена отвечать на постпандемийные вызовы. Первый срез касается разработки психологически обоснованных стратегий и технологий антикризисного управления, характеризующий способность государственно-управленческого корпуса к перспективному видению и стратегическому мышлению. Второй срез касается разработки психологически обоснованных подходов к осуществлению социального прогнозирования. Оба проблемных среза взаимосвязаны и обусловливают друг друга, и в то же время требуют уточнения в части актуализации собственно их социально-психологической обоснованности. Таким образом, проблема, которая определяет цель представленной статьи, заключается в обозначении возможностей и ограничений применения психологических подходов в социальном прогнозировании (на примере социальной архетипики и социологии воображаемого Ж. Дюрана). Результаты проведенного исследования дают основания утверждать, что при разработке прогноза необходимо учитывать не только особенности той или иной ситуации, но и соответствующее (характерное для ситуации) психологическое состояние социальных групп и сообществ. Учитывая то, что прогноз может выполнять как предупреждающую, так и мотивационную функцию, недооценка значимости анализа иррациональной сферы массового (коллективного) сознания в единстве сознательных и бессознательных компонентов может оказаться неоправданной халатностью. Учет мотивационной составляющей человеческого поведения, которое испытывает влияние как сознательных, так и бессознательных компонентов, может существенно расширить методологический арсенал прогностики. В свою очередь, это актуализирует запрос на обобщение наработок социально-психологической науки и определения психологических принципов, необходимых при прогнозировании социальных процессов, что требует дальнейшей кропотливой работы.

Ключевые слова: социальное прогнозирование, социальная архетипика, массовое (коллективное) сознательное и бессознательное, антикризисное управление.

Problem statement. The biggest global crisis of our century is called Covid-19. Its depth and scale are enormous: the coronavirus pandemic has hit the whole world, undermining the basic foundations of political, economic, and social life. At present, humanity is just trying to comprehend the far-reaching consequences of the crisis caused by the pandemic. According to various forecasts, the Covid-19 epidemic is not only capable of leading to economic damage and social collapse. Each crisis individually can become a seismic shock that can dramatically change the world order and the nature of relations in the Man – Society – State System.

When the world is undergoing drastic changes, every country needs an effective and visionary government capable of overcoming obstacles of unprecedented and global scale. To be prepared to solve various problems, including those caused by a pandemic, such a government must predict (anticipate) possible crisis challenges, assess their likely consequences, develop appropriate solutions to prevent or overcome them, and offer alternative long-term development strategies. In other words, the modern age requires governments to have a forward-looking vision and strategic thinking.

The urgency of this problem for Ukraine is due to the specifics of its development: the country has long been in a state of prolonged social crisis, which affects all spheres of public life [1]. Now, against the background of the societal crisis, Ukrainian officials are forced to respond to today's post-pandemic challenges. However, unfortunately, domestic officials can-not boast of success in solving important issues for Ukrainian society and the state, as evidenced by disappointing ratings and low confidence of citizens in various state institutions and decisions taken. How to proceed from the fact that forecasting is the basis of strategic planning and a condition for the effective functioning of state authorities, the score of 3,6 points on a 10-point scale, which at the end of 2020 domestic experts assessed the level of predictability of state development for the next year, indicates an extremely low ability of the management corps to system foresight and unwillingness to meet the challenges of the time [2].

Analysis of recent researches and published papers. Without scientifically sound prediction, it is impossible to respond promptly to internal and external challenges. For this purpose, relevant divisions, analytical centres, and research institutions have been created in Ukraine, whose activities provide information and analytical support to state authorities, which forms the appropriate basis for the formation of strategic tasks, the effectiveness of which depends on the future of our country. In particular, information support and analytical support are provided by the Interdepartmental Commission on Information Policy and Information Security under the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, the National Institute for Strategic Studies, the Service for Information and Analytical Support of Public Authorities, the World Data Center for Geoinformatics and Sustainable Development, etc. Analytical information is prepared by various research institutions operating in the structures of the

National Academy of Sciences (NAS) of Ukraine and the National Academy of Pedagogical Sciences (NAPS) of Ukraine, among them: Institute of Economics and Forecasting of the NAS of Ukraine, Institute of Demography and Social Research named after M. V. Ptukha of the NAS of Ukraine, M. I. Dolishnyi Institute for Regional Studies of the NAS of Ukraine, Institute of Sociology of the NAS of Ukraine, Institute of Social and Political Psychology of the NAPS of Ukraine and others. Ukrainian sociological services regularly publish the results of sociological research, among them, namely: Center named after O. Razumkov, Democratic Initiatives Foundation named after I. Kucheriva, Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, and Rating Sociological Group, etc. These information and analytical services provide government officials with the necessary and sufficient amount of analytical information to make an effective management decision while making predictions about the possible consequences of making or not making such decisions or inaction [3].

Meanwhile, a strange situation has developed around the information and analytical support and support of public authorities. On the one hand, it seems that most information and analytical services operating in Ukraine work autonomously, at the specific operational or ongoing request of their beneficiaries, and compete with each other; there is no coordination between them for the joint formation and use of the source base to track trends and dynamics of social development. Even though a lot of information is located on the internet and is publicly available, it seems that it is becoming increasingly difficult for analysts to cover the multidimensional and cumbersome empirical material that reflects various parameters of social development. In particular, some (conditionally — general) social processes and phenomena can be thoroughly analysed and other facts (conditionally — secondary) can be ignored, which do not seem to be significant, but indirectly influence the tendencies and dynamics of their development. As a result, many of the stated predictions are not confirmed in the practice of public life-sustaining activity.

On the other hand, it seems that numerous analytical notes, information reports prepared by various scientific institutions and which describe in detail the essence of a problem, approaches and optimal ways to solve it, provide forecasts of both positive and negative consequences, etc. receive due attention from government officials or, worse, are used depending on market fluctuations. As a result, the scientific validity of social development and the need to improve the efficiency of social programming, planning and management, in general, are levelled.

Against this background, in the far from the cloudless world of social forecasting, there is a significant gap: insufficient attention from both the expert community and officials to the development of domestic socio-psychological science, which does not stand still and can make a significant contribution to the knowledge and explanation of the social world. The fact is that no matter how many empirical scales the social world is measured, it is clear that in human society there is no social and

cannot be without man, and therefore without his passions, experiences, ideas, emotions, will, that is, without all that, which is called the psyche [4].

Modern forecasting belongs to the integrative fields of knowledge, as it covers socially significant problems that cannot be pre-allocated to individual departments of science. Therefore, the role of socio-psychological aspects of human life in social forecasting and social design is difficult to overestimate. However, their underestimation, in particular, for example, such aspects as archetypes of the collective unconscious, a person's perception of reality, situational factors of social behaviour, etc., inevitably leads to inadequate assessments of situations on the part of persons who make appropriate decisions and who are unable to calculate all possible consequences and results from their adoption. Inadequate attention to the human factor, human resources, and capabilities, as well as those 'nooks and crannies' of the individual and collective soul, does not just weaken the information and analytical support of public authorities. This can pose potential risks and threats both to the safety of people's lives and to the world in which they live.

This gives grounds to highlight the following problems that are especially important for Ukraine as a country that is in a state of prolonged societal crisis and against which it must respond to today's post-pandemic challenges. One of them concerns the development of psychologically reasonable strategies and technologies of anti-crisis management, which characterizes the ability of the public administration corps to the long-term vision and strategic thinking. The other concerns the development of psychological reasonable approaches to the implementation of social forecasting. Both problems are interdependent and condition each other, and, at the same time, need to be clarified in terms of actualization of their actual socio-psychological validity. Thus, the general problem is to determine the prognostic potential of socio-psychological science. Thus, the problem that determines the purpose of the proposed article is to outline the possibilities and limits of applying psychological approaches in social forecasting (on the example of G. Durand's social archetypes and the sociology of imaginary).

Presentation of the main research material. Forecasting is not limited to attempts to predict the whole picture of the future, although it is based on knowledge by observing tendencies and patterns of development of processes in various spheres of human sustaining activity. Social forecasting, in a broad sense, accumulates problems that are related to different areas of scientific knowledge. In a narrow sense, social forecasting reveals the prospects for the development of social relations. The peculiarity of the theoretical and methodological basis of prognosis is the need to constantly consider the new circumstances and the impossibility of obtaining a single result that would be used with one hundred percent confidence. This fact is noticed by many researchers working in the field of social prognosis.

For Example, S. Feder notes that in the field of forecasting, scientists always face the problem of not being able to be unambiguously sure of the cor-

rectness of the received forecast[1]. The researcher himself criticizes the possibility of obtaining a 'single result', i.e. an accurate answer to the prognostic issue, and, referring to J. Armstrong, who adds that predictions with a single result do not avoid uncertainty, they expand the boundaries of surprise only. Another important remark concerns the need to provide alternatives in forecasting, i.e. finding and obtaining different results, for their comparison and use. That is why S. Feder suggests using both quantitative (mathematical) and qualitative (analytical) methods when developing predictive models [5].

According to W. Dunn, forecasts of any kind: regardless of whether they are based on an expert's judgment, simple extrapolation of historical trends, or technically complex econometric models-show a tendency to errors based on false or implausible assumptions, on systems of institutional motivations that increase the possibility of errors, as well as on the rapidly increasing complexity of issues that arise in the changing modern world [6]. Confirmation of this opinion is found in the work of P. Tetlock '*Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know?*' [7], where cases are described *shortcomings of expert judgment*, in particular, that experts may know less than they believe, and that their predictions cannot in part exceed random assumptions. D. Gardner, assessing the accuracy of experts' probabilistic judgments about a wide range of events, from the stability of multinational states to the growth prospects of emerging markets and the risks of interstate conflict, found confirmation of the real stability of such psychological phenomena as self-confidence, retrospective bias, self-serving biases in counterfactual reasoning, and the difficulty of surpassing even simple statistical models [8].

It is necessary to pay attention to such problems as *affective prediction errors and erroneous perception of forecasting models by the general public*.

Analysing the possibilities of predicting the results of the US presidential election, K. Dowding notes that when building models, it is necessary to consider the *constant variability of public sentiment*, use relevant and verified data to obtain reliable results in forecasting [9]. According to research by S. Westwood, S. Messing, Y. Leikes, the public has difficulty understanding and responding correctly to probabilistic predictions [10]. The experiment conducted by C. Norris, A. Dumville, D. Lacy confirms that people are very bad at predicting their emotional reactions to future events, often overestimating both the intensity and duration of their reactions, especially to negative events, which, in fact, distinguishes the problem of *affective prediction errors* [11].

Besides, K. Dowding focuses on threats from the *public's incorrect understanding of forecasts*, because usually the public does not consider estimates of the probability of forecasts and does not understand that they may have an error. As a result, people overestimate or underestimate the reliability of forecasts. That is, the difference between studies based on different criteria causes scepticism about any pro-

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[1] Hereinafter, the author highlights in italics. — *O. S.*

posed forecast, which in turn tarnishes the reputation of the discipline (prognosis). Conversely, what is perceived as a forecast also influences judgments about the (un)success of the model. In short, 'as many people, as many judgments' [12].

In general, the above judgments regarding the problems indicated at the beginning of the article, it should be noted that usually when developing a predictive model based on patterns or tendencies determined in the course of observations, it is assumed that in the future, if the specified conditions are maintained, the corresponding tendencies and patterns will have the appropriate dynamics, which will lead to an appropriate result. If certain parameters of the situation change, the result will be different. However, there is always the possibility that not all conditions are tracked or considered, and a change in one of the unaccounted parameters can radically change the whole picture.

In other words, although modern forecasting has long overcome the limitations of narrow discipline when extrapolation was built based on exclusively special knowledge in economics, sociology, demography, ecology, energy or geopolitics, nevertheless, the scientific and expert environment is quite conservative in its essence, and therefore seeks to apply the usual approaches and methods and is suspicious of experimental methodological developments until they acquire universal recognition. And this imposes certain restrictions on prognostic models.

In this context, the statement, for example, that modern economic laws do not work in societies with a 'non-Western' mentality or are (and in the future, it is not known how many will be) in a specific, for example, psychologically excited state [131, p. *197–198*], not only acquire a completely different connotation but also leads to the need to emphasize the problem of applying psychologically-based approaches in social forecasting, this is determined by improper attention to the role of the psychosocial factor in public life and underestimation of its impact on the development of society as a whole [14].

Given the above, the developments of the French sociologist Gilbert Durand and the Ukrainian School of Archetypes (USAR) deserve attention. In contrast to the classical approaches, built-in line with positivist knowledge, G. Durand proposes to set a broader focus (or context) in the study of social reality, which allows not only to reveal new dimensions of the studied phenomena and processes but also to identify new aspects and properties, which are usually ignored or not considered by traditional approaches. In particular, the classical (structural) approach of G. Durand is complemented by such sections as the sociology of depths, which is a methodological and conceptual development of Jung's ideas, and the sociology of the imaginary, which actually focuses on the study of the imaginary phenomenon [15].

Close to Gilbert Durand's ideas in terms of the methodological and conceptual development of K. Jung's analytical psychology, in particular, the archetypal approach, are the development of the Ukrainian school of archetypes, which for more than ten years in a row sharpens the methodology of

social archetypes on public administration.

In my previous publications [16–18], I repeatedly noted that the actualization of the problem of the mass (collective) unconscious, including the archetype, which acts as a horizon and context for understanding the phenomena of social reality, is not only a return to the archaic foundations of spirituality. It can also determine the direction of the future because archetypes embody the hopes and dreams of the people. In the archetypal ideas, images, symbols, etc., are hidden the deep nature of the desires, expectations, aspirations, and hopes of people, which arises as a result of the joint work of consciousness and the collective unconscious. And since, the archetype can be considered as information that has socio-managerial value, therefore, the appeal to the social archetype in modern social studies, in particular in public administration, is quite natural.

As for the phenomenon of the imaginary, it is appropriate to specify the content of the central concept of G. Durand's theory 'L'imaginaire' (French)[2]. The concept does not have an exact literal translation, a more or less approximate equivalent is the 'world of the imaginary', so it is used literally in the appropriate transcription ('imaginer'). Imaginary means both imagination as ability, and what is imagined (imaginary, which is reproduced through fantasy), and the one who imagines, and the process itself (imagination as a function) and, finally, all that is common, preceding and uniting all these components.

In the focus of the above transcription, the imaginer is worth looking at the well-known from ancient times a purely human mechanism, which R. Merton called 'self-fulfilling prophecy' (self-fulfilling prophesy) [19]. We are talking about the fact that an individual or tribe under the suggestive pressure of foresight unconsciously provokes expected events, even very unfavourable for themselves. For example, from the ethnographic literature, there are cases when the curse of a shaman led to the death of a young healthy person. It is no secret the influence of forecasts on the course of large-scale historical events (for example, the doctrine of the world proletarian revolution). As A. Nazaretian rightly points out, nowadays is full of similar episodes. These are not only religious-mystical or esoteric projects but also theories presented in scientific form. [20, p. *197*].

Returning to the problematic aspects of social forecasting outlined at the beginning of the article, it should be noted that against the background of the outlined difficulties, or rather limitations that exist in the field of social forecasting, focusing on the need to analyse the irrational sphere of mass (collective) consciousness, in the unity of its conscious and unconscious components may seem untimely. However, underestimating the significance of such an analysis may be unjustified negligence, because considering the motivational component of human behaviour, which is influenced by both conscious and unconscious compo-

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[2] An approximate English equivalent is the imagery term.

nents, can significantly expand the methodological arsenal of forecasting.

Usually, the predictive algorithm consists of understanding the past through the focus of the present and the present, as a result of past development, based on this, the future is perceived as a projection of real, very specific processes and tendencies operating in the present, at the further stage of society's development. It is an extrapolation of tendencies, an approach that does not always work where the past, in determining the present, does not help to achieve the desired future. As, for example, in the case of Ukraine, which in its history has had no long experience of either state or nation-building.

In such a situation, another forecasting algorithm is needed, which should probably, firstly, present the image of the desired future, secondly, focus on existing examples that will set the direction of movement in the right direction, and on this basis, thirdly, develop appropriate strategies based on the realities that already exist. In this case, it is appropriate to apply a different research strategy. It is called a 'retroduction': explanation is achieved by establishing a real fundamental structure or mechanism responsible for creating the observed pattern. Based on a retrospective analysis in a theoretical explanation, the researcher can move from real phenomena to structural causes and mechanisms that generate them, that is, conclude unobservable entities and factors that consider the observed patterns [21–23].

In itself, a retro production is an intuitive and creative process rather than logical, because creative imagination and analogy are used for inverse reasoning from data to explanation, from experience in the empirical plane to possible structures in the real plane. At the same time, re-productive logic suggests that you determine the desired (or undesirable) future state of the system/object yourself and determine ways to achieve (or avoid achieving) this state. And it is here that models that consider the motivational structures of the mass (collective) conscious and unconscious become an invaluable helper. This allows you to predict certain desired (or undesirable) results, identify possible necessary (or dangerous) solutions to assess the conditions that will contribute (or not contribute) to achieve the intended.

Conclusions and prospects for further researches. The forecast can perform both a preventive and motivational function. The warning forecast outlines the possible negative consequences of the expected future and forces to look for alternative ways or compromise solutions to prevent it. A motivational forecast, on the contrary, can become a driving force (including an unconscious one) for the implementation of a given project of the future (both positive and negative). Thus, when developing a forecast, it is necessary to consider not only the features of a situation but also the appropriate (characteristic of the situation) psychological state of social groups and communities. In turn, this actualizes the request for generalization of the best practices of socio-psychological science and the definition of psychological principles in predicting social processes, which requires painstaking work, which in modern realities is determined by the need for rational influ-

ence on political, socio-economic and humanitarian processes.

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