THE ROLE OF THE COSSACK INTELLIGENCE IN ORGANIZING SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN THE REAR OF THE INVADERS DURING THE NATIONAL LIBERATION WAR (1648–1657)

Abstract

The article provides a comprehensive analysis of the intelligence and sabotage activities organized by Bohdan Khmelnytsky at the initial stage of the National Liberation War of the mid-seventeenth century. The author examines how, as a result of the formation of the Ukrainian Hetmanate, it immediately found itself in the role of a buffer zone between influential neighbors who sought to strengthen their positions in the region. It is shown that, realizing the vulnerability of the new state, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, from the very beginning of his reign, attached great importance to intelligence issues, actively establishing a system of information gathering and subversive activities.The emphasis is placed on the versatility of Cossack intelligence, which was not limited to espionage, but included the organization of uprisings, recruitment of enemy commanders, and sabotage in the enemy's deep rear. It is shown that, thanks to agents, the hetman could quickly respond to changes in the military and political situation: seize the initiative, divert enemy forces to peripheral theaters of war, and form a strong army from different social groups. The study provides examples of Cossacks conducting large-scale actions even outside their own territories, in particular in Belarus and the vicinity of Warsaw, which significantly weakened the defense capabilities of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. At the same time, a number of problems in the coordination of actions were identified: the lack of a single center for managing the intelligence network caused a fragmentation of efforts, and shortcomings in assessing enemy plans sometimes led to military defeats, as in the case of the Battle of Berestechko.The article also emphasizes the role of intelligence in establishing allied relations with the Crimean Khanate and luring registered Cossacks and elders, which proved to be one of the key factors in the first successes of the Cossack state.The author concludes that the role of intelligence and sabotage activities in the formation of the Hetmanate was extremely important and emphasizes that Khmelnytsky's experience can serve as a historical precedent important for understanding modern security challenges. In particular, the study of Polish sources and the latest scientific works allows us to clarify a number of facts, expand the understanding of the scale and effectiveness of Cossack intelligence, and rethink its importance for strengthening state sovereignty in difficult geopolitical conditions.