THE IMPACT OF GLOBAL ECONOMY ON NATIONAL POLITICS: PARAMETERS OF INTERACTION BETWEEN THE STATE AND INTERNATIONAL MARKET FORCES
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.32689/2523-4625-2025-1(77)-26Keywords:
state, globalization, political autonomy, financial markets, transnational corporations, international trade, neorealismAbstract
The article analyzes the influence of international economic factors on national political processes in the context of intensifying globalization, financial liberalization, and economic transnationalization. The significance of theresearch topic lies in the growing necessity for states to maintain a balance between openness and the imperative to preserve autonomy and independence in domestic policy decisions, particularly during the periods of global crises and digital transformation. The objective of this study is to methodically examine the mechanisms through whichfinancial markets, foreign trade, transnational corporations, and foreign investments influence national policy.Furthermore, the study delineates opportunities for states to maintain adaptability. The methodological foundation of this study is predicated on an interdisciplinary approach, comparative analysis, and political-economic review of theoretical concepts and empirical research. The analysis elucidates the primary channels through which globalcapital exerts its influence on state fiscal and monetary policy, the specific interactions between transnationalstructures and states, and the characteristics of national response models. The neorealist concept of internationaltrade structure and the reconsideration of state autonomy in the 21st century is given particular attention. The findings of the research indicate that states characterized by the presence of developed institutions, effectivecoordination mechanisms, and a strong internal legitimacy are capable of preserving a degree of autonomy in their policy decisions in the face of constraints imposed by global markets. Instead of a complete loss of autonomy, atransformation from independence to flexible adaptability is observed. The study’s conclusions propose a vision of «smart openness» as a strategic balance between global integration and the political capacity of states.
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