**THE IMPACT OF INFORMATION WARS ON THE ELECTION SECURITY**

**Abstract.** It is emphasized that no democracy at the stage of formation can do without a myth in the function of forming national consciousness and consolidating the people. In the context of the dyna-
mics of democratic transition in Ukraine, the mythical images constructed in contrast to the Soviet ones did not rely on national archetypes for a long time. With their help, a unified statist conceptual picture of the world was never created. Characteristic of Ukrainian society during the period of transformation was the antinomy between the realities of life and the ideology imposed by the authorities.

Political reality, in addition to the objective reality, also includes a specific closed virtual reality in which simulacra signs are constructed, act as models and create their own existential world. A complex of such signs is a political myth as a carrier of information about society and the cause of changes in the political space. In the spectator society of the 21st century, where connections are becoming more diverse, the intuitive-irrational type of world perception dominates; individual and social consciousness tends to simplify the picture of the world.

**Key words:** information wars, information security, elections, political party, election process security, public administration, party system, electoral system, national security.

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In the theory of liberal democratization, which is often used to explain transformational processes in post-communist countries, the main emphasis is placed on the use of two approaches in political analysis:

1) the structural one, within which the main attributes of the democratization process are socio-economic conditions, the formation of effective political institutions;

2) the procedural one, within which emphasis is placed on the behavior of elites and the possibility of concluding pacts between elites.

According to modern Western theorists, the establishment and stable functioning of liberal democracy is possible in accordance with the mentioned approaches under the following conditions:

– an appropriate level of socio-economic development,

– building effective political institutions,

– the behavior of the political elite which supports democratic values and principles (Andrieieva, 2009).

In the works of well-known theorists R. Inglehart and C. Welzel, less attention is paid to the study of value influence on the formation of democracy, but more – to institutional influence.

In the context of liberal democracy, the consequences of the rule of populist governments can be reflected in the behavior of populist parties, structural changes in the internal socio-economic environment of societies, and political institutions of liberal democracy. According to some scientists, the activity of populists is directed not against democracy as a system, but against liberal (representative) democracy and certain elements of stable functioning of democracy (within the framework of structural and functional analysis), against a certain type of elites (within the framework of procedural analysis).

Supporting populists in society affects the basic values of democracy, because it means that a part of the public partially tolerates liberal democracy, which, according to R. Inglehart, imposes emancipatory values in politics on citizens. Therefore, some part of the society to a certain extent agrees with the populist orientation against liberal democracy, and this can naturally lead to supporting anti-democratic tendencies.
Under such circumstances, it should be emphasized that value changes are taking place in society in the direction of decreasing support for democracy.

The most popular content of information wars in Ukraine is the myth of the “split of the nation.”

In 2004, after the transformation of a conflict of personalities (V. Yushchenko and V. Yanukovych) into a conflict of essences (the western pro-European region against the eastern pro-Russian one), this conflict was given a timeless form due to the convenience of civilizational rhetoric (according to the theoretical scheme of the “conflict of civilizations” of S. Huntington). The myth of the split of the Ukrainian nation was created by Moscow political technologists after the presidential elections in Ukraine in 2004 and successfully introduced into public (everyday and even theoretical) consciousness.

Technologically, in the absence of opposition and countermyths on the part of Ukrainian society, the inability of domestic myth-making subjects to de-codify negative symbols, stereotypical constructions about the split of Ukraine acquired the nature of a norm and began to be perceived as obvious. Political and public leaders began to readily use the “divisive” mythologeme in public discussions, not realizing what negative consequences this information war could cause.

For example, are the differences between Bavaria and Saxony (which are quite significant) or the fact of differences between Germany and former GDR a real reason for a German statesman to talk about a “split of the German nation”? Of course not. But, as it turned out, it works in a different way in Ukraine, which borders on a semi-authoritarian state, which, moreover, wants to position itself as a strong “core” country of a separate civilizational space.

With regard to strategy, the mythologeme of “split” became very convenient and “profitable” in election campaigns, because it allowed mobilizing and activating significant groups of the electorate on a regional basis. In the presence of the “clarity” of the division of electoral groups according to their commitment in accordance with different values, it is easy for political technologists to work and construct winning artificial myths on this basis. With new elections, mythological constructions of new forms are created, but the previous ones do not disappear either, although the subjects whose needs they served periodically descend from the “political Olympus.” In our opinion, this is explained by special attachment and clear correlation of civilizational rhetoric to the archetypes of the collective unconscious of Ukrainians.

Another artificial myth analyzed by O. Shevchenko as part of the crisis mythology in Ukraine – also exported from Russia (and, by the way, very common in Russia) – is about a management crisis. Within the framework of the coordinates of such a myth perception, the chief ideologue of “United Russia” V. Surkov noted that Ukrainians are not a “state-creating people,” do not have “state existence skills”; they show a fundamental inability to state building and autonomous geopolitical choice, which condemns them to the status of an eternal province (Shevchenko, 2006).

An infamous Ukrainophobe, the owner of a “Golden Pen of Russia” M. Leontiev connects the crisis of public administration in Ukraine with the phenomenon of betrayal, which constantly “haunts” Ukrainian historical figures and modern public figures. For example, in his reflections on the moral degradation of Ukrainian politics, M. Leontiev notes that “Ukrainian politics is always betrayal; whoever betrayed first is the one tall in the saddle.”

In fact, certain signs of the political process in Ukraine – the indecisiveness, propensity for manipulation of the ruling elites, their complete dependence on elites not elected by the citizens (i.e. oligarchic groups) help the “exporters of myths from Russia to Ukraine” in the presentation of new arguments in favor of the myth of a governance crisis in Ukraine. The myth of a managerial crisis (more mythologized than real) continued for some time to psychologically instill apathy and negativism in the public consciousness due to the subsequent spread of the propaganda formula of “national salvation,” although sometimes, in fact, the nation needs to be saved, first of all, from the creators and spreaders of such a myth.

Another component of the crisis mythology is the myth of the inevitable disintegration of Ukraine, which is operated not only by Russian politicians. For example, O. Shevchenko cites Slovak journalist S. Helemendyk’s statement about the “civilizational incompatibility” of many “Ukraines” (which include Kyiv, the pro-Russian northeast, Crimea, agrarian regions of central and southern Ukraine, Galicia, and the former Austria-Hungary). Such a situation, according to S. Helemendyk, gives birth to a forecast of a “Yugoslav scenario,” a probable secession of the part of Ukraine which he calls “Russian” (Crimea, southeast). Perhaps, these are planted materials, but another fact is disturbing: the spread of such analytics outside the CIS.

The most dangerous is the situation of large-scale manipulation of “crisis mythology,” which leads to the perception by the public consciousness of the myth of the disintegration of Ukraine.
as a fatal inevitability. This is an ideal basis for political technologies that popularize a “crisis” image of the state.

In the context of the dominance of the irrational component of the political process, political myth, as a component of consciousness, greatly complicates objective understanding of political phenomena. The crisis mythology of Ukraine analyzed above contributes to the formation of a racist view of themselves among bearers of mass consciousness in Ukraine. In order to protect oneself from persistent destructive consequences of this kind of self-identification, one needs to be clearly aware of the fallacy of the twisted logic of the above-mentioned judgments; also, the introduction of a mechanism of responsibility for such manipulative behavior is necessary.

Let us now analyze other forms of influence of myths on the formation of the domestic political and cultural space.

At certain stages of the democratic transition in Ukraine, authoritarian tendencies in the political sphere of Ukrainian society were re-actualized and were quite strong. In a generalized form, these trends are represented in the form of the myth of a “strong state,” which played the role of an imperative for the political class that formed after the 2010 presidential elections in Ukraine.

A characteristic feature of the 2010 presidential election campaign was a public discussion of the usefulness of introducing a “strong hand” model of authoritarianism in Ukraine. Even candidates supporting democracy spoke about the expediency of building a “strong state.” On September 25, 2010, Yu. Tymoshenko stated on a TV broadcast of the “Ukraine” TV channel that the dictatorship was the only way out of the crisis situation. But she added that it should have been a dictatorship of law and order. One of her opponents, S. Tihipko, went to the elections with the slogan “a strong president is a strong country,” leading a party with the corresponding name – “Strong Ukraine.” S. Tihipko suggested adopting a new version of the Constitution, where the government “as a real and indisputable center of state and executive power” would be subordinate to the President. Another candidate of the 2010 presidential elections, A. Yatsenyuk, declared his intention to “restore order” in the event of his victory. Still another candidate, A. Hrytsenko, presented his draft “Constitution of Order,” based on the strengthening of presidential powers. He tried to convince: “In the current conditions, we need to talk about order and a strong hand not as a counterweight to democracy, but, rather, on the contrary – as responsibility, as a means to create a solid foundation for a real, not a facade, democracy.” So, for the first time in the history of Ukraine, the candidates promised not to deepen, but to curtail democracy.

Advertising of authoritarian attitudes by presidential candidates was correlated with the mood of the population – according to sociological company Research & Branding Group, 80% of respondents believed that the state needed a “strong hand,” and 36% noted that they were ready to accept the restriction of civil liberties. That is, authoritarian slogans in a certain respect are popular among the Ukrainian population even after almost 20 years of democratic transition.

Of course, this was facilitated by a combination of socio-economic and political crises, and this indicates the extreme importance of ensuring the basic indicators of social comfort and security for Ukrainians. So, economic circumstances influence the restructuring of the system of political myths.

The functional load of myths, which consists in hiding the ideological vacuum and lack of supporting the process of transition to a consolidated democracy, turns out to be universal at all stages of the country’s democratic transition. Because of the weakness of democratic and liberal traditions, the population has little faith in rational explanations of the complex dramatic changes they are experiencing.

In the modern world, unlike the archaic one, myths rarely appear spontaneously. Therefore, today, ruling elites, power structures and experts in the field of humanitarian sciences play a key role in the formation of political mythology.

In view of the need for revolutionary changes and patriotic upsurge, the elites actualize the following identification markers:

- of a memorial nature (from the past, from historical books, folklore, from ideas about the early days of prophets and the righteous);
- borrowed markers (borrowed from other nations in competition with them for symbolic heritage or recognizing identity vassalage);
- newly created (created anew, being taken from the current revolutionary experience, which is usually very difficult).

Patriotic protest actions in Ukraine in 2013–2014 were fueled by memorial markers of identity and retrospective understanding of the national; the following worked well:

- the Cossack myth (Cossack centuries);
- commemoration of heroes of the past (in particular, S. Bandera);
- destruction of monuments to V. Lenin;
- cultivation of the Ukrainian language, Ukrainian songs, embroidery, other cultural products.
According to O. Mykhailova, this shows that the national is closely tied to memorial markers (Malakhov, 1999).

Another part of the people of Ukraine borrowed not European, but rather Russian identification markers: paternalism and hostility towards other identities.

In order to determine the nature of modern myth in transitional societies, it is possible to use the concepts of “threshold,” “social structure” and “ideal community” proposed by American researcher of rituals V. Turner. According to the scientist, society includes two inseparable models of human relations:
- a public structure as a structured system of political, legal and economic statuses of people;
- an ideal community as an unstructured and relatively undifferentiated community of individuals that arises where there is a lack of public structure (Hal).

In the post-Soviet states, according to V. Turner, the opposition between an ideal community and a public structure becomes permanent. What is important is the extent to which the groups in these societies that have claimed the status of nation-builders have been integrated into the existing state.

Conclusions. In the conditions of the dissemination of technological myths, which play an increasingly destructive role with regard to the general state of public consciousness, further dividing the government and citizens, creating moods of despair and apathy in society that are unfavorable for strategic reforms, in our opinion, the need for a special legislative regulation of the problem of political populism before the elections turns out to be topical. Our vision of the mechanism for solving this problem lies in a comprehensive reform of the electoral (transition to a proportional system with open lists) and party (introduction of state financing of parties) systems, as well as the adoption of a special law on political responsibility in Ukraine.

Over the past six months, Ukraine has been forming its own identity at an accelerated pace – with a pantheon of martyrs, heroes and traitors, categories of “our people” and “enemies,” which are being very clearly crystallized in the conditions of military operations. The counter-mythical “Banderians,” “junta,” “fascists” are fictional, but they serve as reality for those who are ready to fight them. This is an example of a myth that cannot be rationalized. It is the emphasis on mythological principles of social consciousness that is the reason why consciousness is difficult to understand.

During independent Ukraine, the authorities were in no hurry to destroy political myths, because under the conditions of facade democracy, the demand for myths grew. The fatalistic perception of fate that has been characteristic of Ukraine from the mid-90s of the 20th century to the events of the Orange Revolution partly explains the slow process of the country’s modernization by the fact that citizens had minimal interest in politics.

REFERENCES: