INSTRUMENTAL COMPONENTS OF THE POLITICAL POTENTIAL OF NUCLEAR ROCKET PROGRAMS
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.32689/2523-4625-2022-5(65)-4Keywords:
political strategy, international security, nuclear missile programs, containment policy, military aggression.Abstract
The article examines the features of the political potential of nuclear missile programs in the context of its functional components that affect the system of international security relations. The context of modern security threats led to the appeal to scientific research in this area of understanding the components of nuclear missile programs in the studies of Ukrainian and foreign scientists, in particular D. Johnson, V. Zakharov, A. Krasnov, A. Korbut and many others. At the same time, global geopolitical tectonic shifts caused by a full-scale Russian military invasion of Ukraine made it necessary to study this issue already in the new international security environment. The scientific analysis of the nuclear missile programs of the leading countries of the world, in particular, their components in terms of political potential, has been updated in the context of the search for patterns and understanding of their political impact on international security processes in modern geopolitical realities. The study of nuclear missile programs made it possible to single out three political instruments: 1) pressure; 2) protection; 3) containment. It is proved that the first tool is used by the Russian Federation for the purpose of political influence on leading countries and international security organizations. A similar tool is used by other countries that have a nuclear missile potential and are not among the leading countries in the world. It has been proven that such countries do not have mechanisms for guaranteeing and predicting in the process of security activity, which led to the formation by other leading countries of protection and deterrence tools, which are reflected in the provisions of their nuclear missile programs. The results of the study became possible through the use of research methods, in particular system-structural analysis, systematization, generalization, processing of analytical sources and other methods. The overall result of the study was an assessment of the effectiveness of the political strategy in nuclear missile programs, taking into account the conditions of uncertainty.
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