PROBLEM ASPECTS OF STATE POLICY IN THE FIELD OF DEVELOPMENT OF INCLUSIVE PUBLIC SPACES AND ENSURING CIVIL SECURITY

Abstract

The article provides a comprehensive analysis of the current state of implementation of state policy in the field of inclusive public spaces and civil shelters under martial law, which allowed moving from a declarative understanding of security and inclusion to their assessment as an operationally viable system. It is proven that the network of inclusive public spaces and civil protection structures functions as a single spatial and managerial circuit, in which physical infrastructure, access modes, traffic routes, digital registers, financing and responsibility of balance holders must work synchronously. A separate assessment of public spaces without a simultaneous assessment of the accessibility of shelters and routes to them forms a “half-life” picture and does not allow for an adequate measurement of the real level of civil security of the population during airstrikes. It has been established that the key problem of the current situation is the gap between the formal availability of shelters and the actual possibility of accessing them at a critical moment. This gap is manifested in closed entrances, unclear access modes, the absence of responsible persons, barriers on routes, a lack of navigation, and the unsuitability of some shelters for long-term stay. Thus, inclusiveness in the field of civil security should be considered not as an architectural characteristic of the object, but as a property of the management system to ensure the passage of the “signal – route – access – shelter – stay – exit” chain for different population groups. A generalization of the cases of Kyiv and communities of different types confirmed that the most vulnerable are the organizational and operational links of politics. It is at the level of access regimes, management of people flows, scenario readiness of facilities and personnel behavior that situations of selective exclusion, conflicts and loss of time arise, which directly increase the risk of injury or death. The identified cases of “refusing” people to shelters demonstrate the phenomenon of street implementation of policy, when real access depends on the situational decisions of executors on the ground in the absence of clear procedures, training and accountability. The digitalization of shelter accounting and the introduction of interactive maps have significantly reduced the information deficit, but do not guarantee safety in themselves. Outdated or incomplete data, the lack of accessibility and readiness attributes, the gap between inspection results and updating of registers create the risk of “data as scenery”. In war conditions, this turns into a management risk, since digital visualization creates an expectation of safety that is not always confirmed on the ground.