ELECTIONS DO NOT NECESSARILY MEAN DEMOCRACY: SOME EXAMPLES FROM AFRICA
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.32689/2617-9660-2020-1(7)-11-45Keywords:
elections, home-driven democracy support, civil society, efficient administration.Abstract
This paper investigates democratic conditionality and (mostly Western) Election Observers Missions (EOMs) in Africa. It will look at motives and aims of foreign election support in order to critically assess whether the aims have been achieved. As a starting point, there is a statement: Westerners have often brought to Africa some constitutional elements which were entrenched in Europe but irrelevant to the local context. This misunderstanding has driven to a misunderstanding of premises (democracy = elections) and a misuse of means like democratic conditionality and EOMs. In fact, democracy does not mean primarily elections, but peaceful alternation of power. Elections have never prevented tyrants to run illiberal democracies. The hypothesis of the paper is that democratic conditionality and EOMs are usually designed and implemented in order to respond to democratic requirements in the country imposing the conditions and has little to do with the country subjected to conditionalities. More than to press and cajole non-democratic regimes towards more political openness and participation, Western diplomacy is deployed because ministers and diplomats have to be seen to be “doing something for democracy abroad” to assuage public opinion back home. The presumption to be explored is therefore whether international actors fidget with carrots and sticks in Africa as a sop to the European parliament and other Western audiences. If this were the case, anything that looked from far like an election would be sufficient for rewards and benefits and only frank and widely publicised authoritarian turns would require their temporary interruption. The paper claims that such home-driven democracy support is likely to negatively affect democracy abroad. It argues that Western democracy diplomacy supports a very narrow understanding of democracy (in this case in Africa, but it can be the case elsewhere), gives right to actors equating democracy with regular elections and incentivises rulers to organise regular elections that only look like elections. By forcing African states to navigate between the risk of being sanctioned and the chance of being gratified democratic conditionality creates the risk that more attention is given to satisfying Western observers than to deepen democracy by creating an environment making it work. In a more optimistic way, the paper concludes with suggesting other, more modest, but presumably more efficient means to support democracy in Africa: supporting civil society and efficient administration.
References
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We shall not insist however on another element of democracy, which is nevertheless extremely interesting, namely the difference between representative and direct democracy. Some authors like Guy Hermet do not consider that (representative) democracy is a panacea. On the contrary, the idea to consider representative democracy as the golden rule of good governance is just a mean to avoid any direct exercise of power by the people. At a time where in France the “yellow slickers” still demand a referendum like in Switzerland, the fact that democracy is limited to elections every four or five years can explain many problems viewed in the organization of so seldom elections; Guy Hermet, Le Passage à la démocratie, p. 16. In the same sense, Lokengo Antshuka Ngonga warns against the hasty and precipitous introduction of the majoritarian system, because it exacerbates oppositions instead of smoothing them; Consensus politique et gestion démocratique du pouvoir en Afrique, p. 217. Both reflections could be the topic of further contribution.
Lokengo Antshuka Ngonga, Consensus politique et gestion démocratique du pouvoir en Afrique, p. 43 ; all English quotations of French books are “home-made” translations.
There are examples of recent peaceful transfers of power […] in Ghana, Nigeria, and Liberia. But “these hopeful examples are however largely the exception to the rule”; James Thuo Gathii, Term Limits and Three types of Constitutional Crisis in Sub- Saharan Africa, p. 337.
This example has been told to the writer by Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta when he was Prime-Minister of Mali in 1999, during a “National Conference” in Bamako.
Guy Hermet, Le Passage à la démocratie.
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Georges Glotz, La Cité grecque, Albin Michel, Paris 1953, 241–251 ; Plato, OEuvres complètes, vol. 1, “Ménèxène”, 1950, p. 479 ; both quoted by Lokengo Antshuka Ngonga, Consensus politique et gestion démocratique du pouvoir en Afrique, p. 28.
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“Many donor nations claim to be doing this [cutting aid resources to autocrats], but they could still reduce aid programs in nondemocratic countries”; David F. Gordon, “On promoting Democracy in Africa”, in Marina Ottaway (ed.), Democracy in Africa: the Hard Road Ahead, p. 163.
Born Joseph-Désiré Mobutu, selfproclaimed Marshall Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu wa Za Banga represents (perhaps) the epitome of the African dictator. See a long description of “Marshall Madness” in David van Reybrouck, Congo: the epic history of a people, Ch. 10 (363–394), who makes a comparison between Mobutu in Zaire and Ceauşescu in Romania.
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Paul D. Williams, op. cit., p. 17.
Paul D. Williams, op. cit., p. 276.
See Mamoudou Gazibo, Les paradoxes de la démocratisation en Afrique : analyse institutionnelle et stratégique, ch. 7, RN 24–39.
The word is a creation of Marina Ottaway, Democracy Challenged. The rise of Semi-authoritarianism.
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As it was the case in Harare, were riots took place after the result of legislative elections giving the majority to the ruling party Zanu-PF; see for instance: (consulted January 26th, 2020).
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Ismaïlia Mador Fall, “Les Constitutions africaines et les transitions démocratiques”, devotes a chapter to what he calls : “The persistence of the phenomenon of the opportunist revisionism of the presidential condition” (transl.); in Augustin Loada and Jonathan Wheatley, Transitions démocratiques en Afrique de l’Ouest : processus constitutionnels, société civile et institutions démocratiques, p. 146ss.
This French portmanteau has been created in a book of Max Liniger-Goumaz, La démocrature, dictature camouflée, démocratie truquée (L’Harmattan, Paris 1992).
David Owen, The Hubris Syndrome, Methuen, revised ed. 2012; Prologue: The intoxication of power; see also Tzvetan Todorov, The inner enemies of democracy, Chapter 1, Democracy threatened by its own hubris.
See Audrey Chabal, Syndrome d’Hubris : quand le pouvoir produit des arrogants et narcissiques. (Hubris syndrome: when power produces arrogant and narcissistic people; transl).
D.E. Emanuel, from the Marien Mgouabi University in Brazzavile, has written (in French) an extensive article called “The emergence of the principle of the political conditionality in international public law” (transl.).
<http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/ eng/decisions/1923.08.17_wimbledon.htm> (consulted January 30th, 2020).
< h t t p : / / c t r c . s i c e . o a s . o r g / Tr a d e / CA R I F O R U M - E C E PA / Co t o n o u _ A g r e e m e n t _ & _ L o m e 4 _ l o m e 4 _ e . p d f > (consulted January 30th, 2020).
Whose official title is : Partnership Agreement 2000/483/EC between the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the EU, of the other part; see also <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ TXT/?uri=celex:22000A1215(01)> (consulted January 30th, 2020).
According to Pascal Mukonde Musulay, in fact and in reality, all these pressures for “democracy” emanate mainly from World Bank and IMF; but the final goal is more free market than democratic governance; op. cit., p. 66ss.
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“EU enlargement continues to be the clearest case of positive democratic conditionality, but it is not quite the cut and dried example it is assumed to be. Extensive work on the conditionality deployed by the EU in the context of Eastern enlargement has concluded that incentives played a secondary role and were linked mostly to second phase governance, not the big, overarching choices in favor of democracy.” Richard Youngs, in: Rootledge Handbook of Democratization, p. p. 287 (293).
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Cf. Mamoudou Gazibo, Les paradoxes de la démocratisation en Afrique : analyse institutionnelle et stratégique, p. 163.
This recognition of the prominent democratic role of Southern Africa is also made by Eboe Hutchful, “Militarism and Problems of Democratic Transitions”, in Marina Ottaway (ed.), Democracy in Africa: the Hard Road Ahead, p. 43.
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The ranking for Africa is presented in the Annex.
<https://freedomhouse.org/regions/ sub-saharan-africa> (consulted January 30th, 2020); it is also interesting to note that many elements taken into account for this benchmarking do not include elections.
La Françafrique, le plus long scandale de la République (Stock, Paris 1998); but de facto this neologism was created in the 1950s by Félix Houphouët-Boigny.
Whereas the homophony: Françafrique = France à fric [France with cash, as in French “fric” means “money”]).
All these problems have been thoroughly identified by Pascal Mukonde Musulay, Démocratie électorale en Afrique subsaharienne – Entre droit, pouvoir et argent, pp. 66 – 78.
Among many others, The Guardian : <https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2017/sep/20/kenyan-election-rerunnot- transparent-supreme-court> (consulted January 30th, 2020).
Anne van Aaken, Independent electoral management bodies and international election observer missions: any impact on the observed level of democracy? A conceptual framework.
Pippa Norris and Alessandro Nai, Election Watchdogs.
Apart of Joseph Kabila for the 2018 elections which seem to be flawed from the beginning.
See also Anne van Aaken hypothesis 5a and 5b: Countries with a weak technical system of election administration and countries receiving a high level of development aid (in relation to GDP) will have fairer elections if there are election observers (op. cit.).
Le Temps, January 31st, 2017 : < h t t p s : / / w w w . l e t e m p s . c h / s u i s s e / observateurs-federaux-surveiller-votemoutier> (consulted January 30th, 2020).
Le Temps, November 5th, 2018, <https://www.letemps.ch/suisse/moutierp r e f e t e - i n v a l i d e - u n - v o t e - e n t a c h e - dirregularites> (consulted January 30th, 2020).
See <https://www.jura.ch/fr/ A u t o r i t e s / M o u t i e r / Vo t a t i o n - d u - 1 8 - juin-2017.html> (consulted January 30th, 2020).
It was the same in the Democratic Republic of Congp in December 2018 : The conditions for the smooth running of the presidential were not fulfilled. The National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI) still maintained the vote on Friday December 28th. But it decided to postpone the elections in March in the districts of Beni and Butembo, in the North-Kivu, and Yumbi, in the province of Maï-Ndombe, in the south-west of the country. Some constitutional experts are already tearing their hair out. How can CENI organize such a crucial presidential election by depriving 1.2 million Congolese of the right to vote? When Beni, Butembo and Yumbi can vote, the games will already be played. See: <https://www.letemps.ch/monde/rd-congoelections- peur> (consulted January 30th, 2020).
Among hundreds of articles, see Le Temps – ATS, published August 2nd, 2018 : <https://www.letemps.ch/monde/ heurts-meurtriers-apres-lannonce-resultatselections- zimbabwe> (consulted January 30th, 2020). Seee also “Élections au Zimbabwe – l’Union européenne tance le processus électoral » (Elections in Zimbabwe – the European Union scolds the electoral process) : <http://fr.africanews. com/2018/08/01/elections-au-zimbabwel- union-europeenne-tance-le-processuselectoral//> (consulted January 30th, 2020).
James Thuo Gathii, Term Limits and Three types of Constitutional Crisis in Sub- Saharan Africa, p. 336s.
As a recent and quite shocking example, consider the good relations between USA and Saudi Arabia despite the assassination of journalist Jamal Kashoggi.
Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van de Walle, Democratic experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective, p. 117; see 3.3.
Karl Loewenstein, “Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights I” (American Political Science Review 1937, 417); quoted by Jan-Werner Müller, “Militant democracy”, in: Michel Rosenfeld, The Oxford handbook of comparative constitutional law, Oxford Univ. Press 2012, p. 1253 (1256).
Oumar Ndongo, The Role of West African Civil Society in Peace-building, p. 173, 175.
Emmanuel Ghiyma-Boadi, The Challenges Ahead, p. 90.
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Oumar Ndongo, The Role of West African Civil Society in Peace-building, p. 172. See also the conclusion drawn by Paul D. Williams, War & Conflict in Africa, p. 275–278.
Jeffrey Haynes, “Introduction: twenty five years of democratization – the third and fourth waves of democracy in perspective”, in: Jeffrey Haynes, Rootledge Handbook of Democratization, p. 1–9.
“Civil society is mainly ‘in construction’”, Augustin Loada and Jonathan Wheatley, Transitions démocratiques en Afrique de l’Ouest : processus constitutionnels, société civile et institutions démocratiques, p. 29.
Lokengo Antshuka Ngonga, Consensus politique et gestion démocratique du pouvoir en Afrique, p. 210 : The existence of many NGOs testifies to the vitality of democracy.
Marina Ottaway, “Civil Society”, in Peter J. Burnell and Vicky Randall, Politics in
Marina Ottaway, op. cit., p. 166 (180- 182); the author makes the comparison with the overwhelming efficiency of Islamic civil society. The importance of civil society was especially true for Nigeria: “Despite long periods of oppressive rule, civil society groups have remained active and strong”; Stephen Wright, “Nigeria : Building Political Stability with Democracy”, in Peter J. Burnell and Vicky Randall, Politics in the developing world, p. 463 (469).
Baohui Zhang, Corporatism, Totalitarianism, and Transitions to Democracy, p. 133; for him, Poland with Solidarity is the only posttotalitarian state that had some form of institutionalized societal organizations.
Anne van Aaken, Independent electoral management bodies and international election observer missions: any impact on the observed level of democracy? A conceptual framework.
Paul D. Williams, War & Conflict in Africa, p. 189.
Just a quotation about Nigeria among so many others touching almost all Africa: “Elections have always been manipulated by incumbents, and the 2003 elections were no exception”; Stephen Wright, “Nigeria : Building Political Stability with Democracy”, in Peter J. Burnell and Vicky Randall, Politics in the developing world, p. 463 (468).
Abdulmumin Sa’ad, “The Importance of Restorative Justice in Peacebuilding”, in: Jibrin Ibrahim and Oumar Ndongo, Resolving West African Conflicts – Early Warning Early Response, p. 185 (193).
Paul Valéry translated by Marthiel and Jackson Mathews, Collected works of Paul Valéry, vol. 15, Moi, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1975, p. 291.
<https://freedomhouse.org/regions/ sub-saharan-africa> (consulted January 30th, 2020); between 2009 and 2018, Mali fell into the partially free countries. Therefore in 2018 among Sub-Saharan countries there are 9 «free» against 40 «partly free» or «not free».
