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CHINA'S "THE ONE BELT AND ONE ROAD" INITIATIVE: ORIGINS AND MODERNITY OF RESOURCES DIPLOMACY

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The article devoted to the praxeology of the geopolitical concept of the Chinese Silk Road. The aim of the study is to clarify the world-political context of the objective of positioning the Chinese diplomacy's readiness to cooperate with a number of states and the EU in the "One Belt and One Road" initiative. Histological and systematic methods of analysis are used to clarify: (1) the role of the Chinese geopolitical stratagem in the plans of the elite to change the geography of the world political process in their origin and modern interpretation; (2) the place of the stratagem "One Belt and One Road" in the concepts of the elites on the transformation of China to a world leader; (3) the role of resource interests in these projects; (4) the role and interests of other states in the actualization of the project; (5) the level of influence on the course of international relations. It has been established that the Chinese elite is updating: (1) its own concept of infrastructure development in the adversarial triad of the options "(1) USA- (2) EU- (3)" (2) the elite of Central Asian countries, in particular, the Chinese leaders took advantage of the relative decline of influence Russia and the United States in Afghanistan to expand its influence; (3) The Chinese concept of the new Silk Road is aimed at ensuring the supply of natural resources, in particular energy resources - land from gas and oil deposits in Central Asia, and through the sea through the Malacca Strait and the Arctic regions.

In all times Chinese elites have presented their own theoretical or ideological concepts: to the development of "socialism with Chinese characteristics" – adapting to the changing challenges; Jiang Zemin's "Sange Daibiao" (三个代表, "Three Represents") that started to allow private business people into the party; Hu Jintao's "Kexue Fazhan Guan" (科学发展观, "Scientific Concept of Development") that was to open for a more sustainable – both in terms of ecological and social costs – economic growth model. Since Mr. Xi became chairman of the Communist

Party in 2012 at the 18-th CCP Congress and as state president in March 2013, he has vowed a "great rejuvenation" to restore China to its ancient prominence and promoted the slogan about "Chinese dream" connected with other Xi's slogan "Sige Quanmian" (四个全面, "Four Comprehensives") [6–8; 14; 17–18; 22]. At the 19-th CCP Congress in 2017 Xi Jinping thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, was written into the party's constitution and the first time since Mao Zedong. Tracing modern Chinese history from China's humiliating defeat by Great Britain in the mid-nineteenth century, Xi highlighted the "Chinese dream" as a unifying theme for the Chinese to: (1) achieve a great national revival and the 'new type of Great Power relations', which is supposed to characterize Sino-American relations since Xi met Obama; (2) promote relations with states around China's borders; (3): build the 'one belt, one road' initiative (OBOR). Such fact that China Communist Party abolished constitutional limits on presidential terms and allowed President Xi Jinping to lead China indefinitely — was the latest significant sign that China' plans would be fulfilled.

Hu Jintao had earlier evoked the possibility of some kind of new Silk Road initiative, but it had not gone anywhere. Then in autumn 2013 President Xi visited Kazakhstan and Russia, where he announced plans primarily for transport projects with a view to creating an 'economic belt'. The projects together comprise a series of overlapping elements — upgraded and developed transcontinental railway routes, highways, port facilities and energy pipelines. OBOR potentially involves over 60 countries with a combined population of over 4 billion people, whose markets currently account for about one-third of global GDP [13]. According to China's Ministry of Commerce, from January — August 2016, Chinese companies signed 3,912 project contracts throughout 61 countries. The value of those projects amounted to 69.82 billion dol. OBOR is a second wave of Chinese overseas investments and should be seen as a renewed version of China's 2000 Going Out policy, also known as China's "Go Global" strategy. The Belt is related to six planned economic corridors stretching outwards from China throughout Eurasia, some of which merge with the Road. In the EU, these corridors end up in Rotterdam, Hamburg, Prague, Madrid. Minister of Foreign Affairs of China Wang Yi explained political purpose of the OBOR in such words as: peace and developments with neighbouring countries; trilateral cooperation of China-Japan-South Korea, North Korea, India and members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations; exploring free trade agreements [10] based on the continuation and development of the spirit of the ancient Silk Road. Chris Buckleyfeb [3] said that to sustain China's global rise, Mr. Xi is modernizing China's military and investing heavily in a 1 trillion dol. international trade initiative known as Belt and Road. Officially known as "Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era," the ideology can be given an even more prominent platform: the preamble of China's Constitution. Boiled down, the doctrine is a blueprint for consolidating and strengthening power at three levels: the nation, the party and Mr. Xi himself. The China's economy grew by 6.9 percent 2017, and the growth goal for 2018 year is also robust by global standards. Part of that economic activity will be driven by the country's continued strong spending on infrastructure. The government set aside 115 billion dol. for spending on railways, and more for highway and waterway projects, continuing China's heavy investment in transport networks. China would manage rising levels of domestic debt. China's spending on its military will grow by 8.1 percent 2018 year, taking the official budget for the People's Liberation Army to 1.11 trillion yuan, or about 175 billion dol. Daniel A. Bell's in his book "The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy" wrote that "overall, however, political reform over the past three decades has been informed by commitment to the general principles of the China model: the lower the level of government, the more democratic the political system; experimentation is more likely to take place, including experiments with brand new practices and institutions, in between the lowest and highest levels of government; and the higher the level of government, the more meritocratic the political system" [1].

The aim of the study. The referral to the BRI's topic is justified by search of qualified ground from which to answer some of questions: (1) is any measure of interaction and dependence of traditional context China's stratagems' geopolitics and modern international relation principal: (2) about dreams of China elite not only about expanding the Chinese economy by acquiring resources and markets for China's exports, but also on modernizing the world's largest military force; (3) about possibility of a more aggressive Chinese foreign policy behaviour with declarations of more air defence identification zones and introductions of more oil drilling rigs and artificial islands in disputed territorial waters; (4) to advance its own diplomatic concepts and initiatives such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the BRICS-bank and thereby more proactively seek to shape the international system; (5) the ports, railroads of the OBOR could be used to transport China's military forces across Asia in the future in order to push pendulum of world economy to swung from West to East.

Presenting main material. Professor and Chairman of the Harvard China Fund William C. Kirby, T.M told about China in 2013 that: (1) It may be a 5,000-year-old series of empires, but it is only 102 years old as a country; (2) Politically speaking, there is one China. From the perspective of ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and geographical diversity, one could say that there are many Chinas; (3) China's rise is not a new phenomenon. Outside of the anomalous period of the 1950–1978 with the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, China has been rising over the course of the past century. China is now back to where it could have been had those years not occurred; (4) If China is to lead the 21st century, it needs to lead in "soft power", especially in education, as much as "hard" military and economic power; (5) China's stumbling blocks lie in issues of rule of law and political reform, exemplified by the sudden and mysterious fall of Bo Xilai [8, *2*]. Professors Forest Reinhardt and John D. Black thought that: (1) Energy matters because what it means to be rich is to have more energy resources at one's disposal. Right now, energy is not a single industry—it has two main value chains; (2) One is vehicle fuels, starting in the oil well and ending in car; (3) The other is electricity, starting with coal, water, wind, natural gas, or sunlight and ending in some electrically powered device; (4) In the next 30 years, the interesting phenomena in the energy industry will result from the convergence of these value chains, for example, synthesizing a non-oil fuel substance that acts like oil to run a car; (5) For any product, there is a spectrum between willingness to pay and production cost, with the equilibrium price of the product somewhere in between. For energy, there are also externality costs to consider, namely environmental and national security costs; (6) What China fears most is this national security cost: a disruption in supply, which could occur from energy becoming too expensive or the energy supply becoming inaccessible. To hedge against these types of threats; (7) China has been actively trying to: (a) Diversify away from oil by investing in new energy and technologies, such as compressed natural gas, nuclear, and coal; (b) Pursue an equity oil strategy, buying paper entitling China to cash flows from oil extracted in Africa, for example; (8) On the agricultural front, there is a basic similar worry about food security: a disruption in supply on the food front could result in inflation or a food shortage (could be a political issue, could be a weather issue). To hedge against these types of threats is a little more difficult because: (a) Land is a finite resource - what land can be cultivated worldwide is already mostly cultivated. Land in China, in particular, is heavily controlled by the government; (b) Moreover, as China grows richer and people want to eat more meat, the land needs to produce enough grain not only to feed people but also to feed the animals. (The grain needed to feed all these animals will have to be supplemented by imports) [8, *3*]. We can said now that China now is a country of 1.3 billion people, almost 20 % of the world's population; It consumes 11% of global oil or 27 % of the world's soybeans; China has discovered 171 varieties of minerals, and 158 of them with proved reserves; there are 10 energy-related minerals, including oil, natural gas, coal, uranium. But now it is also the world's second-largest importer (in 2013, it alone accounted for 31 % of global growth in oil demand) [6; 9]. China's dependence on foreign supplies of oil is at nearly 60 %, of which roughly half comes from the Middle East and one quarter from Africa, while dependence on foreign supplies of natural gas is at close to 30 %, of which nearly 50 % comes from Turkmenistan. 80 % of China's energy supplies pass through the Strait of Malacca, which is controlled by the US Navy. In the event of conflict with the USA, China's access to external energy resources could be interdicted. Therefore, one of China's objectives is to create alternative energy and raw material channels across land bridges from Central Asia, South East Asia and Pakistan — and the Belt facilitates this endeavour. These channels, mostly through land, run through sovereign states and are thus perceived to be less vulnerable to US interdiction. In particular, the Pakistani port of Gwadar, which is leased by China and serves as part of the southern corridor of the Belt, could support this purpose of maintaining access to energy resources. [10, *7*]. However, it should be noted that this route faces topographical challenges as well as security threats from insurgency in Pakistani territory. In addition, China's construction of pipelines through Central Asia over the past few years, carrying oil from Kazakhstan and natural gas from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, has, in relative terms, reduced its dependence on maritime and Russian imports [10]. China contributes more than 90% of global output of the 17 rare earth metals, but its own deposits only account for 36.4 % of the world's total reserve of 100 million tons. China can produce over 400 varieties of rare earth products in more than 1,000 specifications. In 2011, China produced 96,900 tonnes of rare earth smelting separation products, accounting for more than 90 percent of the world's total output [19]. China formed its own modernization stratagems. Francois Jullien called it stratagems. He thinks that "the key to Chinese strategy is to rely on the inherent potential of a situation and to be carried along by it as it evolves. It can be formed in such words as "crossing the river by feeling for the stones" (mozhe shitou guohe, 摸着石头过河) approach) [16, *20*]. Such inherent potential we feel in initiatives of Xi and other Chinese foreign policy leaders in their articulation of a new strategic direction for Chinese foreign policy known as: "Fen Fa You Wei" (奋发有为, "striving for achievement"); "Gengjia Jiji" (更加积极, "be more active"); "Gengjia Zhudong" (更加主动, "take greater initiative"); "Jiji Jinqu" (积极进取, "actively go in" [20]. And necessary to say that this slogans are supported by actions: China itself has committed up to 1 trillion dollars to develop infrastructural investment transport links inside the country, much of which will go to the western part of China that will be part of the 'belt'; The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which China set up in 2015 to both complement and compete with the US- and Japan-dominated Asian Development Bank, reportedly has 65 billion dollars in initial capital to support investments of this type; the China Development Bank has notionally reserved a further 890 billion for the development of various sections of the corridor outside the country. Some western estimates put the capital requirement for the latter much higher. The overall time-scale for the project has been set at roughly 35 years. But, we think that OBOR has more sound historical tradition. The period between II BC to X AD is interpreted as the most splendid time in the commercial road communication from the East to the West. There were two great centralized empires: Roman Empire and Han Dynasty Empire; Byzantine Empire and Tang Dynasty Empire. It was only one difference since II BC: the trade was with an intense diplomatic activity, which was guided by Han dynasty (206 BC-220 AD). The Silk Road's products were: materials (silk, medicaments, spices, wood, iron, copper, gunpowder, and gems), technology (compass) and ideology (different religions). The minerals were very important strategic goods, as the government tried to control its extraction in centralized empires. An example of this mineral production's control is China, in s. 1 BC, where it was necessary to state made a monopoly of production and marketing of salt and steel. This monopoly could be possible thanks to the management of mines and furnace. This monopoly was repeated during Tang dynasty (618-907), several centuries after Han Dynasty's fall [2; 5]. In the Roman Empire we must remind the restrictive laws over silk trade, the Roman Senate issued in several times to check the precious metal flight when Oriental products import were paid. In II BC the diplomatic and trade relations were managed from Han Dynasty to Eurasia. It became a road to spread Christianity as well: in 635 CE, Nestorian missionaries from Ctesiphon reached China. Its most famous traveler was Marco Polo, who wrote about minerals of the Silk Road, the finest and biggest rubies in the world. This information was used by Richthofen's in 1870-1872 who reported to the European-American Chamber of

Commerce in Shanghai on China's regional commercial, mining, and railroad prospects highlighted the significance of future lines running west from Xi'an to coal-rich "northern route" around the Tarim Basin. Hedin effectively set Central Asia history and world politics to geological time. Hedin's bid to "Plan for the Revival of the Silk Road" transformed geological Richthofen's Silk into an urgent geopolitical strategy. His first Sino-Swedish scientific expedition (1927–1928) in Central Asia sought the best airline route between Berlin and Peking-Shanghai on behalf of the German government ay Lufthansa; his third Sino-Swedish expedition (1933–1935) plotted a motor-road route between Europe and China financed by the Chinese Nationalist government [11–12].

Now Marlène Laruelle, Jean-François Huchet assesses the dimension of Central Asia's XXI century as "Great Game" [17]. They analyzed new Silk Road's diplomacy of the major players: one is an "external" party — the U S — insofar as it has no shared borders with the region while the two others — Russia and China — are neighbouring countries. Russian influence has been historical and remains preponderant. The US is actor of the more recent past, but remains tenacious about expanding its presence. China, on the other hand, has had an extraordinary run to leadership in the region. The proposal for a "New Silk Road" from US diplomacy dates back to the 1990 s., when Republican Senator Sam Brownback, who closely cooperated with Prof Frederick Starr in his legislative initiative "Silk Road Act", echoed a strikingly similar initiative. The plans original architect, Frederick Starr, chair of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, advanced the proposal in conjunction with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies. At the Istanbul Conference of 2011, Western leadership introduced a controversial template for new security architecture for Central and South Asia. The US diplomacy was going to build "New Silk Road" project as quintessentially of its Greater Central Asia strategy dating back to the George W. Bush presidency for such purposes: facilitating Central Asia's efforts to return to its historic role as the gateway between East and West; Turkmen gas fields could help meet both Pakistan's and India's growing energy needs and provide significant transit revenues for both Afghanistan and Pakistan; Tajik cotton could be turned into linens; Furniture, fruit from Afghanistan could find its way to the markets of Astana, Mumbai; the construction of the nearly one billion dol. Central Asia-South Asia electricity project (CASA-1000) [15]. The CASA-1000 line runs 759 miles through four of the most unstable countries for number of tasks: connect surplus summer hydroelectricity in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to electricity-starved Afghanistan and Pakistan; create alternative energy corridors for post-Soviet countries; break their dependence on Russia's infrastructural ties. It appeared to be that the high-profile nature of the project will make it a target for competition and risks to destabilize the region. The ability of local forces to coordinate and secure of infrastructure alone will be extremely difficult. The U.S. is wary of Russian involvement in the region and its attempt to control any arrangement and undermine Washington's efforts to decouple Central Asia from Moscow's influence. The United States and China have developed competing visions for reviving ancient trade routes connecting Asia and Europe. The U.S. diplomatic strategy focuses on Afghanistan, while China hopes to economically integrate Central and South Asia. India and Russia also have regional ambition.

Russia's interests were confirmed when Russia's Inter RAO-United Electrical Systems signed a 25-year contract with China. Russia has chances and risks in Central Asia but has shown a possibility to reach its diplomatic interests. Russian leaders understand that Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan can go in more integrative relations only in terms of widening energy market. And not only becoming energy exporters, importers, transit countries but member of energy club of equal interests in deal with China, India, Pakistan. Russia's experience with Central Asian electrical systems and its own vast hydroelectric potential makes Russia ready to facilitate Central Asia's hydroelectric needs. It also blends in with the concept of an Energy Club of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (CSO). The elite of Russia in its decision to participate in the creation of energy and transport corridors in Eurasian region have far reaching geopolitical goals. The leaders of Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus have signed in May 2014 a treaty in Astana on the creation of a Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EES) which will come into effect in January 2015. Cutting down trade barriers and comprising over 170 million people it will be the largest common market [18].

Russian economic overdependence on China, as a result of which Russia is attempting to connect with Mongolian and South Korean regional integration initiatives and is seeking warmer ties with Japan. Indeed, Russia's 'turn to the East' has put it in a politico-economic position of precarious overdependence on China — this is unlikely to be sustainable and is likely to affect Russian security interests negatively over time. The interlinking of the EEU and the Belt is still unfolding, but it has brought Russia and China close. And Beijing has own plans for a "Polar Silk Road" in the Arctic as global warming allows for the expansion of shipping routes across the top of the world. China, which does not border the Arctic region but is one of thirteen countries holding observer status with the Arctic Council, released the white paper on Friday calling for greater international cooperation over infrastructure and shipping routes in the Arctic. The Northeast Passage above Russia offers a faster route than the 48 days it can take to sail from northern China to Rotterdam via the Suez Canal. In 2017 a Russian tanker travelled from Norway to South Korea without an icebreaker escort for the first time in a trip that took 19 days. China dreams to have a major role in expanding to network of shipping routes. But this plan contradicts Russian's interests [22]. Traditionally, Indian policy toward China has been mostly characterized by continuity. But though Beijing has resolved most of its land border issues with neighbouring Russia, Pakistan and Afghanistan, India remains an exception. India has other worries over China's growing presence in the region, fearing strategic encirclement by a "string of pearls" around the India Ocean and on land as China builds ports, railways and power stations in country such as Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. The current strategic mistrust between Delhi and Beijing will make it very difficult for Indian policymakers to accept the "One Belt, One Road" initiative in its present form Beijing has to co-design the new Silk Road with India for it to have any chance of success. If the Chinese government wants to address the trust deficit and get a larger buy-in from Indians, it will have to engage Delhi in designing and implementing “One Belt, One Road” [4].

At this point in time, the Belt may offer limited prospects as a platform for broader EU China cooperation on harder security issues in Eurasia. However, it does represent an opportunity for the EU to work towards closer development–security cooperation on a range of softer security or developmental topics. Pre-empting negative geopolitical and geo-economics competition with China, the EU can utilize the Belt to gradually hone strategic ties with China, and nurture greater mutual political trust and understanding of security interests. Admittedly, such engagement might take place only gradually, given geopolitical and geo-economics realities, as well as EU institutional lacunae. However, the EU could start with a strategic assessment and the creation of a forward-looking agenda that discusses the Belt’s security implications in Central Asia, South Asia and other Eurasian (sub-) regions of EU security interest [10]. Theresa May has joined The UK to “Great Game” and sidestepped a Chinese push for a formal endorsement of its 900bn Silk Road strategy, suggesting Britain still has concerns about China’s political objectives for the huge infrastructure project. The UK did not sign a memorandum of understanding giving Britain’s official endorsement to the 900bn dol. Critics have said the project is designed to pull other countries in the region deeper into China’s sphere of influence, and that it could give unfair preferential treatment to Chinese contractors. ‘Global standards and cyber security’ amid doubts over political aims of Xi Jinping Belt and Road plan [7].

Scientific novelty. For the above analysis were used wide range of sources and made different comparison but it is still very preliminary but it does support a gradual development of new thinking and a new approach in China’s OBOR’s foreign policy strategy under Xi that point to big changes in the way that China engages with the international system. Further research is needed and it seems especially important to focus on the implications of the domestic focus in the Chinese leadership — that is their focus on meeting the growing domestic expectations to the role that China will play in the international system in the years to come. But already possible to say that so a kind stratagem’s “crossing the river by feeling for the stones” approach still seems to best characterize the overall development in Chinese foreign policy behaviour rather than a new overall guiding strategy or master plan of OBOR.

Conclusion. A part of what have been signified “new OBOR” are in fact previously carried over projects which are being given new life became a part of “China dream”. Hu Jintao had earlier said about new Silk Road initiative, but it had not gone anywhere. This stratagem was the first to call on Chinese enterprises and industries to “go out” and invest abroad. That is why OBOR is “upgrade” of China’s Going Out policy for China’s businesses and industries. The stratagem of the China Dream was directed to implementing balance between collective identity and individual aspirations: Chinese people feel as having a collective will and identity shaped by a difficult history. It claims that Xi as the first Chinese leader since Deng is strong enough to push through a rethinking of China’s foreign policy strategy. The Belt is a long-term Chinese connectivity vision with no a priori parameters on methods, actors or mechanisms, nor much granularity to date. It therefore allows a great deal of flexibility and could become a leading new model of cooperation and global governance. The Belt will certainly expand China's overseas security interests and will require China to take an increasingly active stance on regional security affairs, not least to protect its investments. China's non-interference stance, which has already been evolving over the past few years, will likely become much more creative in the future. Yet, how this unfolds will depend on the specific security dynamics in Belt target states, as the Belt resources interest implementation progresses.

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Дікарєв О. Китайська ініціатива "одного поясу та одного шляху": витоки та сучасність ресурсної дипломатії.

Стаття присвячена праксеології геополітичної концепції Китайського Шовкового шляху. Метою дослідження є прояснення світополітичного контексту мети позиціонування китайською дипломатією готовності на співпрацю з рядом держав та ЄС в "Ініціативі один пояс та одна дорога". Використовується історіологічний та системний методи аналізу для прояснення: (1) ролі китайської геополітичної стратагемності в планах еліти по зміні географії світового політичного процесу в їх витоках та сучасності; (2) місця стратагеми "Один пояс та одна дорога" в концепціях еліт по трансформації Китаю до рівня світового лідера; (3) ролі ресурсних інтересів у цих проектах; (4) ролі та інтересів інших держав в актуалізації проекту; (5) рівня впливу на перебіг міжнародних відносин. Встановлено, що еліта Китаю актуалізує: (1) власну концепцію розвитку інфраструктури в змагальній тріаді варіантів "(1)США-(2)РФ-(3)ЄС"; (2) еліта країн Центральної Азії, зокрема, лідери Китаю скористалися відносним занепадом впливу Росії і проблемами США в Афганістані для розширення свого впливу; (3) китайський концепт нового Шовкового шляху спрямовано на забезпечення постачання природних ресурсів, зокрема енергоносіїв – по суші з газових і нафтових родовищ Центральної Азії і по морю через Малаккську протоку та полярні регіони.

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