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## **POLAR SILK ROAD IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SECOND FORUM “ONE BELT – ONE WAY”**

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*In the article is given analysis the Polar Silk Road China plan in the new “Age of the Arctic” in the context of The second forum “One Belt – One Way” which was held in April 2019 in China. The study focuses on the theoretical reflection of discourse on a number of problem: (1). The initiative of the Chinese leadership “One Belt – One Way” which combines the projects “The Economic Belt of the Silk Road” and the “Sea Silk Road of the XXI Century”, launched in September 2013 (2). General characteristic of trends in 283 agreements as practical results were achieved in six categories: initiatives proposed or proposed by the Chinese side, bilateral and multilateral documents signed during or immediately before the second forum, multilateral cooperation mechanisms within the forum, investment projects and lists of projects, financing projects and projects of local authorities and enterprises; (3). Influence of ice melting on geopolitical and geo-economic situation in Arctic; (4). The growing circumpolar collaboration between organizations of peoples and regional governments: the North meets the North; (5). Region-building under paramount participation of states with a focus on the Arctic Council; (6). The relationship of the Arctic with the outside world; (7). The effects non-system actors (China) on the transformation of geopolitical and geo-economic strategies in the Arctic region as the sixth part of world space north of the parallel 66° 33'39" with a population of 4 million people in eight circumpolar countries: Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States, rich in renewable (fish, sea animals) and non-renewable resources (up to 20 % of world mineral reserves); (8). “Polar Silk Road”, White Paper “China’s Arctic Policy”.*

This topic is current due to political and economic processes in “The Age of the Arctic”. The scientific discourse testifies to the novelty of these processes in the context of The second forum “One Belt – One Way” which was held in April 2019

in China. The initiative of the Chinese leadership “One Belt – One Way” which combines the projects “The Economic Belt of the Silk Road” and the “Sea Silk Road of the XXI Century”, launched in September 2013. It assumes the conclusion of bilateral memorandums of cooperation with the states located on Eurasian transport routes (more than 40 documents have already been signed) along which the “economic development corridors” to be built. The first forum “One Belt – One Way” was held in Beijing in May 2017. It was attended by 29 heads of state and government, as well as heads of major international organizations. On April 25-27, 2019, the second forum of international cooperation “One Belt – One Way” was held in Beijing, in which delegations from 187 countries took part, of which 37 countries were represented by heads of state and government. A total of 283 practical results, including intergovernmental cooperation agreements, were achieved during the preparation and holding of the current Forum. A large number of representatives from the business and industry circles took part in the conference of entrepreneurs, which was held as part of the Forum, and cooperation agreements on over 64 billion dol. were signed. Bilateral and multilateral documents signed on or immediately before the second forum are: The cooperation plan on industrial potential and investment with the government of Kazakhstan; Transport cooperation documents with the governments of Pakistan, Liberia, Nepal, Georgia, Belarus, Armenia, Saudi Arabia, Laos, Kazakhstan; Seven national railways (China, Belarus, Germany, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Poland, Russia) signed the rules of procedure for the joint working group on the transport of China-Europe container trains; The Chinese Commission for Banking Regulation and Insurance signed a memorandum of understanding with the Astana International Financial Centre (AIFC); The Ministry of Science and Technology of China has signed cooperation documents for a joint research centre and a joint laboratory with the Agency for Science and Technology of Uzbekistan; The China Customs Service has signed documents on customs inspection and verification and documents on quarantine cooperation with the State Revenue Committee of the Ministry of Finance of Kazakhstan; Multilateral cooperation mechanisms within the forum The State Tax Administration of China, the State Revenue Committee of the Ministry of Finance of Kazakhstan and the competent tax authorities of other related countries (regions) held a forum of tax administration cooperation in the framework of the One Belt – One Way Initiative; a memorandum was signed on the creation of a mechanism for cooperation in the tax administration of the “One Belt – One Way” initiative and a two-year action plan. China has established energy partnerships with 28 countries. The National Development and Reform Commission of China signed documents on the lists of priority projects for productive capacity and investment cooperation with the relevant government departments of Kazakhstan, Egypt, Mozambique, Cambodia, Laos and the Philippines; The Silk Road Foundation has invested in the Dewa Concentrated Solar Power project, the Astana International Exchange and the Yamal LNG project (YAMAL LNG is an integrated project for the extraction, liquefaction and supply of natural gas), and in cooperation with the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank; finances the Oman’s National Fibber Optic Broadband Network Pro-

ject (Optical Fibber Broadband Network); The Silk Road Fund is investing in the development of tourism in Samarkand and a project in the oil and gas industry of the Republic of Uzbekistan. It was promised that: The Chinese authorities will create optimal mechanisms in the field of international law; seek to expand the scope of free trade; reduce the burden on foreign partners in the implementation of economic relations with them; to strengthen international cooperation in the field of customs regulation, duties and taxation, auditing; create special fiscal mechanisms for the One Belt and One Way Initiative; take a series of measures to enhance the protection of intellectual property rights; China will not deal with the devaluation of the national currency to the detriment of other countries [1].

Russia supported China's projects on the Silk Road program. And on the Forum 2019, the Russian delegation was represented by higher elite. We put forward the hypothesis that this is largely done for geopolitical reasons. But there is a geo-economic plan associated with the development of the Northern Sea Route and the development of Arctic resources. China has no alternatives but to work with Russia: The Northeast Passage (NEP), controlled by Russia, and the Northwest Passage (NWP), controlled by the US and Canada, are China's only prospective maritime transportation routes across the Arctic Ocean. And Beijing's growing conflict with Washington purportedly makes the NEP the only viable option for Chinese vessels travelling to and from Europe. However, it should be noted that although the US delegation had a small representation in the Forum, however, previous trade disputes did not grow into trade wars.

It is necessary to immediately note that the analysis of the state of theoretical reflection and scientific discourse of such facts of political and economic life as the Forum, the strategies of the Arctic diplomacy, do not have unambiguous interpretations. A number of authors discuss the specifics of Arctic trends in the context that:

1. The Arctic and Antarctic after World War II demonstrated the geopolitical interests and the geo-economic importance of world supply chains for super-goods (Nakano Jane) [12];

2. During the Cold War, the geopolitical pressure and the build-up of the military power of the USSR and NATO also exerted on the Arctic (Young O. R.) [19];

3. Starting in the late 1980s, international cooperation in the Arctic has increased to the extent that a new regional identity is emerging, with numerous political initiatives and new opportunities (Lassi Heininen) [8];

4. This describes new "Age of the Arctic" (Young O. R.) [19]; Arctic Europe Petroleum Resources (Zolotukhin A. B.) [22];

5. In accordance with the Ottawa Declaration of 1996 to provide "ways of organizing cooperation, coordination and interaction between eight circumpolar states" a number of organizations were created, and in 1998 the Arctic Council was created without a legal status similar to the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 (Schmidt Amanda) [14], (Wallström Margot) [20];

6. In order to get effective cooperation were signed raw of binding agreements: Agreement on cooperation in aviation and maritime search and rescue in the Arctic (2011), Agreement on cooperation in the field of preparedness and response

to sea pollution oil in the Arctic (2013) and the Agreement on the deepening of international Arctic scientific cooperation (2017) states, such as China and India, which today are among the 13 other Council members who have observer status and the desire to solve their own economic and commercial problems in the region (Andreas Eiterjord Trym Aleksander [16], Kuersten Andreas [10]);

7. The Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) is the forum for intergovernmental cooperation on issues concerning the Barents region. The geo-cultural dimension of the Council consists of six groups of indigenous peoples of the North: the International Aleutian Association, the Arctic Athabask Council, the International Guiche Council, the Inuit Circumpolar Council, the Association of Indigenous Minorities of the North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian Federation and the Council (Margot Wallström [20], Zolotukhin A. B. [22]), (Wallström Margot) [20];

8. The problem of access to the mineral wealth of the Arctic regions is inseparable from the issue of control over the Northern Sea Route. These factors predetermine the expansion of the zone of confrontation, both in the military sphere and geo-economic, both in the Arctic and other powers in the struggle for control over the strategic space and for resources (Jones Jeffrey) [9] (Zolotukhin A. B.) [22], (Schmidt Amanda) [15] and others [2], [9], [14], [17–18], [22].

9. Geo-economically China is making a qualitative leap forward, adapting to the rapid development of technology and changing the balance of power in the international arena Brady Anne-Marie [3]; Lanteign Marc [11]; Zheng Wang [21]; and others [4–6];

10. The world is entering the era of the new industrial revolution, which is characterized by the continued breakdown of the link between labour and capital and this encourages China to abandon its competitiveness model at the expense of low labour costs and instead focus on the development of strategic high-tech industries as part of the implementation of the “Digital Silk Road” initiative and the “Polar Silk Road” (White Paper “China’s Arctic Policy”) Brady Anne-Marie [3], Anteing Marc [11], Kuersten Andreas [10];

11. The pledge of technological leadership in the era of the new industrial revolution is becoming the scale of demand that China has provided its products through monopoly control over the growing domestic market and the development of economic interconnection with the rest of the world. The implementation of the “One Belt, One Road”, “China’s Arctic Policy”; initiative contributes to the transformation of global value chains as a result of the emergence of new transport and energy corridors leading to China and funded by Chinese international financial instruments [13–22].

For our analysis, it was fruitful thesis of Cornet Lexandre [6]. He worked out the chronology of the Chinese policy in Arctic: Interest regarding the Arctic zone is relatively old. China’s action in the region started in 1989, with the creation of the Chinese Polar Research Institute (CPRI). As early as 1988, the Chinese Academy of Sciences published a new journal devoted to Arctic and Antarctic issues, the Chinese Journal of Polar Research. From 1980 to 2008, most of the Chinese publications related to the Arctic theme were related to the natural sciences and

basic research. Between 1999 and 2012, China has led 5 Arctic expeditions, and established its first station in 2004 in Norway. It is only in the last ten years that the Chinese academic work on the Arctic has moved closer to the human sciences and more political subjects. They are for instance dedicated to the Arctic governance or the place of the Arctic in Chinese geopolitics. It is also noted that the academic environment seems quite keen on making proposals to a government that remains, for its part, more cautious. China elite proposal in 2010 to include maritime space beyond the EEZs in the heritage of humanity. In 2017, the publication of a Chinese paper presenting the maritime silk roads then unveils a new part of the project, a “blue corridor”, which would connect China to Europe via the Arctic Ocean, the first official confirmation that the Arctic Ocean is among the 'blue economic passages' Beijing is seeking to develop. This document then becomes the most obvious harbinger of an upcoming official Chinese Arctic policy. The interest to the Far North arose in connection with global warming. According to American researchers, the temperature in the Arctic today is higher than at any other point in time over the past two thousand years [6]. An important area of scientific reflection of the Chinese arctic policy is energy diplomacy. The researcher Jones drew attention to the activity of Chinese companies in the Arctic region [9]. These facts are important for us to continue the study of China's vectors and economic strategies in the region. The facts are as follows: In February 2013, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) completed its acquisition of the Canadian energy firm Nexen, despite internal debates within the Canadian government. The deal, worth 15.1 billion dol., solidified Chinese interests in the potentially lucrative oil sands of northern Alberta, but also resulted in a tightening of regulations in Ottawa regarding purchases of oil sands assets by state-owned enterprises out of concern that foreign governments would gain too much control over a primary Canadian resource. By 2014, Chinese firms had invested more than 30 billion in Canadian energy industries, but many of those business relationships were affected by operational delays and tepid initial profits [9].

The fact that there is a consolidation of China's interests in the region is that On January 26, 2018, the first edition of the White Paper “China's Arctic Policy” appeared. Prior to this, Beijing's priorities in the region were voiced by representatives of the Chinese political elite, who were distinguished by their restraint of language, or by experts, on whose side, on the contrary, there were many complaints, often badly correlated with the existing norms of international maritime law. Now, the White Paper at the conceptual level, affecting all areas that are to some extent related to the Arctic issues, proclaims the active positioning of China in the Arctic. So, China declares that the development of the situation in the Arctic goes beyond the region and the interests of exclusively Arctic countries and is of vital importance not only for extra-regional players, but world politics. Indeed, the thesis of the Arctic as a public domain is extremely popular among non-Arctic countries, although it is completely out of legal nature. It gives them the opportunity to justify their growing interests in the region related to the development and exploitation of its spaces and resources. A special argument is the statement about the climate-forming role of the Arctic, namely that the changes taking place here

can affect a significant number of states. In particular, the melting of the Arctic ice will lead to an increase in the level of the oceans, which is fraught not only with the flooding of a number of island states, but also is capable of affecting the coastline of coastal countries. China, by the way, in this spirit, justifies its role in the fight against global warming and the need to participate in the development of decisions regarding the Arctic as a whole. Beijing's interests are not limited to shipping and the development of mineral resources of the bottom and subsoil, they are also related to the harvesting of aquatic biological resources, the protection of the marine environment and its biodiversity, and scientific research [2; 6–7; 9; 12; 15; 17–18; 21–22].

The PRC white paper clearly points to the fact that Chinese involvement there will be a multilateral, not a bilateral affair. Illustratively, Chinese initiatives since 2010 have evinced Beijing's interest in maintaining equally balanced ties with all Arctic governments including, South Korea and Japan for technological support via the promotion of multi-national platforms for dialogue and cooperation as well through various treaties [1–22]. It means that the management regime in the Arctic, which Beijing intends to improve, has long existed. It is based primarily on the provisions of general international law, as well as the treaty rules, in particular, codified in the framework of a key international agreement in this field – the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The latter plays for the Arctic, as for the entire World Ocean, the role of not only the original Constitution of the seas, but also the so-called “legal umbrella”, under which more specifically fragmented legal regimes, often of regional significance, are formed. At the next level – the national legislation of the coastal, in this case – the Arctic, states. China recognizes two of the above levels of regulation – broad international and narrower regional. The only problem is that he de facto reduces the detailed regional level to a single agreement – the Treaty of Paris on Spitsbergen in 1920, of which he has been a member since 1925. But in relation to the Arctic, there are a number of agreements (the agreement on the polar bear; on the preservation of the northern Pacific fur seals, etc.), which have been fully working for more than a decade. In parallel with this, in the framework of the Arctic Council, the process of improving regional regulation is under way through new agreements (the Search and Rescue Agreement, oil spill response, scientific cooperation).

As noted by a number of specialists, perhaps the only thing omitted in the White Paper is the military-strategic importance that China places on the Arctic region. China considers itself as a state ready to be responsible for the development and improvement of the rules of behavior in the Arctic, moreover, the control system of the Arctic region as a whole. The goal of such a system is extremely universalistic – to create conditions for the protection, development and management of the Arctic in the interests of all mankind. To this end, Beijing is ready to cooperate not only with the Arctic states, but also with all other countries and members of the global community, including international state and non-state institutions and organizations. In fact, this is an ambitious attempt to lead the process of activating extra-regional players, a camouflaged desire to play among them one of the leading roles in shaping the agenda [6–12; 14].

In the region, China pays a special attention to a country like Iceland. China not only gained real access to modern Icelandic technologies of clean geothermal energy, it also gained leverage in Iceland itself. And this influence, as soon as Iceland heads the Arctic Council in 2019, will help strengthen the position of China. Iceland was viewed as an ideal choice for one of Beijing's first set of developed country free trade negotiations due to the island state's small size and limited number of economic sectors, as well as its distinct position outside of the EU but linked to the EU Single Market through membership in the European Economic Area (EEA). Brussels calls on all EU countries for unity in building relations with China. But so far, not one of the EU states has refused agreements with the PRC on multi-billion investments, which was demonstrated, in particular, by the last visit of Chairman Xi Jinping to Italy, France and Monaco. Italy the first of the key EU countries set foot on the "New Silk Road". "Pompeo visits Iceland as US-EU rift on Iran grows" [13] was also aimed at working out a common position with the EU, in particular with the countries of Northern Europe, to prevent the activation of the practice of achieving its strategic China interests in the Arctic. In the 2019 China Forum referred to above, the American delegation was insignificant, indicating concern about the strengthening of China. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visited the NATO ally in the north Atlantic on February 2019, also to discuss security relations and China and Russia's growing presence in the Arctic. The brief visit to Iceland on his way back to Washington came after a short stop earlier in Brussels, where he met with the EU's top diplomat. The breakfast meeting with EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini came just a day after U.S. Vice President Mike Pence accused Britain, France, Germany and the EU as a whole of trying to evade U.S. sanctions on Iran. His visit comes amid increased interest in the Arctic, which has big reserves of oil, gas, gold, diamonds, zinc and iron. Iceland sits in a "strategic place in the world", Pompeo said during his visit. It is obvious that United States planned to counter China and Russia's increased presence in the Arctic through the Arctic Council policy using Iceland's rotational leadership in May 2019. Pompeo said that the United States "deeply understands the geo-strategic challenges" that exist in the Arctic and the risks that are there and watched America's adversaries begin to deploy assets in a way that they believe will strategically disadvantage not only the United States, but Iceland and the European countries as well" [5; 16; 18].

As we can see, the European and Arctic plans of the Chinese elite bear the old and focused on the prospect of dominance. The bilateral free trade talks began in 2006, well before China's current Arctic policies began to be solidified, and at that time much of Beijing's motivation for pursuing the agreement was to demonstrate its commitment to deeper economic engagement with Europe, especially in the wake of failed exploratory talks towards a possible China-EU free trade agreement earlier in the decade. The Iceland talks experienced a long pause between 2009 and 2012 as a result of Iceland's financial crisis (*kreppa*) in late 2008, as well as the July 2009 application from Iceland to join the EU. The Icelandic company Orka Erney has allied with the China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (Sinopec) to form the joint venture Shaanxi Green Energy. Geothermal Develop-

ment, whose capital is 51 % owned by the Chinese side, all financed by a 250 million dol. loan from the Asian Development Bank. China is also willing to respond to Icelandic fossil fuel opportunities as they arise. For example, one of the two main potential Icelandic oil fields, Dreki, was explored until January 2018 by a joint venture between China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), Eykon Energy and Petoro Iceland, where once again the Chinese party held a majority stake of 60 %, before the CNOOC and Petoro decided to give up their license for lack of results. In 2013, China was admitted to the Arctic Council as an observer member, backed by Iceland. At the same time, the EU saw, once again, its request rejected [6].

Features of the offensive marketing strategies of China were manifested in Greenland. Much of the international focus of Beijing's recent resource diplomacy has thus far been on Greenland, which has been greatly affected by recent climate change as evidenced by the melting of its vast Ice Sheet (Sermersuaq) and the uncovering of coastal lands that may be suitable for mining operations. These developments take place during a time where Greenland's future political status has been the subject of considerable debate. As part of the Kingdom of Denmark, Greenland achieved 'home rule' in 1979 and self-rule in 2009, with Denmark retaining the right to determine policy in the areas of Greenland's defence and foreign policy while the remaining political portfolios were transferred to the Greenlandic government. Greenland's small population (about 56,700) is largely dependent upon fishing and seafood as well as an annual subsidy provided by Copenhagen in addition to assistance with defense and maritime security. Under pro-independence governments, the island has been seeking alternative forms of income and a possible path towards greater sovereignty and eventual independence. The retreat of the ice sheet from these areas, while presenting serious environmental consequences, has opened up greater possibilities for extracting valuable metals, minerals and gemstones, including copper, gold, iron, nickel, platinum, titanium and zinc, along with diamonds and rubies. Moreover, the potential for a future mining boom in Greenland was the main issue during the election on the island in March 2013. The vote saw the centre-left government of Kuupik Kleist, then-leader of the Inuit Ataqatigiit ('Community of the People') Party, fall to the Siumut ('Forward') Party led by Aleqa Hammond. Greenland Inuit – the people of the Far North, which has achieved broad autonomy. The Greenlandic Inuit (Greenlandic: kalaallit, Danish: Gornlandske Inuitter) are the most populous ethnic group in Greenland. Most speak Greenlandic (Western Greenlandic, Kalaallisut) and consider themselves ethnically Greenlandic. People of Greenland are citizens of Denmark. China's investment plans for Greenland are supported mainly by the ruling left-nationalist party of Greenland, Inuit Atakatigit, led by Kuupik Kleist, half Dane and leader of Greenland nationalism. Although the rest of the four political parties in Greenland do not support China's investment in turning the rare-earth metals rich in Greenland into one large mine for the production of smart phones. But for Denmark, the United States remains a fairly acceptable investor. Greenland receives 20 % of the budget in the form of payment for leased by the US military facilities. After Denmark joined NATO



at the end of the 1940s, the United States limited only to military penetration permitted within the framework of cooperation. Denmark was never particularly happy about that, but was forced to endure. The United States turned a blind eye to the fact that Denmark often violated international law by not letting anyone in the Greenland territorial waters. The elite of the USA motivates its investment plans in Greenland with the need to increase combat efficiency and situational awareness. But recently, US plans have been announced to develop the resources of the Arctic shelf. China does not promise the Grenadines any significant budget revenues, but its investments have long-term prospects, which suits the island's population. Denmark also needs to invest in the island's economy, for which she herself does not have enough money. In 2016, China almost succeeded in trying to buy a Danish naval base in Greenland, which previously belonged to the US. Denmark was ready to sell the base, which required high maintenance costs, but the American side dissuaded the country, so at the last moment Denmark promptly withdrew the offer. The authorities of Greenland made a compromise by choosing Denmark as an investor in the construction of new international airports in Nuuk, Ilulissat and Qaqortoq instead of China. In the EU, such facts of confrontation in the Arctic are worrying. In the case of the penetration of China into Greenland and its separation from the EU, the NATO system in the Arctic receives new challenges: in addition to Russia, such a large anti-NATO actor as China appears in the Arctic with its "Polar Silk Road" plan [20].

As the aforementioned facts of the political process and economic life show, in the arctic Chinese diplomacy has developed cooperation strategies both at the interstate level and on the regional and global one. The People's Republic of China regards Russia as a partner in a number of projects, but continues to pursue diplomacy in engaging in a wider range of actors in world politics. Even in the Arctic Russia is not China's only potential partner. As the aforementioned facts of the political process and economic life show, in the arctic Chinese diplomacy has developed cooperation strategies both at the interstate level and on the regional global one. The following facts can be confirmed by this thesis.

**Summary.** On 2019, the second forum of international cooperation "One Belt – One Way" was held in Beijing, in which delegations from 187 countries took part, of which 37 countries were represented by heads of state and government. A total of 283 practical results were achieved in six categories, namely: initiatives proposed or proposed by the Chinese side, bilateral and multilateral documents signed during or immediately before the second forum, multilateral cooperation mechanisms within the forum, investment projects and lists of projects, financing projects and projects of local authorities and enterprises. Russia supported China's projects on the Silk Road program. This is largely done for geopolitical reasons. But there is a geo-economic plan associated with the development of the Northern Sea Route and the development of Arctic resources. China recognizes two of the above levels of regulation – broad international and narrower regional. The only problem is that he de facto reduces the detailed regional level to a single agreement – the Treaty of Paris on Spitsbergen in 1920, of which he has been a member since 1925. But in relation to the Arctic, there are a number of agreements

(the agreement on the polar bear; on the preservation of the northern Pacific fur seals, etc.), which have been fully working for more than a decade. In parallel with this, in the framework of the Arctic Council, the process of improving regional regulation is under way through new agreements (the Search and Rescue Agreement, oil spill response, scientific cooperation). China declares that the development of the situation in the Arctic goes beyond the region and the interests of exclusively Arctic countries and is of vital importance not only for extra-regional players, but world politics. It thus determines the strategic interest of China and proclaims the possibility of independent policy in the Arctic.

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***Дікарев О. І. Полярний шовковий шлях у контексті Другого форуму “Один пояс – один шлях”.***

*У 2019 році в Пекіні відбувся Другий форум міжнародної співпраці “Один пояс – один шлях”, в якому взяли участь делегації із 187 країн, з яких 37 країн були представлені главами держав і урядів. Всього було досягнуто 283 практичних результатів у шести категоріях, а саме: ініціативи запропоновані китайською стороною, двосторонні та багатосторонні документи, підписані під час або безпосередньо перед другим форумом, механізми багатостороннього співробітництва в рамках форуму, інвестиційні проекти, фінансування проектів як місцевих органів влади, так і підприємств. Росія підтримала проекти Китаю в рамках програми Шовкового шляху. В основному це робиться з геополітичних причин. Але є геоекономічний план, пов’язаний з розвитком Північного морського шляху і використанням арктичних*

*ресурсів. Китай визнає ряд рівнів регулювання — широкі міжнародні та більш вузькі регіональні. Єдина проблема полягає в тому, що КНР де-факто зводить детальний регіональний рівень до єдиної угоди — Паризького договору про Шпіцбергена в 1920 році, членом якої він є з 1925 року. Але стосовно Арктики існує ряд угод (угода про білого ведмеда; про збереження північних тихоокеанських морських котиків тощо), які повністю працюють уже більше десяти років. Паралельно з цим, у рамках Арктичної ради процес удосконалення регіонального регулювання здійснюється через нові угоди (Угода про пошуки та порятунок, відповідь на розливи нафти, наукове співробітництво). Китай заявляє, що розвиток ситуації в Арктиці виходить за межі регіону та інтересів виключно арктичних країн і має життєво велике значення не тільки для позарегіональних гравців, а й для світової політики. Тим самим визначається стратегічний інтерес Китаю та проголошується можливість самостійної політики в Арктиці.*

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